KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Edited by Kadir Ayhan

Foreword by Nancy Snow



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Korea's Public Diplomacy

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Korea's Public Diplomacy

Edited by Kadir Ayhan

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CONTENTS

PART II: KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN OTHER COUNTRIES

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FOREWORD

Nancy Snow
Pax Mundi Professor of Public Diplomacy,
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SHARING STORIES AND BUILDING PEACE: THE SOUL OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The night before the June 2016 graduate student conference on Korea's public diplomacy, I was given a most precious gift: a box made of Najeon, black laquer wood with mother of pearl inlay. You want to know what is public diplomacy? This gift is public diplomacy. The gift welcomed me officially to Korea. And public diplomacy is all about having a welcoming heart that seeks understanding and to be understood.

Diplomacy refers to the art or practice of conducting international relations, as in negotiating alliances, treaties and agreements. We think of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs related to it. The second definition of diplomacy is "tact and skill in dealing with people." It is this second definition where I believe the soul of good public diplomacy lies.

So, do you want to just study public diplomacy or also practice being a public diplomat? I suggest doing both.

From 1992-1994, I worked at the United States Information Agency and U.S. State Department as a Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO), and Academic Exchange Specialist in the Fulbright Office of the Academic Exchanges Division of the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs. I also worked at the State Department as the UNHCR liaison to Capitol Hill. I became a speech writer on international exchange issues. I wrote feature articles and press releases which were designed to raise the visibility of USIA programs. I did this because no one else in our Agency was doing this. I asked if I

could write stories. I wanted practice at storytelling.

In order to tell a good story, you need to interview people and write profiles that will inspire others. To conduct better public diplomacy, you need to get away from the office, away from the ministry and talk to people from all walks of life.

Why do I say that you need to get away from the corridors of power and go meet the everyday people? Because we live in an age of democratization of international relations. Everyone feels both connected and disconnected to public policy. Citizens have a love/hate relationship with their representatives, public servants, government officials. I know this. I was once a government official. In order to do your job better, you must have an ability to listen on the ground to what people are saying, what they think. Listen to the people. And from that active listening, you will be better able to craft policy-related stories that are more accessible to the public and have the power to build mutual understanding.

In whatever program you have in public diplomacy, you should present it as if you are trying to understand the experience of the person whose support you are seeking. Too often I see public diplomacy programs that are run from the perspectives of the organizers alone. They may run smoothly, but there isn't enough sensitivity to the needs and the wants of the program participants. Plan your programs according to the other's perspectives and you will be surprised at how much more positive reception you receive. We know that most persuasion and influence is self-persuasion, so nothing we do to enforce a point of view will work well if people don't feel respected and feel as if their perspectives are being accounted for.

In the pages that follow, it is clear that Korea's public diplomacy is building a bridge of mutual understanding across East Asia. Geographically, Korea is a bridge between two superpower economies. There is an unprecedented number of persons crossing borders in this area of the world that too often is cast off as just a troubled region with a lot of tension. Ultimately all people want is to live in peace. We want to trade in goods and services, we want to travel to see new places, make new friends, see family and old friends. That's the East Asia I know. I know the darker side too, but the good stories of this part of the world far outweigh the bad. That's where public diplomats come in.

Part of what we do as public diplomats is to put in place the foundations of peace building, which, in turns, relates to building the security of a nation. We help to build peace by showing faith in the power of publics to both understand and act on the stories we share. This is why I feel so strongly that public diplomacy needs to be both a scholarly discipline with books and journal articles, but just as important, it needs to be a big tent for non-scholars to understand their roles in the public diplomacy process.

Do not be discouraged if you do not make peace or increase mutual understanding overnight. It's a lifelong pursuit, with intervals of the wind at your back and strong headwinds. But I guarantee you that if you focus on people and the process of increasing communication, understanding and dialogue between different peoples with different beliefs, your sense of purpose in life will be fun, rewarding, and educational.

Nancy Snow

Kyoto, 28 November 2016

INTRODUCTION

Kadir Ayhan

The term public diplomacy was coined by Edmund A. Gullion, the Dean of Fletcher School, in the mid-1960s. Prior to that, the closest term that was used was propaganda. Indeed, in 1967 Gullion said that he "would have liked to call it (public diplomacy) 'propaganda'" since "it seemed the nearest thing in the pure interpretation of the word to what they are doing, but 'propaganda' has always had a pejorative connotation…" (Arndt, 2005, p. 480).

Public diplomacy has been increasingly studied, particularly since the end of the Cold War, probably as it is better distinguished from its predecessor 'propaganda.' The shock of September 11 brought public diplomacy to the attention of almost every country regardless of its size or development status (Melissen, 2005, p. 8).

Most literature on public diplomacy is still predominantly American. As a very recent field of study, public diplomacy still lacks literature on non-American experiences. Among many other prominent scholars, Gilboa (2008, p. 57) calls for more research on public diplomacy of countries other than the United States.

Korea is one of the latecomers in public diplomacy. The first Ambassador for Public Diplomacy of Korea, Ma Young-Sam et al (Ma, Song, & Moore, 2012, p. 1), states in his article that the concept of public diplomacy "was officially launched in 2010" in Korea. As is the case of the United States and other countries, there have been similar but different concepts that were used in Korea, such as propaganda, nation-branding and cultural diplomacy.

As a new concept in the country, there has not been much literature on Korea's public diplomacy neither in Korean nor in English until very recently. Some recent developments triggered more interest in the study of

public diplomacy in Korea. Firstly, and most importantly, public diplomacy has become more popular both in theory and in practice all over the world. Due to globalization, democratization and technological advancements particularly in the communications field, public diplomacy has become a must-have in the foreign policy toolbox of every country. As the studies on American public diplomacy have become more saturated, there has been more interest and curiosity for non-American and particularly non-Western public diplomacy. Secondly, Korea "officially launched" its public diplomacy policies in 2010, and has placed more emphasis thereon particularly since 2013. The Korea Foundation has added the new focus of supporting "official diplomacy by facilitating public diplomacy" on its own and in collaboration with Korean "non-governmental diplomacy organizations" (Korea Foundation, 2015). Since then, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy has become one of the pioneers of Korea's public diplomacy efforts to facilitate academic debate and research and provide public diplomacy activities and policies with more academic background. Following the trend, in February 2014, Ewha Womans University Institute for International Trade and Cooperation opened the country's first Public Diplomacy Center, also to become the Institute's largest center. While there was no course at any university with public diplomacy in its title, public diplomacy courses are now offered at couple of universities. These were not enough. Last, but not the least, in order to achieve more and to make up for being a latecomer, Korea enacted the new Public Diplomacy Act in February 2016 to be effective from August 2016. The Act is analyzed in the next section of this chapter in more detail.

These developments helped to stimulate more interest in Korea's public diplomacy among scholars, diplomats, media and NGO activists. However, compared to its counterparts, academia in Korea still lacks public diplomacy research, literature, academic courses and grants. The participants of the recent special symposium on public diplomacy on the occasion of introducing the new Public Diplomacy Act, many of whom were Korea's public diplomats and policymakers, "drew a common understanding that infrastructure for public diplomacy should be expanded to the level of other member states of the [OECD]" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

This book comes out against this backdrop as a modest attempt to

contribute to English literature on Korean public diplomacy. More importantly, all the articles in this book were written by graduate students who are still in the very early stages of making their career. For some of them, their articles, written for the purposes of this book, led them to study Korean public diplomacy in more depth for their dissertations. Another important aspect of this book is that the authors are from eight different countries, bringing diverse approaches to Korea's public diplomacy. We hope that, their arguments will also trigger more interest in Korea's public diplomacy among the readers, leading to more debate and more literature on the topic which is very far from being saturated.

The initial idea behind having this book was the lack of literature on Korea's public diplomacy activities, particularly written in English. What made this book possible, though, was the funding provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a member of the Korean Public Diplomacy Scholars Group, I proposed having a graduate students' conference on Korea's public diplomacy at Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies where I teach public diplomacy. The Ministry's Culture and Arts Division (changed to Multilateral Cultural Affairs and Tourism Division) agreed to have the conference using the public diplomacy budget. Hangang Network for Academic and Cultural Exchanges, a Korean NGO registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was contracted to organize the conference from the promotion of call for papers to the publication of this book. The conference was at the same time an article contest awarding prizes to the graduate students. This book is an outcome of the conference and the article contest.

KOREA'S NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACT

Korea has what is often referred to as '*bballi bballi'* culture. This is one of the first Korean phrases foreigners get to learn when they come to Korea. It literally means 'quickly' or 'to hurry.' The history of Korea's public diplomacy policies also reflects this *bballi bballi* culture. Korea was very late to "officially launch" its public diplomacy policies in 2010; but the rapid evolution of the policies to catch up with the latest trends in the field

has been noteworthy. The year 2016 is an important year for Korea's public diplomacy since it is the year Korea's Public Diplomacy was enacted (3 February 2016) and passed into law (4 August 2016). This book on Korea's public diplomacy is especially important as it is being published right after the enactment of the Public Diplomacy Act.

The Public Diplomacy Act aims to strengthen Korea's public diplomacy policies with a more systematic approach to public diplomacy. One of the most important developments regarding the introduction of this Act is that it brings a new Public Diplomacy Committee which is appointed by the President and led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Committee is to include various related government officials from different ministries and departments as well as those whom the President deems fit to add value to the Committee. The main reason for having this Committee is to increase efficiency by avoiding redundancies in the programs and activities of various ministries and departments and by coordinating their efforts. Creation of this Committee responds to calls from various scholars for a coordination center of Korea's public diplomacy efforts (Kim, 2012, p. 539; Park, 2010, p. 3). Indeed, there was the Presidential Council on Nation Branding from 2009 to 2013 during President Lee Myung-Bak's Administration. However, the focus of this Council was limited to nation-branding and was far from coordinating public diplomacy efforts at other divisions.

Per the official reasoning of enactment attached to the Act, it was found that due to the absence of a consistent strategy until now, there was uncertainty regarding government-wide and long-term planning and objectives of public diplomacy ("Gonggong Waegyo Beob," 2016). The official explanation also cites the enormous public diplomacy budgets of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Japan. Due to all these reasons, the Act calls for a government-wide cooperation system and institutionalization of public diplomacy's organizational operating system to strengthen the connection between public diplomacy activities and policies ("Gonggong Waegyo Beob," 2016). Most importantly, to be able to effectively conduct public diplomacy activities, the Act aims to mediate the policies of and facilitate cooperation between different departments and to empower the public diplomacy capabilities of local governments and the

private sector by preparing the grounds for (financial) support ("Gonggong Waegyo Beob," 2016).

While it is better understood and widely accepted in public diplomacy policy circles in Korea that public diplomacy policies must go beyond a short-sighted understanding of it as nation-branding and an ambiguous relation with soft power, the purpose of this new Act is to improve Korea's national image and status in the international society ("Gonggong Waegyo Beob," 2016). The Act defines public diplomacy as the state's direct, or in cooperation with local governments and the private sector, diplomatic activities using various soft power (assets) such as culture, intellect, and policies to improve understanding of and trust towards Korea by foreigners ("Gonggong Waegyo Beob," 2016).

Article 1 and Article 2 of the Act give an oversimplified, and rather outdated, understanding of public diplomacy. Nevertheless, Article 3 explains "the basic principles of public diplomacy" ("Gonggong Waegyo Beob," 2016) more in line with the more recent understanding of 'new public diplomacy':

1) Public diplomacy should harmoniously reflect the universal values of humanity and Korea's inherent characteristics.
2) Public diplomacy policy must emphasize sustainable friendship and cooperation with the international society.
3) Public diplomacy activities should not lean too much towards specific regions or countries.

Moreover, particularly Articles 8, 9, and 11 of the Act acknowledge the importance of public-private partnership for public diplomacy initiatives. Prior to the enactment of the Public Diplomacy Act, there were a couple of channels for individuals and NGOs to obtain support for their activities in the realm of public diplomacy, or "private diplomacy" (민간외교)[1] as it is

1 I have my reservations about the strict distinction of "public diplomacy" (공공외교) as the realm of state-initiated public diplomacy and referring to all non-state public diplomacy as "private diplomacy" (민간외교). While it is beyond the scope of this introductory chapter to explain my reservations, I believe that the choice of the word gonggong (공공) for public is not a very good one. This is because, public refers to the publics who are addressed in public diplomacy, while gonggong implies the subject (or host) of the initiative.

often referred to in Korea. The Ministry had programs such as Public Diplomacy Scholars Group (which made this conference possible), All Citizens are Public Diplomats (which is analyzed by Cho Junghyun in this book), and Senior Public Diplomacy Group. Furthermore, the Korea Foundation has had a framework to support "Diplomatic NGOs" (Korea Foundation, 2015b, 2015c) since 2007, but more so since 2013 (Korea Foundation, 2015a). It is expected that with the enactment of this Act, there will be great increase in the range and size of the support for and cooperation with individuals and non-state actors.

Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed its first Public Diplomacy Ambassador, Ambassador Ma Young-Sam, in 2011 (one year after official launching of Korea's public diplomacy policy). However, there were practical and bureaucratic obstacles in putting this new position into effective use. The boundaries of the Ambassador's new post, particularly its network position vis-à-vis all other public diplomacy-related positions within the Ministry, were not clear-cut. Ambassador Ma assumed this new post for two and a half years together with his other position as the Ambassador for Performance Evaluation, and later was assigned as Korea's Ambassador to Denmark in 2014.[2] Ambassador Choi Sung-ju was assigned as the second Ambassador for Public Diplomacy 19 months after Ambassador Ma left the position. Ambassador Choi held this office for only five months, again, together with his other position as the Ambassador for Performance Evaluation.

It was right after the enactment of the Public Diplomacy Act that Korea assigned the third, but this time more empowered, Public Diplomacy Ambassador, Cho Hyun-Dong, in March 2016. From the time this position was established to the appointment of Ambassador Cho, there were two fundamentals alterations that empowered the position of Public Diplomacy Ambassador: 1) the Public Diplomacy Act was enacted and 2) Ministry of Foreign Affairs was restructured. Currently, the Public Diplomacy Ambassador is reporting directly to the Minister and oversees the activities

2 Experience in Public Diplomacy Ambassadorship proved helpful for Ambassador Ma and in turn Korea's Embassy in Denmark. Anyone interested in Korea's public diplomacy must have realized that in the last couple of years, Denmark has been one of the top countries where Korean public diplomacy activities have been most vivid.

of five different divisions related to public diplomacy. It is likely that the Public Diplomacy Ambassador will act as de-facto Secretary General of the above-mentioned new Public Diplomacy Committee, which is going to be led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Having the Public Diplomacy Ambassador more empowered and reporting to the Minister directly is "excellent" news for Korea's public diplomacy. Grunig et al.'s (Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002) study, which led to the formulation of the widely accepted excellence theory of public relations, suggests that excellent public relations function requires empowerment of the Public Relations Department. One of the characteristics of "empowerment of the public relations function subsumes" that the top public relations person, in this case the Public Diplomacy Ambassador, "has a direct reporting relationship to the senior managers" with the greatest power in the organization, in this case the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Grunig et al., 2002). It is too early to analyze the impact of this change, but based on prior public relations studies, including Grunig et al., it is safe to assume that Ambassador Cho will have more human and financial resources at his disposal with the recent changes.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The book is consists of two parts. The first part contains articles on Korea's public diplomacy policies. In the second part, the authors analyze Korea's public diplomacy vis-à-vis certain countries or regions.

The first article by Jeffrey Ordaniel analyzes Korea's public diplomacy regarding Dokdo between the years 2008 and 2015. Ordaniel divides Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy into three parts: 1) citizen-driven public diplomacy (i.e. non-official); 2) proxy-public diplomacy (i.e. the activities of NGOs with public funding); and 3) official public diplomacy. He argues that the interplay of ideational factors, such as the roles and discourses of Japan in Korean polity, and observable behavioral factors, such as Japan's policies and occasional references to the disputed land feature, determines Seoul's passionate and vigorous Dokdo-related public diplomacy. Ordaniel posits that while Korea's efforts may have practical

effects in reinforcing the favorable status quo, they may also be counterproductive for Seoul as the public diplomacy activities may have resulted in highlighting the existence of the dispute between the two countries before a global audience, and may support Japan's position of bringing the issue to rest via an international court ruling.

The second article by Felicia Istad analyzes Korea's public diplomacy, particularly cultural diplomacy, activities. Istad argues that Korean public diplomacy lacks a focal point and suggests that Korea can place its popular cultural contents, often referred to as the Korean Wave or Hallyu, at the center of its cultural assets and build its other assets around this. In line with prior research, Istad also draws attention to the lack of a control tower for public diplomacy and the increasing need for collaboration with non-state actors. Both issues are addressed in the new Public Diplomacy Act; we are now to monitor the implantation stage.

Jian Lee's article examines Korea's climate action diplomacy which changed from being in a passive observer position to become one of the facilitating countries. Lee examines Korea's public diplomacy on climate change, focusing on three main aspects: Korea's leadership in international climate change negotiations, its role as a base for international organizations addressing climate change, and the development of environmental provisions in Korean free trade agreements (FTAs).

The fourth article by Junghyun Cho explores the Karandashi project which was a citizens' initiative as part of the "All Citizens are Public Diplomats" program by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She explores the characteristics and success factors that have affected the effectiveness of this public diplomacy initiative which was selected as the best public diplomacy project by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015.

The last article of the first part, written by Simon Morin-Gélinas, analyzes Korea's development cooperation diplomacy from a public diplomacy perspective. Morin-Gélinas argues that, having graduated from an aid recipient country to become a donor country, South Korea's push towards international partnerships in the field of development fit in with its foreign policy orientation which broadly aims to position the country as a leader among middle powers. The article examines the cases of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), in which

South Korea has sought to play a leading role.

The second part begins with Seungyun Oh's article which explores Hallyu (Korean Wave) and responses vis-à-vis anti-Hallyu in China and Japan. She finds differences in the development of Hallyu in the two countries which stem from a combination of factors, ranging from political structure, domestic media environment, historical relations with Korea, and public opinion. Oh argues that that sustainability of Hallyu depends on employment of specific context-based strategies according to different countries, and consideration of mutual interests to go beyond pursuit of Korea's national interests.

The second article in this part by Seksan Anantasirikiat explores the Korea Foundation's educational programs vis-à-vis scholars and students from ASEAN countries. The Korea Foundation has managed these programs as part of its knowledge diplomacy aiming to build and manage relationships among young prospective academics and leaders from ASEAN countries. His interviews with the participants reflect their positive attitudes after the program.

Di Huang's article analyzes the Weibo account of Korean Embassy in China. The author finds out that the Korean embassy is one of the most active embassies in China that uses 'microblogging diplomacy' to reach out to the Chinese publics. She argues that while the influence of microblogging diplomacy on foreign policy is still limited, it is becoming a major influence in promoting and shaping the national image of Korea in China.

The last article in the book is written by Aduol Audrey Achieng. Her article is concerned with assessing the impact of the launch of Korean Studies at the University of Nairobi amongst the Kenyan public. She argues that from the perspective of Korea, Korea can promote itself as a reliable partner through diffusion of Korean culture and language in partnership with a prominent local university; while from the Kenyan perspective, there would be a competent group of Kenyans who are proficient in Korean language and able to engage with Korean people and Korean-owned companies in Kenya. She concludes that the collaborative initiative is a win-win situation for both countries.

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Part I

KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY POLICIES

Balancing National Interest and National Pride: Korea's Dokdo-Related Public Diplomacy, 2008-2015

Jeffrey Ordaniel

INTRODUCTION

Offshore territorial and maritime entitlement disputes are a common feature of every bilateral relationship in maritime East Asia. From the Sea of Okhotsk to the South China Sea—littoral states of East Asia have been, for many decades since the end of the Second World War, struggling to deal with these sensitive issues persisting through unsettled history. The Japanese-Korean bilateral relationship is not an exception. Both countries are claiming sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks, a tiny land feature in the Sea of Japan/East Sea known in Korean as Dokdo[1] and in Japanese as Takeshima. Tokyo continues to insist that South Korea has been "illegally" occupying the islands and "unlawfully" controlling the surrounding waters (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014). Seoul has consistently asserted that "no territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo, and therefore Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, (n.d.). After all, the status quo is in favor of South Korea. Seoul has been exercising effective control since 1952 when then-President Syngman Rhee enforced a "Peace Line" that incorporated the islands into Korean territory. South

1 Since this research is studying the Korean perspective, and for purposes of consistency and brevity, the Korean name of the islets, "Dokdo" will be used all throughout to refer to the Liancourt Rocks known as Takeshima in Japanese. In the use of the term, no judgment is made on any of the two countries' claims.

Korea now has facilities and several detachments in the islands, manned by some forty police officers and provincial civil servants assigned on rotation by the Gyeongbok Provincial Government.

Despite the current status quo of the disputed islets that favors Seoul, the South Korean Government has been, since at least 2008, adamant about vigorously publicizing its claim in an attempt to influence global public opinion. Korea is doing so through public diplomacy initiatives channeled through its Foreign Ministry, various government-funded NGOs, local government units, and academia. In addition, private citizens have also been engaged in public diplomacy efforts, including advertorials in international and online media, international essay contests, and field trips to the contested islets for foreign students and residents. The official budget for such campaigning rose dramatically, from a meager KRW 250 million (approx. US$ 223,000) in 2003 to as much as KRW 4.24 billion (approx. US$ 3.8 million) in 2013 ("Parliament Allocates Budget," 2012).

Korea's vigorous Dokdo-related campaigns give rise to an important question: Why, despite the favorable status quo, is Korea pursuing all this public diplomacy?

This question becomes all the more important when considering Seoul's dispute with Beijing over the Socotra Rocks in the East China Sea. While this is merely a maritime boundary dispute, China's behavior in that regard has been worse than that of Japan. This is considering that Beijing has been sending government vessels into the contested zone, while Japan has not done so in waters surrounding Dokdo. For instance, according to publicly available data, the number of Chinese government vessels approaching or entering the disputed Seoul-controlled maritime zone surrounding the Socotra Rocks had been increasing steadily, from only seven in 2007 to at least thirty-six in 2012 (Coast Guard of the Republic of Korea, 2012, p. 40). Other sources report as many as 192 Chinese intrusions between 2009 and 2012 (Park, 2013). Despite China's behavior, Korea's public diplomacy initiatives on the issue have not been as aggressive as those involving Dokdo.

This paper is an attempt to examine Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy initiatives since 2008. The author argues that the interplay of ideational factors, such as the roles of and discourses on Dokdo and Japan

in Korean polity, and of observable behavioral factors, such as Japan's policies and occasional references to the disputed land feature, are largely responsible for Seoul's passionate and vigorous Dokdo-related public diplomacy. In the conclusion of this paper, it is suggested that while Korea's efforts may have the practical effect of reinforcing the favorable status quo, they may prove counterproductive for Seoul. For instance, public diplomacy efforts may have served to highlight the existence of the dispute between the two countries before a global audience, and may ultimately provide support for Japan's desire to put the issue to rest via an international court ruling.

DETERMINANTS OF KOREA'S DOKDO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Amidst the broad literature on East Asian diplomacy and foreign policy, several studies have attempted to identify the determinants of South Korea's behavior and policies related to the Dokdo territorial dispute. The findings should then have implications on Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy initiatives. According to Chungin Moon and Li Chun (2010), Seoul's policies are determined first by behavioral factors. They seem to argue that Tokyo's repeated public pronouncements claiming that the islets stimulate nationalist responses from the Korean government. Those responses are further determined by "issue-character, domestic political terrain involving public opinion and leadership perception, and feedback from political leadership in Japan" (Moon and Li, p. 352-354). It must be noted that Moon and Li are particularly interested in explaining the variation in Seoul's responses to provocative Chinese and Japanese behaviors, and that their findings are not limited to the Dokdo/Takeshima issue. Behavioral factors relating to other issues, such as the contents of history textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine visits by Japanese politicians, were also included. Hence, their work cannot satisfactorily explain Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy per se.

Meanwhile, Youngshik Bong (2013) suggests that Korea has no choice but to deal with the issue in "provocative terms" due to constraining factors, namely "path dependency from the past and domestic political institutions"

that continue to deprive policymakers in South Korea (and in Japan) of "political autonomy" on the issue. Adopting the line of thought presented here would mean that Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy initiatives have been largely the result of the inability of the country's top leaders to deviate from path dependency and to resist or withstand pressures from domestic structural incentives prescribing nationalist policies. This study arrives at the same conclusion for what determines Japan's policies on the issue, suggesting that the interplay of constraining factors of the two countries results in policies that naturally alienate both. However, path dependency and constraining domestic political institutions may not be convincing as variables determining Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy.

Krista Wiegand (2015) finds the Dokdo territorial dispute to be a "major symbolic deterrent" to any cooperative mechanism related to security, arguing that while security agreements are necessary, domestic accountability in South Korea regarding the Dokdo islets and related tensions with Japan often impedes the furthering of security relations. Wiegand holds that an examination of Korean domestic public opinion, actions of civil society groups, and actions and decisions of South Korean politicians demonstrates that domestic accountability has been an important obstacle to the improvement of security relations with Japan. Wiegand's research, however, has more to do with the relationship between domestic politics and the bilateral security engagements between Seoul and Tokyo vis-à-vis the Dokdo territorial dispute, and has few implications for Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy initiatives.

FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGIES

This paper mainly posits that the interplay of ideational factors and behavioral factors determine Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy. Those factors serve as a stimulus to the generation of public diplomacy initiatives.

DOKDO AND JAPAN FOR KOREANS: IDEATIONAL FACTORS

Ideational factors refer to the preconceived and dominating ideas, knowledge, thoughts and convictions shared by the Korean public towards Japan in general, and Dokdo in particular. Indeed, most South Koreans perceive the Japanese colonization of the peninsula negatively. For them, Japan's claim over Dokdo is an unnecessary reminder of those "dark years" and a revival of a militaristic Japan. Elias Khalil (2012, p. 337) argues that Tokyo's Dokdo claim "was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back," which "ignited deeply ingrained collective memory of past injustice."

It must also be noted that discourses on Dokdo in Korean polity are also connected to other Japan-related historical issues such as those related to comfort women, forced labor, and compensations, among others. One scholar points out that for Koreans, Dokdo is "inseparable from the subjugation and humiliation of the nation at the hands of Japan - a trauma that remains vivid to this day" (Selden, 2011, p. 1). In essence, the Dokdo issue is not merely a territorial dispute involving two states with competing material interests. Rather, it is one that "cannot be viewed outside of the context of the historic antagonisms" (Wiegand, 2015, p. 355).

These are the ideational factors that create one part of the impetus for Dokdo public diplomacy. In other words, public diplomacy functions as an expression of antagonistic feeling towards Japan brought about by unsettled historical grievances. Ideational factors, however, are not enough.

JAPANESE POLICIES AND EXPRESSED CLAIMS: BEHAVIORAL FACTORS

The other part of the impetus comes from the Japanese side. Thus, behavioral factors refer to the observed phenomena being exhibited by Japan in relation to the territorial dispute. Not much has been written about how Japanese actions arouse responses among Koreans. But the author argues that every time Japan's claim over Dokdo is expressed through policy, official gestures, statements and other behaviors, it meets the

ideational factors, resulting in efforts by Koreans to reassert their own claim through public diplomacy initiatives, notwithstanding the favorable "effective control" status quo that is unlikely to change any time soon.

In other words, public diplomacy is also serving as a response to perceived Japanese provocations.

KOREA'S DOKDO-RELATED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, 2008-2015

Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy can be divided into three categories: 1) citizen-driven public diplomacy; 2) proxy-public diplomacy; and 3) official public diplomacy. Citizen-driven public diplomacy is non-official. These are initiatives taken by private citizens – from common people to celebrities – in order to sway global public opinion on the matter. Proxy-public diplomacy is driven by non-government organizations, attached autonomous agencies of government ministries, and other organized groups, many of which receive public funding. Among the most active are the Northeast Asia History Foundation (NAHF), a think tank devoted almost exclusively to promoting Korea's positions on Japan-related historical issues, and the Volunteer Agency Network of Korea (VANK), a youth volunteer group that is also partly funded by the Korean government. These, among other organizations, conduct campaigns promoting Korea's claimed sovereignty over Dokdo within and outside Korea. Finally, official public diplomacy refers to direct government efforts to influence the global public opinion, initiated by national government agencies and/or by local government units (provincial, municipal levels).

CITIZEN-DRIVEN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The Korean public is overall passionate about the Dokdo issue. News items on Japan asserting sovereignty over the disputed feature always generate emotionally charged responses from the Korean public. It is not unusual to read news articles about some Koreans throwing human feces on the façade of the Japanese Embassy in downtown Seoul. In fact, many private citizens

– ranging from celebrities to students – have also resorted to public diplomacy initiatives in an effort to influence the global public opinion.

Among Korean celebrities, no one is more famous than rock-balladeer Kim Jang-hoon when it comes to promoting Korea's Dokdo claims to the world. Indeed, since 2008, his Dokdo-related activities have captured the attention of many news outlets worldwide. On July 9, 2008, he sponsored a full-page advertisement in the New York Times. "For the last 2,000 years, the body of water between Korea and Japan has been called the 'East Sea.' Dokdo (two islands) located in the East Sea is a part of Korean territory. The Japanese government must acknowledge this fact," the ad stated (Park, 2008). Such was just the beginning. Kim again sponsored Dokdo advertisements in early 2010. On March 1st that year, a 30-second video advertisement was played 48 times on one of the giant electronic billboards at the famous Times Square in New York (Kwon, 2010). The following year, on April 26, the Wall Street Journal also printed a Dokdo ad on his behalf ("Singer Kim Jang-hoon puts ad," 2011). In January 2013, Kim launched an online advertisement via the website of the Wall Street Journal. The campaign lasted for two weeks ("Stop Dokdo Ads," 2013).

Kim's passion was not limited to placing advertisements in foreign media outlets. He had also sponsored an essay contest on the Dokdo issue in August 2008, organized a Dokdo festival in March 2011, and launched a Dokdo information website and a Dokdo foundation in September 2011 and July 2012, respectively. Moreover, he also spearheaded a Dokdo fundraising drive in October 2013 with the goal of raising KRW 10 billion (approx. US$ 8.9 million), which funded his Dokdo Art Show in Soho, New York the following month and his other initiatives (Chun, 2013a). He also held a similar art show in Shanghai, China in April 2014.

Other private citizens, particularly everyday Koreans, have also had their own share of public diplomacy initiatives. For instance, in August 2008, a significant number of Korean internet users funded a full page Dokdo advertisement that appeared on an issue of the Washington Post ("Netizens Fund Dokdo Ad," 2008). In August 2009, several students of Seoul National University, who called themselves "Dokdo Racers" embarked on a world tour to promote Korea's Dokdo claims (Bae, 2010). In 2010, a group of teachers associations declared October 25 to be Dokdo

Day ("Group Declares Dokdo Day," 2010). These are just a few examples of how ordinary Koreans conduct public diplomacy campaigns.

In addition to Koreans living in Korea, overseas Koreans have also been active in promoting Seoul's position on the Dokdo issue. For instance, in July 2008, several Korean-Americans formed a group aimed at influencing American perception on the Dokdo issue ("Korean-Americans Launch Group," 2008). In March 2009, the Korean Dry Cleaners Association used its 3,000-strong membership in New York City to publicize Korea's sovereignty over Dokdo. Polyurethane bags used to drape dry-cleaned clothes were printed with images of Dokdo and a text that stated, "Dokdo Island is Korean territory. The Japanese government must acknowledge this fact" (Fahim, 2009). Moreover, in May 2009, an association of Korean parents in New York launched an aggressive campaign for the use of Dokdo, instead of its international name or Japanese name in all of New York Public School textbooks (Jung, 2009).

Also, in March 2013, Korean-American dentist Jonathan H. Kim sponsored a large billboard advertisement in an AT&T Park parking lot in San Francisco, California, the venue of the final round of that year's World Baseball Classic. The ad stated, "Welcome to Dokdo, Korea, East Sea… Dokdo belongs to Korea!" (Chun, 2013b).

Outside the U.S., other members of the Korean diaspora have also been active. For instance, on August 15, 2012, a Korean Community website in Australia known as Hojunara published a printed ad on the front page of the Sydney Morning Herald. The advertisement stated, "AH! DOKDO! So alluring, just the spot for a holiday – a beautiful island in the East Sea." For this, the Japanese Deputy Consul-General in Sydney, Toshiaki Kobayashi had to emphasize a point, which was, "… Takeshima is not a touristic island" (McDonald, 2012).

PROXY-PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Officially, Korean diplomats have been clarifying that Seoul's strategy in dealing with the Dokdo issue is one of "quiet diplomacy." Apparently, the goal was to protect Korea's position that there is no dispute between the two

countries over Dokdo. An active and loud Korean Government may indeed emphasize that a dispute exists, the position being held by Tokyo. But what does "quiet diplomacy" mean in terms of policy? The biggest manifestation of such was Korea's blatant use of non-government organizations and other groups to influence the global public opinion on the matter and make sure that Japanese pronouncements would not be detrimental for Korea. The author refers to the initiatives falling under this category as proxy-public diplomacy. They mirror the government's positions but they are technically unofficial.

Two of the most active organizations that have been conducting public diplomacy initiatives since the second half of the 2000s are the Northeast Asia History Foundation (NAHF) and the Voluntary Agency Network of Korea (VANK), as mentioned earlier. Both organizations, the former a research institute or think tank and the latter a youth volunteer group, receive government funding.

NAHF was established in March 2005 during the term of then-President Roh Moo-hyun. The goal was to have an organization devoted solely to dealing with history-related issues, in particular, disputes involving Japan and China.

Indeed, NAHF has been at the forefront of public diplomacy initiatives related to Dokdo. In July 2008, NAHF was used by the Korean government to establish the Dokdo Research Institute. The initiative was one of the proposals made by a government task force on Dokdo headed by then-Prime Minister Han Seung-soo. The Institute's thrust was for "education, public relations activities and various promotional events at home and abroad" (Hwang, 2008).

In the same year, NAHF launched an international essay competition on the issue of Dokdo in association with The Korea Times (Ha, 2008). The theme was, "why Dokdo is Korean territory." Needless to say, any essay that argued to the contrary would automatically have lost. The contest was promoted worldwide, generating at least 700 entries from 27 countries, an impressive record considering that it was the first run of the contest. The contest has been held annually since then, generating hundreds of entries each time.

NAHF has also been organizing academic or quasi-academic conferences

and forums in an attempt to further inform the general public, and more so, international scholars, historians, journalists, and foreign governments, of the strengths of Korea's position on the Dokdo issue. In May 2009, NAHF co-sponsored the International Dokdo Symposium in Washington DC to discuss "historical and legal perspectives" involved in the Korean-Japanese dispute.

In August of the same year, the Foundation hosted a forum in Seoul on East Asia's territorial disputes. The forum however, despite its title, largely focused on Dokdo and included non-Korean academics such as John Duncan of the University of California, Los Angeles, Fukuhara Yuji of the University of Shimane, Clive Schofield of the University of Wollongong of Australia, and Anthony Carty of the University of Hong Kong, among others. "Japan's Claim to Dokdo Threatens Peace in N-E Asia," was the headline used by The Korea Times (2009) when it reported on the NAHF forum in its daily publication. For that alone, NAHF's public diplomacy initiative was a success.

NAHF has also been conducting Dokdo-related educational workshops, exhibitions, and symposiums. In 2011, it launched an iPhone application centered on the islets (Lee, 2011). In 2012, it created a national database on Dokdo's history ("Foundation to Build National Database," 2012). In September 2012, NAHF inaugurated the Dokdo Museum in Sodaemun-gu, Seoul (Lee, 2012).

NAHF was also adamant about making the impression that beyond being nationalistic, its efforts could withstand academic scrutiny. Hence, the Foundation was elated when a research on Dokdo by Yi Saang-kyun, a NAHF research fellow, was published by *Espaces et Societes*, a highly respected French academic journal ("Research Showing Dokdo," 2013).

Furthermore, as a testament to NAHF being a tool of Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy, it had sponsored several foreign students in Korea to actually visit Dokdo. One such instance happened in the spring of 2014 when eighteen foreign students from China, Japan, Taiwan, Mongolia, Spain, Bulgaria, and Uganda studying at various universities in Korea, were able to visit Dokdo. The trip was fully arranged and paid for by the Foundation (Park, 2014).

In February 2013, NAHF released a document available in ten major

languages, detailing Korea's arguments against Japan's on the issue of Dokdo ("Japan's Dokdo Claim Rebutted," 2013).

The activities mentioned above are just a handful of the many other public diplomacy initiatives pursued by NAHF.

Another organization that has also been very active in promoting Korea's Dokdo claims to the world is VANK, which was founded in 1999. According to its website, VANK is a "cyber diplomacy organization of 120,000 Korean and international members united under the purpose of properly introducing Korea to the world and promoting cultural exchange through international friendships." While VANK's scope of activities is rather wide, Dokdo is among its priority issues. It has conducted campaigns, many of them internet-based, to support Korea's position on the Dokdo issue. For instance, the organization has been actively crawling the World Wide Web in search of websites, maps, documents, and applications, among others that omit the name Dokdo and instead use either Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks. They notify these sources of information and appeal for the name Dokdo to be used instead.

When Google and Apple attempted to localize their map services, Korea thought that its position on the Dokdo issue was compromised. Apple for instance began listing the disputed islets using its three names – Dokdo, Takeshima and Liancourt Rocks. Google meanwhile, retained the name Dokdo only for users accessing Google Maps in Korea. In Japan, the application would show Takeshima, while the English version of the map would show Liancourt Rocks. Officially, the government of Korea was furious and the decisions of both American tech companies were protested. But VANK was even more aggressive in publicly increasing pressure against Google and Apple to reverse positions, and drop the islets' Japanese and English names in all of their mapping services. VANK mobilized its 10,000 members "to send letters of protest to the CEOs of both companies everyday of the year" (Lee S., 2012).

There are other organizations, such as those affiliated with the academe, that are engaged in public diplomacy initiatives on the Dokdo issue.

OFFICIAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Despite its position being officially known as "quiet diplomacy," the Korean Government has also been actively conducting public diplomacy initiatives related to the Dokdo issue. For instance, in May 2008, the North Gyeongsang Province and the Korea Dokdo Research Center announced its plan to publish promotional booklets on Dokdo in English and Japanese. It was the first state-level effort to promote Dokdo in foreign languages (Kim, 2008). In July of the same year, an official of the then-ruling Grand National Party (now known as Saenuri) announced that Seoul would be launching a brand marketing campaign targeted at the U.S. Government in order to influence American public institutions to use the name Dokdo exclusively in all its documents, maps, books and other materials (Kang, 2008).

From April to July 2011, the Korean Government held a large-scale exhibition in Cheonan and Seoul to promote its sovereignty over Dokdo. It included presentations of historic records, photos, and video clips, as well as academic seminars and essay-writing events for students, among others. This was the first national government-level Dokdo-related event (Yoon, 2011).

Officially, Korea has also used the media, including social media, for its Dokdo-related public diplomacy. For instance, in October 2012, Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs allotted KRW 650 million (approx. US $581,000) for Dokdo-related advertisements. "The advertisement campaign will highlight that Japan's ongoing claim over the islets is in line with its past invasion of the Korean peninsula," a ministry official was quoted as saying by the media (Chung, 2012). By April 2013, Korea's MOFA announced that it had "decided to create a website in multiple languages to enable foreigners to easily understand Korea's stance" (Lee 2013).

In January 2014, Korea released a promotional video clip on video-sharing website YouTube.com explaining its position on the issue, apparently in response to Japan's own initiatives. In May of the same year, the Foreign Ministry also launched a mobile web page on the Dokdo issue.

Korea's official Dokdo public diplomacy initiatives have also largely focused on reemphasizing its effective control over the islets. For instance,

in June 2011, Seoul gave the disputed feature its new postal address, and in August of the same year, the presidential office installed a large TV at its reception desk showing live images of Dokdo. Periodically, Korea would also hold naval exercises at the vicinity of the disputed islets to the dismay of the Japanese government. In August 2012, then-President Lee Myung-bak became the first Korean president to visit Dokdo, a trip that was widely reported by international press.

BEHAVIORAL AND IDEATIONAL FACTORS

Why is Korea engaging in all these public diplomacy initiatives despite being in full control of the disputed islets? From 2008 to 2015, the interplay of behavioral and ideational factors has largely influenced Korea's public diplomacy initiatives. The author argues that for Korea, public diplomacy serves as a response to Japanese behavior and as an expression of shared deep-seated animosity against the Japanese.

BEHAVIORAL

From 2008 to 2015, there were at least thirty-eight instances of Japan expressing its claim over the territory in question through means such as revision of history textbooks and announcement of official government statements. Such instances always generate official protests from the Korean Government, as well as indignation from the Korean public. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between Japan's observed behaviors and Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy initiatives during the period covered in this study. This section of the paper proposes the following questions: 1) What are the Japanese behaviors that prompt Koreans to respond? And 2) How do these behavioral factors relate to Korea's Dokdo-related public diplomacy?

The most noticeable behavior involves history textbooks. For instance, in May and July of 2008, Japan's Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEXT) announced that it would describe the disputed features in the Sea of Japan as "Japanese Territory" in Japanese middle school

textbooks. This was so serious an issue that Seoul had to recall its ambassador to Japan for consultation (Yoo, 2008). It happened again in December 2009 when Japan's education ministry included in its high school teachers' handbook a prescription to inform students of the status of the disputed islets. In March 2010, MEXT approved five textbooks with descriptions of the islets including the name Takeshima and the exact coordinates on a map. In March 2011, MEXT endorsed several middle school textbooks that named the islets as Takeshima and described the area as Japanese territory. Again in March 2012, March 2013, and April 2015, MEXT had approved several new social science textbooks for Japanese primary and secondary schools that claim Dokdo to be Japanese territory.

Quite obviously, many of Korea's public diplomacy initiatives were triggered by textbook-related pronouncements coming from the Japanese Government. For instance, soon after the decision of MEXT to mention Tokyo's claim over the disputed islets in guidelines for middle school social studies textbooks in 2008, several public diplomacy initiatives were launched. One of which was the establishment of the Coalition of Korean Americans in the U.S. whose president at that time said, "We've launched this organization to frustrate Japan's strenuous attempts to claim the Dokdo islets by collecting and providing information… to the South Korean government, American citizens and Korean-Americans" ("Korean-Americans Launch Group," 2008).

Officially, Seoul did not want to be overly vocal about the textbook issue as doing so could affect its position that Dokdo was not a disputed territory. Nevertheless, it had to respond. In addition to official diplomatic protests, Korea resorted to proxy-public diplomacy in that it made use of government-affiliated organizations to engage in public diplomacy on its behalf. Certainly, the textbook controversy in 2008 prompted NAHF to establish the Dokdo Research Institute as mentioned above. During the inauguration of the Institute, NAHF Chairman Kim Yong-deok was quoted by the media as saying, "We will develop long-term strategies and measures in cooperation with related government bodies to counter Japan's repeated claims to the islets" (Kang S., 2008). Such was a clear indication of how Japan's Dokdo-related behaviors push Koreans to carry out more public diplomacy initiatives.

Japanese textbook-related controversies in the succeeding years resulted in a similar trend. Many other public diplomacy initiatives by private citizens, NGOs and other organizations were triggered by new Japanese textbooks claiming Dokdo. For instance, soon after March 2012 when it was revealed that out of thirty-nine Japanese high school social science textbooks, twenty-one claimed Dokdo to be Japanese territory, several new public diplomacy initiatives were launched. In May of that year, the National Map Museum of Korea began exhibiting various ancient maps that corroborate Korea's historical claims (Kim B., 2012). In the fall of the same year, NAHF inaugurated the multilingual Dokdo Museum in downtown Seoul to promote Korea's claim to Dokdo to domestic and foreign visitors.

Behavioral factors could also be attributed to Japanese annuals – in particular the Annual Defense White Paper released by the Ministry of Defense and Japan's Diplomatic Bluebook released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by the National Diet. Japan's Defense White Paper first mentioned Dokdo in its 2005 edition. Since then, successive editions of the White Paper have been mirroring the official position of Tokyo. Meanwhile, the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Bluebook had begun to refer to Dokdo as Takeshima and as Japanese territory since 2000. The same refrain has been used since, for example, "clearly Japan's sovereign territory, whether viewed historically or in terms of international law." Similar to the textbook issue, Japanese annuals claiming sovereignty over Dokdo also generate responses from Koreans – from diplomatic protests to street protests, and relevant to this research, more vigorous public diplomacy efforts as previously described.

Apart from actions related to social studies textbooks and government annuals, Japan had also exhibited other behaviors that Koreans viewed as provocative. For instance, on January 18, 2008, Japan's Geographical Survey Institute compiled the first 1:25,000-scale topographical map of Dokdo ("Detailed map of Takeshima," 2008). By the following month, Japanese MOFA uploaded details of its sovereignty claim on its official website. On December 28, 2008, Japan released a booklet under the title, "Ten Issues on Takeshima," available in seven languages to "raise international awareness of Japan's stance on the issue" ("Govt Releases Takeshima Book," 2008).

In July 2009, in the run up to the 2009 elections, the Democratic Party

of Japan (DPJ) signed a manifesto vowing to "seek an early solution to the issue through dialogue" ("Japan's Main Opposition Party," 2009). Needless to say, this was perceived in South Korea as an indication that the Dokdo issue was a bipartisan topic in Japan, and that regardless of the party in power, Tokyo was highly unlikely to drop its claim.

In 2011, for the first time, the ruling DPJ sent a representative, sitting lawmaker Shu Watanabe, to attend the annual "Takeshima Day" ceremony held in Shimane Prefecture ("DPJ Lawmaker to Attend," 2011). The Prefecture has held the annual Takeshima Day since 2005 but 2011 was the first time for the DPJ to send a ranking official.

Meanwhile, 2012 was a year of leadership transition in both countries. Hence, there was a noticeable increase in nationalist rhetoric in Korea and Japan. In Japan, the Dokdo dispute was one of those issues that became very political, especially after the visit of then-President Lee Myung-bak to the disputed territory. For instance, South Koreans were outraged by the speech of Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba, in which he vowed to not to accept Korea's continued occupation of Dokdo ("Japan PM Rejects Seoul," 2012). Seoul immediately protested, urging Gemba to withdraw his statement.

On April 11, 2012, around 800 senior Japanese officials gathered in Tokyo to call on their government to resolve the territorial dispute with South Korea. This was a large enough gathering to generate a response from Korea. "Our government expresses deep regret over the Tokyo gathering held on April 11, which Japanese senior government officials and many Japanese lawmakers attended. Dokdo is part of South Korea's territory and our government has complete administration over it. No matter how Japan claims, it cannot change this clear fact and it would only add an unnecessary burden to the relationship between the two countries," Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson Cho Byung-jae was quoted by The Korea Herald (Kim Y., 2012).

As the election drew near, Dokdo-related pronouncements from several of Japan's highest officials grew sharper. For instance, in August 2012, Gemba again outraged Koreans when he described Korea's occupation of Dokdo as "illegal" ("Korea to step up global PR," 2012). A few days later, then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda himself articulated a similar statement:

"It is my understanding that Takeshima is being illegally occupied by South Korea," Noda said to a committee meeting arranged by the House of Councilors, as quoted by the Japan Times (Ito, 2012).

Moreover, as the election draw even closer, Dokdo became an easy target for Japanese politicians, particularly by the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) led by Shinzo Abe. "What happened in the past three years? Russia's president landed on the Kuril Islands, while South Korea's president landed on Takeshima" (Nakamoto, 2012). This was one of those lines Abe used to convince Japanese voters to oust the ruling DPJ. Abe's Party won the December 16, 2012 election and he became Prime Minister.

In February 2013, under the LDP, Japan announced that it would be setting up a new office in charge of promotional campaigns to promote Japan's claims to the three territories it is disputing with other countries. In the same month, eighteen members of parliament, including a junior minister who was sent by Abe, attended the Takeshima Day in Matsue City, Shimane Prefecture ("Eighteen Japanese MPs," 2013). By October, the Japanese Government uploaded videos on YouTube.com explaining its position on the Dokdo issue. Several versions of it in different languages, including Korean were uploaded in the succeeding months.

In February 2014 and 2015, the Abe Government again sent official representatives to the annual Takeshima Day in Shimane. In April and August 2015, the Japanese Government reported that it was actively gathering documentary evidence as well as helping preserve substantial existing evidence proving Japanese sovereignty over the disputed islets in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea ("Govt Posts Takeshima Islets," 2015). Tokyo also announced that many of those archival materials were uploaded to the official government website, apart from that of MOFA.

All of these prompted the Korean Government to lodge diplomatic protests, among other measures that included symbolic patrols of the disputed islets and strongly worded media statements. These government measures, however, fall short of calming the emotions of the Korean public whenever these behaviors were displayed by Japan. Public diplomacy became a convenient and readily available avenue for private citizens, NGOs, and the government to respond to what they deemed as "provocations" on the part of the Japanese. In this case, public diplomacy

was serving as a response to these behavioral factors.

IDEATIONAL

Behavioral factors are just but one side of the story. Ideational factors complete the picture of what determines Korea's passionate public diplomacy on the Dokdo issue. In this regard, public diplomacy is serving as a legitimatized channel for the expression of deep-seated animosity towards the Japanese, legitimized because of the behavioral factors.

In order to verify this claim, the author traced various discourses in the news media that accompanied Korea's public diplomacy initiatives. The most common theme was how the Dokdo issue was connected to Japan's previous colonization of Korea. For instance, Korean Federation of Teachers' Associations (KFTA) President Lee Won-hee, in protesting Japan's decision to describe Dokdo as "Japanese Territory" in middle school textbooks, was quoted by the media as saying, "The Japanese government, having never seriously reflected on its past wrongdoing, has committed this rash act that is reminiscent of its imperialism" ("Anti-Japan rallies gain strength," 2008). It must be noted that KFTA in 2010 declared October 26 to be Dokdo Day. This sentiment is shared by many in Korea, especially those who were active in public diplomacy initiatives.

For Kim Jang-hoon, who has been the most active Korean celebrity to campaign for Seoul's sovereignty over Dokdo, the islets are a symbol of his country's independence. Several of his activities were launched on dates that commemorate important Japan-related historical events. For instance, the advertisement on a Times Square billboard was unveiled on March 1, 2010, the 92nd anniversary of the Korean independence movement from Japanese colonial rule.

For Bae Jin-soo of Dokdo Research Institute, affiliated with NAHF, "the islets represent Japan's first imperialistic move in the early 20th century. When Japan was trying to rob Korea's national sovereignty, it first incorporated Dokdo as part of Japan. That was done illegally" ("Japan's Claim to Dokdo," 2009). Bae made such statement at a NAHF-sponsored international forum in Seoul in August 2009, one of Korea's proxy-public

diplomacy initiative on Dokdo identified earlier in the paper.

Indeed, many Koreans perceive the Dokdo issue as not just a territorial dispute but an issue connected to Japan's colonization of Korea in the first half of the 20th Century. In February 2011, a public poll indicated that 40% of Koreans cite Japan's Dokdo claim as the "most serious history problem," way ahead of the comfort women issue (17.6%) and the Yasukuni Shrine visits by Japanese politicians (7.5%) ("40% of Koreans cite Japan," 2011).

But statements that reveal these ideational factors were not limited to non-government pronouncements. Officially, since 2008, the Korean Government has issued statements that mirrored the public's perception of Dokdo and its place in national discourse. For instance, in calling for Japan to drop its plan to include Dokdo in the Japanese middle and high school textbooks, Korean foreign ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young said, "it represents a very incorrect behavior which is reminiscent of its imperialistic expansion ambitions [sic]. Japan should immediately stop such unreasonable claims which are nonsense" ("Seoul presses Japan," 2014).

Another related ideational theme to consider was the interconnection of Korean pride with the Dokdo issue. Indeed, according to Bae Jin-soo of the Dokdo Research Institute, "the Dokdo debate touches on Korea's identity and national pride" (The Korea Times, 2009). In August 2008, the International Herald Tribune quoted Kwak Young Hwan, captain of the 5,000-ton Sambong, which was South Korean Coast Guard's largest patrol boat patrolling Dokdo, as saying, "If the Japanese try to take this island from us, we will fight to the end… If we run out of firepower, we will ram our ship against the intruders! Our national pride is at stake" (Choe, 2008).

Even President Park Geun-hye has confirmed that Dokdo is a matter of national pride for Korea. "Defending Dokdo is to defend the pride of the Republic of Korea," Park said during a Coast Guard Day ceremony in Incheon in September 2013, celebrating the launch of a 1,000-ton Coast Guard vessel, later assigned to patrol the disputed islets ("S. Korean Ship to Patrol," 2013). Earlier, in 2012, her predecessor Lee Myung-bak said when visiting the island, "Dokdo is truly our territory worth protecting with our lives. Let's protect this with pride" (Shin, 2012).

In another instance, in 2008, when several of Japanese textbooks referred to Dokdo as Japanese territory, several Korean lawmakers went to

Dokdo in protest. "This is a humiliating day in which the country's pride has been stepped on by Japan," the opposition Democratic Party of Korea said in a statement (Shin, 2008).

Apparently, national pride has also largely underpinned VANK's public diplomacy initiatives. Its website states, "Dokdo is the symbol of pride for Koreans. To Koreans, Dokdo is a holy cross for peace. It is a symbol of peace that will stop colonialism and militarism from ever reviving again [sic]."

Earlier studies indeed had already confirmed this. According to scholar Koo Min Gyo (2005) of Seoul National University, "The island itself has come to symbolize Korean national identity and pride, making it an issue even more difficult to resolve."

ANALYSES AND CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this paper, it was stated that Korea's vigorous Dokdo-related public diplomacy begs an important question: Why, despite the favorable status quo, is Korea so vigorously attempting to influence the global public opinion on the issue? This study, examining Seoul's Dokdo-related public diplomacy initiatives since 2008, argues that the interplay of observable behavioral factors, such as Japan's policies and occasional references to the disputed land features, and ideational factors, particularly the roles of and discourses on Dokdo and Japan in Korean polity, gives rise to Seoul's passionate and vigorous public diplomacy.

On the ideational side, Tokyo's claim of sovereignty over Dokdo is a reminder of "unsettled historical injustice" brought about by Japan's colonization of the peninsula in the first half of the 20th century. It is also a symbol of national pride for Koreans. Hence, public diplomacy serves as an expression of very deep-seated animosity by Koreans towards the Japanese.

On the behavioral side, Japan's occasional references to Dokdo reconfirm the ideational factors that create structural incentives for public diplomacy. Korea simply cannot ignore Japan in this regard. In this case, public diplomacy functions as a convenient response to perceived Japanese provocations; convenient because it allows Korea to attempt to influence the

global public opinion on the Dokdo issue, without officially confirming that any territorial dispute exists.

Korea's efforts may have practical effects in reinforcing the favorable status quo. Indeed, the country was able to communicate to Japan and to the world, that Dokdo is non-negotiable. Hence, regardless of what Tokyo says or does, the status quo of the islands in terms of effective control and occupation is unlikely to change any time soon.

Despite the cementing of Seoul's effective control of Dokdo, public diplomacy may also be counterproductive for Korea since these efforts may serve to highlight the existence of the dispute between the two countries before a global audience and may support Japan's position that the issue should be put to rest via an international court ruling.

Indeed, there were instances in the past when Korea's loud public diplomacy initiatives could be connected to how the Korean position was compromised. For instance, in late 2012, both Google and Apple added Liancourt Rocks and Takeshima to their English and Japanese map services, respectively, and retained the name Dokdo only for users in Korea. Moreover, in July 2008, the U.S. Board on Geographic Names dropped "Dokdo" in favor of "Liancourt Rocks" and reclassified the islets as land features with "undesignated sovereignty." While it is difficult to determine whether these changes came about due to Japan's own efforts or due to Korea's loud public diplomacy on the issue, it cannot be discounted that every time Korea responds to Japanese references to the disputed islets, the issue gets the attention of the worldwide media. Also, Tokyo's position that the dispute should be settled peacefully and legally through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is an attractive proposition and has the potential to ultimately weaken the appeal of Seoul's position in the eyes of the global public.

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A Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy in South Korea

Felicia Istad

This paper is structured as follows. First, this paper will explain the notion of public diplomacy in general and cultural diplomacy specifically. Second, Korean cultural contents will be explored, followed by an explanation of their role in South Korea's cultural diplomacy. Also, government efforts towards promotion of public and cultural diplomacy will be outlined. Third, this paper will carry out an assessment of former and current governmental approaches to public and cultural diplomacy. Finally, policy recommendations will be given based on the preceding assessments.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy was first applied by advanced nations during the Cold War era. At the time, United States and its allies were in ideological war with the communist bloc (Lee, 2015). It was recognized that persuasion of foreign publics could have a great impact on the relations between nations, and would allow countries to move beyond inter-governmental negotiations (Cho, 2012, 279). The former American diplomat Edmund Guillon was the first to coin the term 'public diplomacy': "Public Diplomacy is the means by which governments, private groups, and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions" (Cho, 2012, 279).

Public diplomacy represents three major shifts from traditional diplomacy. Firstly, public diplomacy has moved beyond inter-governmental negotiations

to include foreign publics. Traditionally, governments sought to persuade those at the highest political levels in the target country. However, from the 1960s, governments started to recognize the value of influencing the people of other nations rather than their governments (Suh, 2013).

Secondly, governments have begun to compliment so-called 'hard power' tools with 'soft power' tools. Hard power assets refer to military and economic capabilities (Lee, 2009, 123). Soft power assets include the attractiveness of a nation's values, its performance in terms of development and global influence, its traditional and contemporary culture, its reputation as an international player and its desirability in terms of beauty, friendliness, etc (Choi and Kim, 2014, 349). Many argue (Elfving-Hwang, 2013, 2; Lee, 2009, 123; Lee, 2012, 2; Lee and Melissen, 2011, 5) that soft power assets are of particular importance to middle-power countries that do not possess sufficient hard power resources to achieve their desired political and economic goals. To these countries, soft power tools can serve as alternative means to exert influence over other countries.

Thirdly, public diplomacy involves both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, such as civil citizens, private corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The notion of stakeholders in public diplomacy has undergone a significant transformation since the concept first emerged 50 years ago. Initially, governments attempted to disseminate their ideas, ideals and policies to foreign publics in order to achieve their goals. However, as globalization and technology changed the socio-political environment, public diplomacy was extended to involve non-state actors (Lee and Ayhan, 2015, 57). This development in public diplomacy is sometimes referred to as 'new public diplomacy', 'public diplomacy 2.0', 'networked public diplomacy' and 'collaborative public diplomacy' (Kim, 2012, 532; Park and Lim, 2014, 79). Notably, the participation of non-governmental actors does not imply that the role of the government becomes less important. Lee and Ayhan (2015, 59) points out that diplomacy cannot be efficiently carried out without an overall government direction. That is, although non-governmental actors are involved in shaping the perception of their country among foreign publics, the government needs to provide a direction, coordinate stakeholders and promote related activities.

The terms soft power, nation branding and public diplomacy are sometimes used interchangeably. These are interrelated, yet distinct concepts. As explained above, 'soft power' refers to the assets that countries apply when engaging in public diplomacy, and the foreign public subject to the influence of these assets. The concept does not equal public diplomacy as the latter moves on to include a definition on stakeholders involved in carrying out public diplomacy.

Another related concept is 'nation branding'. Choi and Kim (2014, 349) defines nation branding as "a conscious effort to influence the social imaginary of a nation." The concept of branding has its origin in business marketing and refers to the attempt by companies to create a favorable image among its customers through branding. Nowadays, governments are also making efforts to enhance their international profile through branding measures (Choi and Kim, 2014, 349). Testifying to the growing recognition of nation branding, Anholt (2009) developed the 'Anholt/GfK Roper Nation Brands Index'. The index quantifies brand value across nations according to the following six criteria: people, tourism, exports, governance, culture and heritage, and investment and immigration.

National government and private corporations both seek to increase awareness of their brand, whilst also improving their favorability and credibility (Lee, 2011). This similarity between corporate and public management is interesting because it presents an unusual overlap between the two academic disciplines of business marketing and international relations (Dinnie, 2009, 2). However, it should be noted that although company branding and nation branding share the same purpose of enhanced self-representation through brand management, they differ somewhat with regards to their goals. Whereas companies seek to attract and retain customers, countries are looking to utilize soft power to achieve political and economic goals, promote exports, and attract foreign investment and tourists (Dinnie, 2009, 1). Also, cultural diplomacy seeks to communicate a country's values and enable mutual understanding between countries through exchange of cultural contents.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

According to Cull (2008, 2), there are five major categories of public diplomacy, namely listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting. This paper will focus on cultural diplomacy:

> Cultural diplomacy, which has been defined as: ”the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding,” is the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is in cultural activities that a nation’s idea of itself is best represented.
>
> - U.S. Department of State, 2005, 4.

Whilst it is recognized that all categories of public diplomacy are important and that each of them carry out distinct roles, there seems to be a wide consensus regarding the importance of cultural diplomacy. Lee (2015, January 22) argues that: “cultural diplomacy is the basis of public diplomacy because culture serves as a foundation of international understanding.” Magnan-Park (2008, 228) goes to the extent of claiming that culture in form of soft power has become even more important than economic, political and military power.

Cultural diplomacy can be considered a broad category that involves a wide variety of contents such as music, animation, films, comics and television programs. To a large extent, cultural diplomacy corresponds with cultural industries, also called ‘content industries’ and ‘creative industries’ (Nam, 2013, 216).

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH KOREA

This section is structured as follows. First, the central role of cultural diplomacy to Korean public diplomacy will be advocated. The notion of Hallyu and its role in cultural diplomacy will be explained. Second, the

Hallyu phenomenon will be elaborated, with details on its origin, ever-increasing recognition and current standing. Third, this paper will outline the Korean government's approach to public diplomacy in general and cultural diplomacy specifically.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH KOREA

> Korea using war or economic sanctions as diplomatic tools is far more dangerous and risky than using cultural assets or other knowledge resources when competing with advanced industrialized countries such as the U.S., Japan, Germany, and even with China.
>
> - Lee, 2009, 124.

It could be argued that cultural diplomacy is of particular relevance to Korea due to its position between China and Japan, the haunting image of the Korean War and the threat of North Korea still affect the country's image (Dinnie, 2009, 1; Kim, 2011, 124; Park and Lim, 2014, 80).

> Nation branding emphasizes the importance for a nation to actively manage its reputation rather than passively allowing external parties to impose their own brand onto the nation. Nation branding may thus be conceived as a form of self-defense in which countries seek to tell their own stories rather than be defined by foreign media, rival nations, or the perpetuation of national stereotypes.
>
> - Dinnie, 2009, 1.

South Korea ranked 27th in the most recent Anholt/GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (Kim, 2014). Lee (2015, January 22) points out that this is ranking is relatively low considering the size of Korea's economy, which is the 13th largest in the world. On the other hand, it's noteworthy that Korea is one of the fastest climbers in this and other similar nation brand indexes. Between 2008 and 2014 jumped 5 spots from 32rd to 27th (Stanhope, 2014). According to Brand Finance's annual report on brand power, Korea increased its brand value by 29% between 2013 and 2014 (Cho, 2015,

February 13).

The cultural content industry in South Korea has undergone a significant transformation over the past two decades. A range of factors has contributed to this development, including market liberalization, deregulation, globalization, government subsidies and policy interventions (Nam, 2013, 217). Today, Korean popular culture is recognized as one of South Korea's major sources of soft power. Not only has Korean mainstream contents grown into a billion dollar industry, it has also reached beyond the national borders of South Korea, as the industry appears to have a remarkable appeal among foreign audience. The globalization of Korean popular culture is being referred to as the Korean Wave, or Hallyu (Cho, 2012, 286). Cull (2012, 6) argues that the appeal of popular culture is unpredictable and therefore difficult to combine with concerted governmental policies. Yet, in recognition of the great impact that Hallyu has abroad, South Korea has embraced Korean popular culture as a tool for cultural engagement and economic development (Elfving-Hwang, 2013, 15; Kang, 2015, 443). Today, Hallyu enjoys considerable legitimacy among Korean bureaucrats and business circles (Otmazgin, 2011, 318-9). Notably, the Korean mainstream culture is also being recognized as an efficient tool for dispersion of Korean traditions, culture and values (Park and Lim, 2014, 81): "The enthusiasm for Korea's popular culture produced by the Korean wave naturally led to a mass consumption of symbols and ideas relating to Korea" (Lee, 2009, 130).

This paper does not seek to advocate the role of Hallyu in Korea's cultural diplomacy. Rather, it acknowledges the current policy direction of Korean public diplomacy. As shown above, Hallyu has already taken deep roots as one of the cornerstones of Korean cultural and public diplomacy. In other words, this paper is not concerned with *where* the Korean government should exert its efforts, but rather *how* South Korea can enhance its efforts within the already established policy direction for promotion of Hallyu.

Otmazgin (2011, 318) points out that "the [Korean] government does not see any problem in using "culture" as a tool in the service of the nation." However, this paper recognizes that government support for popular culture is disputable for various reasons. For example, it can be argued that Korean dramas offer distorted images of South Korea, that K-pop idols are not

healthy ideals for young people, that Korean language textbooks do not accurately depict Korean values, and so on. Furthermore, it is recognized that there are instances of negative reception towards Korean cultural exports. The most prominent example of this is the formation of anti-Hallyu groups in Japan and China (Cooper, 2015, 18). Kang (2015, 441) explains that some groups perceive the Korean Wave as 'cultural imperialism'. It is recommended that future research explore the possibility of developing policies that mitigate the potentially negative reception of Korean cultural contents abroad.

THE KOREAN WAVE

THE RISE OF HALLYU

Hallyu is commonly understood as the rising popularity of Korean cultural products abroad (Kim, 2011, 126; Lee, 2009, 123). The wave first spread across East Asia in the late 1990s, when the Korean TV drama 'What is Love All About' became a major hit in China, and another drama, 'Medical Brothers', took Vietnam by storm. In Japan, the melo-drama 'Winter Sonata' became a major hit, and soon after, the historical drama 'Daejanggeum' was a success in Hong Kong. In addition to the rising popularity of Korean TV dramas, Korean pop groups also garnered many fans in the region. A former Korean boy band named H.O.T. became a big hit in China when it performed there in 2000. Since then, both TV dramas and popular music have reached beyond East Asia and have gained popularity in countries including Mexico, Malaysia, Egypt, Russia, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, the United States, and several European nations (Lee, 2009, 131-2; Park and Lim, 2014, 81; Sohn, 2012, 31).

THE SUCCESS OF HALLYU

Lee (2009, 130) accredits the success of Hallyu to both internal and external factors. Domestically, Korean popular culture was supported by improved economic capability and accompanying living standards. The increasing

demand for cultural products has been met with significant investments by major Korean conglomerates and strengthened intellectual property rights. Also, American influence has contributed to a fusion of American and Korean music that has grown popular with both local and foreign audiences. Across the recipient countries, the success of Hallyu seems to differ depending on the destination. Lee (2009, 131) explains that the Korean Wave hit China at a point when income had started rising, but cultural products had yet to materialize at the scale of Korean popular culture. Nam (2013, 229) also points to characteristics of foreign audiences in explaining the success of Hallyu. Influential factors include among others the nostalgia among Japanese housewives and the desire for urban lifestyles among Vietnamese teenagers. On the other hand, Hwang (2015) argues that Korean culture has succeeded in attracting a large audience due to its universal appeal. With themes like romantic love and family life, it is easy for people from all cultures to relate with the characters in Korean dramas.

HALLYU IN NUMBERS

The reason for its success might be disputed, but there is no doubt regarding the incredible growth of Hallyu. Its success is manifested in various aspects of the Korean economy, including tourism, immigration and exports. Although there is no scientific method available to measure soft power, it is argued that economic indicators and perception surveys can provide valuable insights. Recent examples include the impact of the Korean dramas 'My Love from the Star' and 'Descendants of the Sun' on Chinese tourism to Korea and related consumption of cultural products (Cho, 2016, March 31).

Exports of cultural contents and consumer goods increased from 6.16 billion dollars (Song, 2015) to 7.03 billion dollars between 2014 and 2015 (Park, 2016, March 24). This is a significant increase from ten years earlier, when exports of Korean contents generated KRW 1.4 billion (Otmazgin, 2011, 311). The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) and the Korea Foundation for Cultural Industries Exchange (KOFICE) estimate the economic effect of Hallyu to have accounted for KRW 12.6 trillion in 2014 (Song, 2015) and KRW 15.6 trillion in 2015 (Park, 2016, March 24).

The numbers regarding Hallyu's economic effect should be viewed critically as they merely reflect estimates. Still, it is believed that these measurements can provide useful indications of the impact that Hallyu carries for the Korean economy and politics.

PROMOTION OF CULTURAL AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH KOREA

> When you think about how the Korean Wave, like, K-pop and K-culture, all were formed, it wasn't actually originated by the support of the Korean government. (…) It's the working people, I mean, filmmakers or singers, who take the lead in actually promoting the Korean Wave outside South Korea. The government is just putting a little bit of stepping stones so that they can jump up and move.
>
> - Sohn, 2016, April 7.

As pointed out above by the Minister of Culture Sports and Tourism, Kim Jong-deok, Hallyu is not a result of national policy. Yet, it seems reasonable to credit the government's support of the Korean wave in terms of financial investments and promotional activities. Whilst promotion of cultural contents dates far back in time, it can be argued the motivational factor has been changing significantly over the years. Originally, Korean cultural policies were motivated by a desire to reinforce nation building and to prevent infiltration by foreign cultures. Later, cultural contents were promoted to support ideological values. More recently, creative contents have been gaining recognition for their potential economic value and soft power (Otmazgin, 2011, 313).

THE KIM DAE-JUNG AND TOH MOO-HYUN ADMINISTRATION

Otmazgin (2011, 316) argues that the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998-2003) was South Korea's first government to declare promotion of cultural industries a national aim. Among others, President Kim Dae-jung allowed for imports of Japanese culture. By doing so, he contributed to the exchange of creative contents between the two countries. The Roh Moo-hyun

administration (2003-2008) moved on to recognize the potential of culture as a soft power tool by which Korea could enhance its legitimacy. The administration set up the National Image Committee in 2002 and appointed the Prime Minister as its chair. Advisory members were mainly composed of government officials, but did also include representatives from the private sector (Kang, 2015, 437).

In his first year at the Blue House, President Roh Moo-hyun also established the Korea Foundation for Cultural Industries Exchange (KOFICE). KOFICE is registered as an entity affiliated with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST), but operates as an autonomous foundation that primarily seeks to promote the Korean Wave. More specifically, the foundation seeks to facilitate communication between the public and private sector, and to foster interaction with foreign publics. Its activities include, among others, academic conferences and music festivals (Kang, 2015, 441; Nam, 2013, 221).

THE LEE MYUNG-BAK ADMINISTRATION

When President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2008, the National Image Committee was disbanded (Kang, 2015, 437). Instead, the new administration (2008-2013) established the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) in 2009. The Korean government sought to enhance perceptions of its country through culture and regarded nation branding as an effective approach (Elfving-Hwang, 2013, 17).

In addition to the top-level branding committee, Korean ministries were also carrying out various activities related to public diplomacy. In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) published the 'Cultural Diplomacy Manual' in which it recognized cultural diplomacy as the "third pillar of diplomatic power" (Kang, 2015, 434). A variety of complimentary projects were also initiated, including the formation of the Korea Public Diplomacy Forum and the Public Diplomacy Policy Division, the appointment of Korea's first Ambassador for Public Diplomacy (Ma, Song and Moore, 2012, 16) and the establishment of the Korean Wave Research Institute (KWRI) (Cooper, 2015, 14). In 2012, MOFA established the nonprofit group Senior Public Diplomacy Group (SPDG). The group is formed of 20

'public diplomats' represented by civil citizens whose experience and positions are widely recognized. The main purpose of SPDG is to raise awareness of public diplomacy among Korean civil citizens (Redmond, 2015). Also in 2012, MCST launched the K-Culture Promotion Task Force. The organization was allocated a budget of 33.5 billion in its first year of running and was organized by officials within the ministry. Explaining his vision of the newly established task force, Minister Choe Kwang-shik emphasized the importance of Hallyu in promoting Korean culture (Cho, 2012, April 3; Seo, 2012):

> If K-drama and K-pop have opened the door for us to introduce Korean culture around the world, now we need to develop concrete ideas on how to consistently promote Hallyu so that we can present other cultural assets like Pororo, food, traditional arts, fashion, tourism and others in the future. (…) It is necessary for Korean pop culture, including K-pop, to influence the overall cultural sphere, 'K-culture,' and eventually create added value out of it.

THE PARK GEUN-HYE ADMINISTRATION

President Park Geun-hye took office in 2013, and shortly after, she announced her vision of a 'Creative Economy'. The policy seeks to foster new industries and promote innovation (Mundy, 2015). In her first year at the Blue House, President Park allocated KRW 33.5 billion to MCST for the purpose of promoting Korean culture ("The Korea Herald," 2012).

Four years into her presidency, Park Geun-hye is still working towards her vision of a creative economy. In 2016, the president emphasized that her "administration's top priorities (are) creative industries and cultural enrichment" (Sohn, 2016, April 12). The current government has launched a range of initiatives in support of its creative contents strategy, including public campaigns and business centers.

In 2015, the Korean government kick-started the tourism campaign "Visit Korea Year 2016-2018." One notable feature of this campaign is the K-Travel Bus program, which offers tourists an opportunity for guided tours across Korea. The destinations include, among others, the filming locations

of various famous dramas (Callanta, 2016, April 5). Starting in 2016, K-Pop Academies will open at 20 of the Korean Culture Centers located across Asia, Europe, Africa and the Americas (Lee, 2016, March 15).

One of President Park Geun-hye's major projects for promotion of creative contents is the so-called 'Culture and Creativity Fusion Belt'. The project features a variety of establishments and is intended to operate as a cultural ecosystem. In February 2015, the Center for Culture and Creation Convergence was launched. The new establishment is run by the government in collaboration with one of South Korea's conglomerates, the CJ group, which is also a major player in the entertainment industry. The center is in charge of planning and developing cultural contents across the cultural ecosystem. Another feature of the Culture and Creativity Fusion Belt is the Culture and Creative Venture Complex, which will support the creation of cultural contents. Also, there is a Culture and Creativity Academy, which is aimed at fostering and training individuals with creative talents. Finally, the K-Culture Valley will feature a concert hall, shopping mall, a hotel and a theme park. The government has set aside a budget of 1.4 trillion won for the project (Seo, 2016) and expects that more than 53,000 jobs will be created over the next five years (Sohn, 2016, March 2).

In addition to the establishment of new organizations and campaigns, the current government is also supporting previously established programs, such as the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute (KCTI), the Korea Culture Information Service Agency (KCISA) ("MCST," n.d.) and the Korea Foundation for Asian Cultural Exchange (KOFACE) (Otmazgin, 2011, 316). Another long-running initiative is the Korea Culture and Information Service (KOCIS). KOCIS was established in 1971, and is as such one of the very first public initiatives for cultural promotion in South Korea. According to the official webpage, KOCIS "serves as a communication bridge to promote Korea overseas, to shed light on international cultural exchanges and to bring that news back to the Korean audience" ("KOCIS," n.d.). Another government-supported organization is the Korea Foundation, established in 1992. The foundation operates a variety of cultural and exchange diplomacy activities (Cull, 2012, 5). More recently, in 2001, the Korea Culture and Contents Agency (KOCCA) was launched. The agency is tasked with overseeing and supporting the development of Korean cultural

industries (Elfving-Hwang, 2013, 17). The King Sejong Institute Foundation (KSIF) is a major promotional organ for Korean culture and language abroad. The foundation is present with institutes in more than 90 countries (Cull, 2012, 5). The Korean Corners are also advancing awareness and accessibility to Korean culture through supply of books, journals, CDs and other materials to existing libraries in other countries (Ma et al., 2012, 17). Lately, the Korean government has also increased its support for organizations that promote of Korean literature. Initiatives include among others the Korean Literature Translation Institute (KLTI) (Elfving-Hwang, 2013, 15) and the Academy of Korean Studies and Koran Literature (AKS) (Cooper, 2015, 16). Finally, Korea has two international broadcasting channels. KBS World is part of the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), South Korea's largest television station. KBS World produces contents for foreign viewers and provides subtitles for Korean productions broadcasted over its mother channel (Cull, 2012, 5; Ma et al., 2012). First established in 1996, Arirang TV is another public service agency that promotes awareness of Korea on international airwaves. In its own words, the broadcasting station aims to "burnish Korea's image in international communities and to improve relationships with foreign countries through close cooperation with broadcasting companies overseas" ("Arirang TV," n.d.). The Korean television channel has more than 100 million viewers in 188 different countries (Ma et al., 2012, 13).

ASSESSMENT OF KOREA'S APPROACH TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

As shown above, public diplomacy in general, and cultural diplomacy in specific, has garnered increased attention and recognition in South Korea over the past decade. The allocation of direct and indirect resources has surged, and related policies have been adapted. However, the Korean government has yet to develop a conceptual and pragmatic framework. Through a comprehensive analysis of current and former government efforts, it will be argued that South Korea is lacking a strategic approach to its public and cultural diplomacy.

Critical aspects of Korea's pursuit for public diplomacy relate to both the effectiveness and efficiency of related government policies. Firstly, a

major challenge to public diplomacy in Korea today is the lack of continuity in public policies. Public diplomacy needs to be practiced with long-term perspective (Cull, 2012, 8; Melissen and Sohn, 2015, 4; Sohn, 2012, 33). The gains are not immediate, and the efforts need to be carried out in longer periods of time in order for policies to be effective. Whereas some activities are carried out continuously, such as KBS World and the King Sejong Institutes, many activities, and especially policies, are being discontinued whenever a new president is elected. This is not unique to South Korea or to the politics of public diplomacy, but it is a great barrier in building up an effective system for public diplomacy in South Korea. Instead of continuing existing efforts, the Korean government has repeatedly replaced former policy initiatives with new activities. President Lee Myung-bak disbanded the National Image Committee and President Park Geun-hye dismantled the PCNB. Naturally, politicians choose to discontinue former policies because they seek to enhance the system, but this paper questions the need to entirely disband previous efforts instead of improving on them by making adjustments.

Secondly, the current government lacks a control tower that can coordinate and oversee activities related to public diplomacy. As a consequence, current policies lack efficiency due to limited information sharing and poor policy coordination (Lee, 2015, January 22). Not only task coordination, but also efficient resource allocation is important to prevent waste (Ma et al., 2012, 18). Furthermore, a control tower has the potential of systematically pushing forward the agenda for public diplomacy. It would have the influential power to project a unified vision and to secure sufficient budget allocation and the necessary manpower (Ma et al., 2012, 2; Park, 2011, 1). The need for a control tower is particularly important in public diplomacy as it involves a large number of stakeholders. Firstly, the government must coordinate efforts among government ministries and affiliated organizations. As shown above is there a large number of organizations involved in promoting Korean cultural industries. Secondly, the government needs to collaborate with private industries and non-governmental organizations. Finally, civil citizens should be involved in the process of developing national public diplomacy. Civil citizens can also be considered diplomats as they communicate Korean culture and values when

facing foreigners at home and abroad. As such, their role in promoting cultural diplomacy is very important.

It should be noted that coordination at the highest level of the government ought not to take on a unilateral, top-down approach. The very definition of public diplomacy lies in the involvement of non-governmental stakeholders and their communication with foreign publics. Also, it is particularly important to avoid a rigid approach to cultural diplomacy, since this field deals with a highly dynamic industry. Inflexible hierarchies in a dynamic industry will inevitably create limitations. As such, it is important to develop a strategic approach to cultural diplomacy that recognizes the distinct dynamism of creative industries. Otmazgin (2011, 309) claims that the Korean government's approach to public diplomacy resembles its famous intervention in industrial promotion. The author argues (2011, 310) that this approach is not fit for the more dynamic cultural industries:

> If governments wish to develop their own successful economically driven cultural industries they need to study the work of the cultural industries more thoroughly and construct a dynamic mechanism for nurturing, commodifying, and commercializing artistic and cultural creativity on a massive scale.

Elfving-Hwang (2013, 3) adds to this line of argument by pointing out that not only the creators, but also the audience of cultural contents shapes the final products. Creative contents are produced to appeal to consumers, and therefore these consumers have significant influence over the development of cultural products. As a result, the creative industries are hybrid in nature.

Thirdly, the government needs to improve its collaboration with private industries and civil citizens. Both the former and current government have initiated private industry collaboration. President Lee Myung-bak collaborated with the Lotte Group (Ma et al., 2012, 14), and President Park Geun-hye is currently collaborating with the CJ group. Also, both governments have been cooperating with the private industries through the joint establishment of the Bureau of Cultural Diplomacy with the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) (Cooper, 2015, 17). However, the FKI only represent larger companies. In order to be a member, annual sales must

exceed KRW 50 billion ("FKI," n.d.). Otmazgin (2011, 321) points to the importance of small companies and start-ups in developing cultural products: "the process of innovation, development, and commodification is shared by a larger number of competitive players and not by a few big producers." In order to stimulate small and medium-sized companies and to benefit from their contribution to cultural contents, it is important for the government to establish close relations with all parts of the cultural industry, not only the larger players.

Finally, to ensure that public diplomacy is being effectively carried out, it is necessary for the government to establish and nurture partnerships with the civil society. Public diplomacy is complex by nature, as it seeks to involve a variety of stakeholders in promoting the same goal. Theory of public diplomacy holds that a government should both communicate with and engage its civil citizens through a variety of channels. South Korea prides itself as being the world's most wired country (Lankov, 2011) and announced in 2012 that it will utilize social media to enhance its communication with foreign publics. MOFA referred to this initiative as 'Total and Complex Diplomacy' (Park and Lim, 2014, 81). However, as Park and Lim (2014, 81) point out, the use of social media does not necessarily translate into effective communication as it largely dependent on efficient utilization. Furthermore, Ma et al. (2012, 18) argue that public awareness regarding the importance of public diplomacy is low and that South Korea is in need of public awareness campaigns.

In summary, it is argued that the current government lacks a strategic approach to public diplomacy that effectively and efficiently supports, promotes and coordinates cultural diplomacy. The government needs to develop a strategy that facilitates and harmonizes cultural industries, whilst also enabling the participation of civil citizens and non-governmental actors in the pursuit of cultural diplomacy.

This paper is not the first to argue that South Korea lacks a strategic approach to its public diplomacy. Kang (2015, 442) claims that the policy is lacking an enabling framework. Cho (2012) and Lee (2015, February 24) argue that South Korea is in need of an effective strategy. Ma et al. (2012, 2) point to redundant programs across the public sector.

Despite existing assessments of former and current government policies

for promotion of Korean soft power, the debate on Korean public diplomacy appears to be lacking specific policy recommendations. Policy suggestions in this context are important for two reasons. Firstly, government policies impact the effectiveness and efficiency in allocation of public resources. Secondly, government policies also affect local industries, including the industries of cultural contents. Hallyu has been on the rise over the past decades and its potential as a soft power asset has become widely recognized. The development has mainly driven by private sector and consumers, but the government is also believed to have a significant potential for further promotion and leverage of Hallyu. As such, the government needs to outline a strategy for coordination, support and promotion of Korean creative contents at home and abroad.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

COORDINATING ACTIVITIES IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This paper argues that there are particularly two aspects in which current government policies require improvement. The first policy recommendation is concerned with the organizational structure of South Korea's activities in public diplomacy. It is argued that the Korean government should establish an organ that oversees, coordinates and promotes public diplomacy activities across governmental and non-governmental entities.

The current government has placed its ambassador for Public Diplomacy in MOFA. On one hand, this is sensible as the target of public diplomacy is people of other nations and therefore a concern for MOFA. One the other hand, this approach fails to recognize that the soft power assets leveraged to achieve influence over foreign publics are created by stakeholders also outside of MOFA. MCST is a key player in this regard, as it oversees some of the major pillars of public diplomacy, namely culture, sports and tourism. Also other stakeholders are making major contributions to Korean public diplomacy. These include among others the Korea Foundation, the King Sejong Institutes, the Korean Culture Centers and Arirang TV. If South Korea fails to coordinate efforts by these various stakeholders, the govern-

ment is likely to waste resources on redundant programs, miss out on benefits from information sharing and fail to go ahead with a unified vision for its efforts in public diplomacy.

LESSONS FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL BRANDING

The Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB) will be presented as an example of an organizational structure that sought to coordinate public diplomacy policies. As mentioned previously, the PCNB was set up by former President Lee Myung-bak in 2009 and dismantled by President Park Geun-hye in 2013. This paper is not looking to assess the performance of PCNB or to advocate for PCNB as the optimal approach to public diplomacy. Clearly, the council had shortcomings in this regard, as it was specifically targeted at nation branding and not public diplomacy in general. It is should also be noted that the formation of an ideal organizational structure does not necessarily translate into efficient management and successful policy outcomes. Yet, it is believed that the former council provides valuable lessons for central management of public diplomacy.

The first notable feature of the PCNB is its position within the governmental hierarchy. The council was located at the highest level of the government. As such it reported directly to the president and advised him on related policies (Choi and Kim, 2014, 347). The council's top position reflected the high priority it was given. Also, it implied that the council had the opportunity to unify all stakeholders, which in turn indicate the possibility of more coordination across different units, such as MOFA and MCST.

The second notable feature is the composition of the council. In accordance with public diplomacy, the committee was represented by a variety of stakeholders. Specifically, the committee of forty-seven members was composed of thirteen government officials and thirty-four civilian members. The majority of government representatives were ministers, while most of the civilian members represented the private sector (Kim, 2011, 124).

The third and final feature relates to both of the former two points. By involving non-governmental representatives and establishing a committee at the highest level of government, the former president directed the spotlight

to public diplomacy, especially nation branding. Dinnie (2009, 4) reports that the establishment of PCNB "set in motion a flurry of activity, including numerous articles in the Korean media on the topic of nation branding, an ongoing public debate, visits by foreign experts, and conferences in Seoul."

The PNCB might have had shortcomings, but it is argued in this paper that the former council provides important strategic implications for policies in public diplomacy. Whether the PCNB was carried out efficiently or not, its centralized approach to nation branding provided an opportunity for coordination, optimization and promotion of public diplomacy activities across governmental and non-governmental entities.

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

The second policy recommendation in this paper is concerned with the creation of synergies between the various assets of Hallyu. It is believed that the promotion of synergies can be a potentially powerful tool in optimizing South Korea's cultural diplomacy. Specifically, this paper argues that the Korean government currently lacks a strategic approach to its cultural diplomacy and can improve by learning from corporate theory. Although it is recognized that governments and corporations face different challenges and opportunities, it is also suggested that corporate theory offers valuable lessons for public management (Zenger, 2013, 3):

> Effective corporate theories (…) provide managers with vision to navigate the surrounding strategic terrain over an extended period of time. They provide a conceptual tool and filter — one that can be repeatedly used to select, acquire, and assemble complementary bundles of assets, activities, and resources from the abundance available.

THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY

The Walt Disney Company will be introduced as an example of an organization that has applied a multidivisional corporate structure to

Original sketch by Walt Disney (1975)



Source: Zenger, 2013, 2

enhance and strengthen its market position. Several similarities are being observed between the Walt Disney Company and the Korean Wave. It will be argued that the company offers valuable implications for Korea's cultural diplomacy.

The Walt Disney Company is an American public corporation situated in California. As of May 2016, the entertainment company ranked number 71 on Forbes' list of the world's biggest public companies, with a market value of 169.3 billion dollars ("Forbes," n.d.). Disney is widely recognized in the management literature for its multidivisional corporate structure (Bohas, 2015). The company's entertainment assets are divided into five market segments, namely media networks, parks and resorts, the Walt Disney studios, Disney consumer products and Disney interactive (Carillo,

Disney: Distribution of Revenue



	Media Networks	Parks and Resorts	Walt Disney Studios	Disney Consumer Products	Disney Interactive
Percentage	46%	29%	16%	7%	2%

Source: Carillo et al., 2012, 3.

Crumley, Thieringer, and Harrison, 2012, 3). Walt Disney envisioned his company as a diversified entertainment enterprise in which theatrical films were placed at the center. Examples of theatrical films include both classics like 'Pinocchio' and recent box office hits such as 'Frozen'. Surrounding the core of Disney's Studios are other complimentary assets, including the aforementioned parks and resorts, media networks, Disney consumer products and Disney interactive. The company refers to these segments as a 'portfolio of brands' (Carillo et al., 2012, 2).

One notable feature of Disney's corporate structure is that it does not draw on the size of market segments in formulating its corporate theory. A breakdown of Disney's revenues by market segments shows that theatrical films produced at the Walt Disney studios do not bring in the majority of revenues. Among the five market segments of Disney entertainment products, media networks account for the larges revenues, followed by parks and resorts, the Walt Disney studios, Disney consumer products and Disney interactive (Carillo et al., 2012, 3). The Walt Disney studios account for less than half of the media networks, yet this segment is placed at the middle of Disney's multidivisional company structure.

Zenger (2013, 1) argues that Walt Disney placed theatrical films at the center because he considered the films to be a central asset that "in very precise ways infuses value into and is in turn supported by an array of

related entertainment assets." In other words, Disney has created an ecosystem in which the success of one segment, particularly theatrical films, is expected to create value for other related assets (Carillo et al., 2012, 2). The 2013 movie 'Frozen' is a good example of synergies between the various Disney market segments. The mega blockbuster raked in more than US$1.2 billion, making it the fifth highest-grossing movie of all time. The soundtrack also became a great success, with hit songs like 'Let it Go'. The subsequent album was the first to sell a million copies in 2014 (Rothman, 2014). Moreover, 'Frozen' merchandise was sold for more than US$1 dollars in 2014 (Li, 2015). In other words, the successful movie released by Walt Disney Studios created significant revenues for other market segments such as Disney Consumer Products.

It is believed that Korean cultural diplomacy can benefit from synergy effects similar to that of Disney by approaching its cultural assets as a portfolio of brands in which it places television dramas at the core.

KOREAN CULTURAL ASSETS

When asking foreigners about their associations with Korean popular culture, it is likely that they will mention K-pop. The most prominent example is perhaps the song 'Gangam Style' by Korean artist Psy, which became a global phenomenon in 2012 (Cooper, 2015, 14). Indeed, statistics repeatedly rank popular music as the most popular segment in Korean cultural industries. An analysis of the submissions to a video contest for foreigners showed that the most popular theme was pop music, followed by nature and scenery, food, traditional culture, film and television, people, economic development and advanced technology, Korean language, historical themes and sports (Ma et al., 2012, 16).

The popularity of K-pop is also evident when comparing sales across Korea's creative contents industry. In 2014, publishing accounted for the largest share of sales, followed by broadcasting, advertising, knowledge and information, games, characters, films and others ("Invest Korea," 2015, 3). As broadcasting refers to not only dramas, but also entertainment shows and other programs, dramas are likely to account for even less than the reported

Popular Korean Themes Among Foreigners



	K-Pop	Nature and Scenery	Food	Traditional Culture	Film and Television	Korean People	Economic Dev. and Advanced Techn.	Language	Historical Themes	Sports
People	769	631	624	524	498	309	308	195	108	88

Source: Ma et al., 2012, 16.

Hallyu: Distribution of Sales



	Publishing	Broadcasting	Advertising	Knowledge and Information	Games	Characters	Films	Others
Percentage	21%	16%	14%	12%	10%	9%	5%	2%

Source: Ma et al., 2012, 16.

16%.

Whilst Korean popular music dominates in terms of sales revenues and public interest, the appeal of Korean culture is also evident in other segments of Korean cultural industries.

Exports of Korean movies have increased significantly over the past two decades. In 1995, only 15 Korean movies were exported abroad. By 2004, this number had increased more than 12 times with exports of 193 movies

(Otmazgin, 2011, 312).

The comics industry has also been on a rise. The domestic webtoon[1] market had an estimated value of KRW 420 billion in 2015. Testifying to the growing popularity of Korea cartoons, two of the major webtoon providers recently started to offer their comics in English and Chinese (Marshall, 2016).

Korean literature is another segment of Korean creative contents that has experienced growing popularity abroad. In 2011, author Shin Kyung-sook won the Man Asian Literary Prize for her book 'Please Look After Mom' (Jalicon, 2014). On May 16 this year, the Korean author Han Kang won the prestigious Man Booker International Prize for her novel 'The Vegetarian' (Chang, 2016, April 4).

Korean television dramas have witnessed a remarkable development over the past decade. Between 1995 and 2004, the exports increased from US$5.5 million to US$71.4 million (Otmazgin, 2011, 312). In 2013, the television drama 'My Love From the Star' became a major success with both domestic and international audiences. In particular, the Korean drama attracted a huge fan base in neighboring China (Park, 2016, March 24). In the following year, non-Korean tourists visiting Korea was recorded to be 14.2 million (Sohn, 2016, March 2). Among these, approximately 2 million tourists came from China (Park, 2016, March 24). In 2016, the Korean drama 'Descendants of the Sun' also became a major hit both domestically and internationally. The drama exceeded 2.4 billion views on China's largest video-streaming site, iQiyi (Park, 2016, March 24). The production company New Entertainment World (NEW) has already sold broadcasting rights for the drama to more than 30 countries across Europe, Asia and Oceania (Sohn, 2016, April 4). Also, the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) and MCST have recognized the overwhelming popularity of this drama. In 2016, the male lead actor in the hit drama 'Descendants of the Sun' was appointed as the honorary ambassador for Korean tourism. The actor, Song Joong-ki, will feature in advertisements and other promotional activities, amongst some of which will take place at drama filming locations (Chang, 2016, May 26). The government also plans to transform several of

1 Webtoons refer to South Korean comics published online (Kang, 2014).

these sites into tourist attractions. Indeed, local travel agencies are already receiving huge numbers of requests from tourists for travels to filming sites that appears in the smash hit drama (Park, 2016, April 14).

The diversity of Korean television dramas adds to their leverage. The megahits 'My Love From the Star' and 'Descendants of the Sun' fall within a variety of genres, including fantasy, romance, comedy and melodrama. Another recent hit, 'Misaeng' combines drama and comedy with social commentaries. The series depicts hardships experienced by the office workers at a major Korean company, where long work hours and a strict hierarchical structure define their daily life. The drama is based on a hugely popular webtoon, which has sold more than 1.5 million copies (Ahn, 2014, November 12). As such it is not only an example of the diversity in Korean dramas, but also the complementarity between Korean cultural assets. People who read the cartoon might watch the drama, and people who watch the drama might read the cartoon.

TELEVISION DRAMAS AT THE CENTER OF KOREAN CULTURAL ASSETS

This paper argues that the Korean government should approach its cultural diplomacy in a strategic manner. It is recommended that the government facilitate an ecosystem in which the potential synergies of various Korean cultural assets are being realized. It is also argued that the central theme of Korean cultural assets should be chosen according to its potential for synergies with other segments, and not according to its size of revenues.

It can be argued that Korean dramas have great potential for spillover effects on other cultural assets. Their popularity abroad has sparked interest in Korean language, food, fashion, beauty, travel and more. This view is supported by President Park Geun-hye, who recently highlighted the positive impact of Korean dramas on Korean cultural industries: "'Descendants of the Sun' (…) has caused a surge in demand for cosmetics, clothing and food items made in Korea" (Sohn, 2016, April 12). Also KOFICE points to a rapid increase in related exports, such as cosmetics (Park, 2016, March 24). Recently, the Korea Development Bank (KDB) Chairman and CEO, Lee

Dong-geol, announced that the state-run bank and Korea Broadcasting Station (KBS) will create a joint fund of KRW 100 billion to promote Korean creative contents: "We will finance a variety of cultural products such as television series, movies, games and reality shows in the coming five years to help generate another mega-hit South Korean TV series such as 'Descendants of the Sun'" (Seo, 2016).

It can also be argued that Korean television dramas potentially provide an efficient channel for communication of Korean values and lifestyle. That is not to say that Korean dramas are the most accurate source of life in Korea, but rather that they efficiently promote a more comprehensive understanding of Koreans. This is in alignment with theory on public diplomacy, which emphasizes the promotion of mutual understanding through communication.

Spanish cinema provides a good example in this regard. Movies from Spain have been on a rise over the past decade, and the 2006 release of 'Pan's Labyrinth' (El Laberinto del Fauno) by Guillermo Del Toro received international attention as it won the prestigious Palme d'Or award at Cannes. The movie falls into the fantasy genre, but is set against the backdrop of falangist Spain in 1944. Film critic Mark Kermode (2006) describes 'Pan's Labyrinth' as "an epic, poetic vision in which the grim realities of war are matched and mirrored by a descent into an underworld populated by fearsomely beautiful monsters." The movie does not seek to present Spain in a favorable or realistic way. Rather, it communicates Spanish history to the world by applying artistic measures and thereby promotes understanding of Spain and its culture.

As pointed out previously in this paper, public diplomacy differs somewhat from national branding as it moves beyond projection of imageries and instead seeks to foster mutual understanding and communication across cultures. Screen productions are efficient in this regard, as they provide entertainment against the backdrop of a cultural context. The audience seeks out movies and dramas for enjoyment, and as a result learn about the culture or histories featured on screen. However, there are drawbacks to this type of communication channel. The featured content might not be reflective of real life or it might depict aspects of a culture in an exceedingly positive or negative manner. Hollywood movies are often criticized as being unrealistic,

simplistic or even misguiding. Yet, they play a major role in promoting American culture abroad. Similarly, Korean television dramas are expected to great potential for promotion of Korean public diplomacy as a core asset of Korea's cultural diplomacy.

CONCLUSION

This paper discusses current and former government policies towards public diplomacy in general and cultural diplomacy in particular. It is argued that both areas lack a strategic approach, and respectively two sets of policy recommendations are proposed.

Firstly, this paper argues that the Korean government has failed to develop a strategic approach to public diplomacy that effectively and efficiently supports, promotes and coordinates related activities. Three major points of criticism include the lack of continuity in public policies, the absence of a control tower and the need to improve collaboration with non-governmental actors. It is suggested that South Korea establishes a top-level organization that coordinates efforts by the various governmental and non-governmental stakeholders involved in promoting the country's public diplomacy. It is noted, though, that a decision to establish a control tower should be accompanied by efforts to avoid a unilateral approach, as this collides with the multilateral nature of public diplomacy.

Secondly, this paper also argues that the current cultural diplomacy of Korea is highly diversified and lacks a focal point. It is believed that the government can benefit from placing Korean dramas at the center of its cultural assets. The Walt Disney company has successfully employed a strategic emphasis on theatrical film, around which it has built a network of additional assets that not only benefit from but also reinforces the impact of its movies. Although it is recognized that government and corporations face different challenges and opportunities, it appears that the networked structured of Walt Disney share significant similarities to the potential complementarity of the Korean cultural industries. As such, it is argued that the Korean government might enhance its public diplomacy by placing Korean dramas at the core of its strategy. Not only are the dramas popular,

they also help promote various aspects of Korean cultural industries, including music, fashion, food and local attractions. Furthermore, the dramas provide a valuable insight to Korean social values and trends, thereby increasing foreigners' understanding of the country.

The findings of this paper contribute to studies on public diplomacy in general and Korean cultural diplomacy in specific. However, this paper also has limitations. Policy recommendations are provided for the organization of public diplomacy, with particular emphasis on the need for a control tower. However, the policy suggestion includes no discussion on the formation of a leadership in this regard. Future research would benefit from a debate on the necessary qualifications and potential conflicts that should be considered when establishing a centralized organ for public diplomacy efforts.

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Global Korea Scholarship (GKS) as Public Diplomacy

Marieline Bader

INTRODUCTION

In 2008 when Lee Myung-bak was elected president, he came to realise that Korea's global image and national brand lagged behind its national power, and thus undertook new foreign policy initiatives under the banner of 'Global Korea' to improve Korea's nation status and brand image (Jojin, 2015, p.39). To coordinate these initiatives, Lee established the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) and announced that Korea intended to improve its brand image, aiming to climb from 33rd place to 15th by 2013 out of the 190 countries included in the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (Byun, 2009). Against this backdrop, in 2009, the council established a 10-point action plan, one element of which was the Global Korea Scholarship (GKS) program, designed "for foreign exchange students to help improve the country's image among foreign students and scholars" (Markessinis, 2009). The program is led by the National Institute for International Education (NIIED), a government organization affiliated with the Ministry of Education.[1] With this decision, a few existing scholarship projects, including the Korean Government Scholarship Program (KGSP) which started in 1967, were incorporated into the GKS program.

The stated objective of the GKS is "to encourage mutual cooperation and amity between nations due to their educational exchanges, to enhance its status as ODA in education for developing countries, and to establish a

1 The Ministry of Education separated from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in 2013.

global network in favour of South Korea" (NIIED staff, personal communication, June 14, 2016). Today, over 800 graduate students and approximately 120 undergraduate students from over 150 countries are given the chance annually to pursue their studies with a generous scholarship at one of the 66 NIIED-designated universities or institutions in Korea (KGSP Graduate Application Guidelines, 2016). There are currently around 2500 KGSP students pursuing courses in Korea, with alumni since the launch of the program in 1967, totalling 3000 (NIIED Newsletter, June 2015). This paper maintains that the new GKS is in a stable position, expanding its expertise and gaining popularity, with further growth anticipated in future years. The program, however, represents not only a vehicle for the provision of scholarships, but marks a milestone in Korean public diplomacy. The GKS is not only the largest scholarship program in terms of scope and funding, but also bears a distinct public diplomacy purpose. The scholarship has undergone significant changes and improvements in relation to the "new public diplomacy" concept, from collaboration, mutual understanding, and trust, to the ideas of two-way communication and engagement. Furthermore, the GKS works to support the promotion of Korea's strategic foreign policy objectives. The ODA plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) makes reference to GKS, and its organisers work closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regards to the country quota criteria (NIIED staff, personal communication, June 14, 2016). Intended to develop human resources who will in promote Korea's image at home and abroad in the future, the GKS offers an opportunity for many incoming students to enjoy a positive experience of Korea and receive degrees at good universities with a full stipend. In this sense, the GKS lies at the centre of the important people-to-people diplomacy concept. Its fundamental premise is that educational exchange will lead to improved common understanding between countries and a positive perception of Korea among exchange students. It is anticipated that recipients of the scholarship will convey a positive image of Korea to the rest of the world following the completion of the program, such that accumulative results might be expected over time. It is in this respect that the availability of scholarships remains crucial in attracting foreigners to come and study in Korea.

This paper is divided into three sections. Section one sets out a

conceptual framework of soft power in relation to the Global Korean Scholarship Program as a tool of public diplomacy. The second part analyses the evolution of the KGSP, particularly in the context of its more recent developments since its integration into the GKS program, and examines the role of the GKS in relation to public diplomacy. Thirdly, based on impressions of various stakeholders and online data, it identifies and explores gaps and opportunities of the GKS as public diplomacy. Findings suggest that the GKS represents a distinct public diplomacy initiative that has come to appreciate the importance of aspects of public diplomacy. Furthermore, while it is too early to evaluate overall outcomes, thanks to the country's growing popularity and the continued support and financing afforded to GKS by the government, the program seems stable and likely to keep improving in quality. Nevertheless, some challenges need to be carefully identified and addressed if NIIED strives to stay the central agency for recruitment of foreign students.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER

In the late 1960s, the KGSP was developed as one of the early ambitions of the Korean government to attract foreign students to Korea and to promote the internationalisation of education (NIIED, personal communication, June 14, 2016). More comprehensive measures were taken in 2004 with the government-led 'Study Korea Project' to attract students to study in Korea in a bid to enhance South Korea's soft power. However, it was not until 2010 when the concept of public diplomacy started to gain academic prominence. Joseph S. Nye (2008) defines soft power "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment," and suggests it is comprised of "resources of culture, values and policies" (p.94). Soft power is often understood as complementary to hard power. In particular, the September 11 attacks prompted governments to realise that hard power alone cannot be used to respond to international threats. Guy Golan (2013) writes of the "need to move away from traditional government-to-government diplomacy and toward a

government-to-citizen perspective that highlights a relational approach based on two-way engagement" (p.1251). As for public diplomacy, Nye understands it as an "instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries" (2008, p.95). Similarly, Jan Melissen (2005) conceptualises public diplomacy as a "key instrument" of soft power, which "targets the general public in foreign societies and more specific non-official groups, organizations and individuals" (p.5).

In an interview with the Korea Times in 2008, Jan Melissen identified Korea's need for a public diplomacy strategy "as a central element of diplomatic practice today" and that it would have a "good starting point because it doesn't have a significant problem of how it is perceived" (Yoon, 2008). However, the concept of "public diplomacy" only started to gain significant academic prominence in Korea from 2010. According to Ma and Song (2012), the objective of Korea's public diplomacy is to "win the hearts and minds of foreigners" (pp.2-4, 12, 21). They emphasize that Korea wields abundant soft power resources such as *hallyu*, Korean food, Korean education, Korean language and culture etc., and that greater exchange with international citizens would enrich these assets. Furthermore, the combination of traditional with public diplomacy would be helpful to boost the country's national image, as well as its influence on the world stage.

In recent years, the public diplomacy literature has focussed on the concept of *new* public diplomacy (Hocking, 2005; Melissen, 2005), which should be regarded in relation to the rise of new media and communication tools, technological progress, the spread of democracy, and the increasing influence of NGOs and multilateral organisations, which all have come to change the power dynamics of today. These developments have given rise to the idea that the public is no longer confined to an object of government policy, but in fact plays an active role in its construction. Jan Melissen (2005) has summarised the concept of new public diplomacy as the following:

> *The new public diplomacy is no longer confined to messaging, promotion campaigns, or even direct governmental contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. It is also about building relationships with civil society actors in other countries and*

> *about facilitating networks between non-governmental parties at home and abroad (p.22).*

Kathy Fitzpatrick (2013) stresses the importance of shifting away from a one-way communication channel that limits genuine cooperation towards a "relational public diplomacy" with two-way communication and engagement, which "sees public diplomacy as a means of achieving mutual understanding and advancing shared interests among nations and peoples" (p.30). Nancy Snow (2016) elaborates on these ideas: the purpose of public diplomacy is ultimately to "seek understanding and being understood," while it requires the "skill in dealing with people" so as to "address the needs and wants of participants."

International education and cultural exchanges have assumed a key role within effective public diplomacy. Nye (2008) has emphasized three dimensions of public diplomacy: the first being "daily communication," the second "strategic communication," and the third "the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels" (p.102). Byrne and Hall (2013) have argued that there is a "strategic benefit" and "overarching and enduring soft power value" of international education as a public diplomacy tool (pp.420, 422). De Lima (2007) has summarized the function of educational exchanges as:

> (i) [generating] mutual understanding
> (ii) [creating] a positive image of the host country
> (iii) [creating] support to the host country's foreign policy (p.248)

Korea's current foreign policy strategy has strongly focussed on bringing foreigners to Korea for language, cultural and educational study exchanges. Study programs supported by the government provide opportunities for international students to experience the host country and contribute to the development of its public diplomacy as part of a mutually beneficial relationship. The GKS presents a distinct public diplomacy initiative that has come to appreciate the importance of aspects of public diplomacy and the important concept of people-to-people diplomacy. Students are no

longer just the target to address the needs of the government, but have become important stakeholders whose needs and wants must be addressed in the making of effective public diplomacy. It is in this respect that the Global Korean Scholarship (GKS) provides a good case study to understand the soft power implications.

KOREA'S STRUGGLE WITH ITS UNDERVALUED BRAND IMAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE KGSP

The number of student exchanges in the world is rapidly increasing, with the most popular destinations such as the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia and Canada comprising 50% of all foreign enrolled at tertiary education institutions (OECD, 2013). In 2012, over 4 million students were enrolled in tertiary education outside their home country, with more than 50% of these coming from Asia, particularly China, India, and South Korea (OECD, 2014). However, relatively few students come to Korea to pursue their studies, in comparison with the number of domestic students who leave the country to study abroad. Thus, there is an imbalance between outgoing Korean students and incoming foreign students. The Korean Government Scholarship Program (KGSP) was established against this backdrop in the late 1960s as one of the early government ambitions to internationalize education and attract foreign students to come to Korea. These ambitions were further strengthened with the establishment of the 'Study Korea Project' by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in 2004, a project initiated by the government aimed at expanding the KGSP with the goal to increase the number of foreign students to 50000 by 2010 (Park, 2004). The number of foreign students had substantially increased from a little less than 17,000 in 2004 to nearly 70,000 in 2009 and thus surpassed the original plan. However, considering the 210,000 outgoing Korean students, an asymmetry persisted (KGSP Alumni Newsletter, undated, p.12). Thus, with the 'Study Korea Project," the government decided to expand its efforts to make Korean culture and language more accessible. The realisation of this goal required structural changes, particularly in regards to the availability of English-

language classes, dormitory capacity, and information and resource accessibility. In short, the government made efforts to make Korea a more attractive place to study.

In this context, it should be noted that only a few decades ago, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, but currently ranks 11th in the world GDP ranking (The World Bank). Due to the rapid development of its economy within a short time, a gap was formed between its economic clout and its brand image in the world. Until very recently, foreigners would associate South Korea with the Korean War back in the early 50s, the 1988 Olympics, or with no image at all (Perez, 2014, p.21). Since then, various efforts have been made to enhance Korea's global image. In 2002, Kim Dae-jung started to rebrand Korea under the banner of "Dynamic Korea" with regard to the Korea-Japan World Cup. A year later, this slogan was replaced by 'Korea Sparkling' under the administration of Roh Moo-hyun (Dinnie, 2016, pp.234-235). However, despite these various efforts, Korea's national image continuously declined. According to the Anholt-GFK Roper Nation Brand Index in 2008, which measures the global reputation of a country, Korea ranked 33 out of 50 nations. In the same year, Jan Melissen, in an interview with the Korea Times, suggested to Korea to go beyond tourist promotion and nation branding and advised the government to develop a strategy for public diplomacy (Yoon, 2008).

In 2008, when Lee Myung-bak became president, he actively started to address the problem of Korea's deficient brand image. To coordinate and systematise these efforts, Lee established the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) in 2009 with the ambition of increasing its nation brand index to 15th by 2013. In the same year, the government established a 10-point action plan to achieve this goal. Among these were the promotion of taekwondo, the sending of volunteers to developing countries under the World Friends Korea program, the implementation of the "Korean Wave" and "Campus Asia" programs, an increase in foreign aid, investment in technology, the nurturing of the cultural and tourism industries, the improvement of Korea's charm as a tourist destination, the promotion of Koreans as "global citizens" via exchange programs and the establishment of cultural centres in Korea. It also established the Global Korea Scholarship (GKS) program, with a view to supporting foreign students to pursue their

studies in Korea and to boost its national image (Kim, 2011, pp.125-126). It was under this GKS umbrella that the previous KGSP and other scholarships were integrated and coordinated by the National Institute for International Education (NIIED), a government organization under the Ministry of Education.

Before the establishment of the integrated GKS, the soft power implications of the Korean Government scholarship program can only be analysed with caution. While the ultimate goal to attract more students to Korea was achieved, foreigners' perceptions of Korea may only be evaluated through feedback from alumni. Recently launched KGSP alumni newsletters feature positive experiences, mostly of successful graduates who have taken up Korea-related professions, high-class elites, or co-founders of the KGSP alumni community abroad. In one of the KGSP alumni letters (undated) a KGSP 1997 alumnus stresses the necessity of scholarships in pursuing a higher degree in Korea. Emphasizing the mutual benefit for both the Korean government and scholarship beneficiaries, he further states that:

> *The Korean government spends a lot of money on giving scholarships to foreign students, therefore, it is very appropriate to see the fruit of its investment. I presume that many Korean government scholarship alumni, after completing their studies in Korea, become elite class of the society wherever they live and work. While some of them emerge as significant leaders in their field of discipline (whatever they have studied) that they can influence and help many people around them. Such Korean government scholarship alumni can play significant role between Korea and their respective countries to improve political, economical, cultural, and humanistic relationship. As a matter of fact, the people who are educated through Korean government scholarship and have spent several years in Korean culture and Korean society, to some extent, they should be ambassadors of good Korean cultural values in their respective countries (p.14).*

Nevertheless, some scholars have remarked upon the limitations of practically measuring immediate public diplomacy outcomes of exchange

programs (Triana (2015), De Lima (2007)). While scholarships remain crucial in attracting foreigners to come and study in Korea, the connection between the pursuit of the program and the evolution into a global leader who serves to convey a positive image of Korea to the rest of the world rests on the broader vision of accumulative results expected over time and is not necessarily evident.

EMERGENCE OF THE GKS UMBRELLA – CONSOLIDATION OF ITS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FUNCTION

It is the restructuring and integration of the Korean Government Scholarship Program (KGSP) into the Global Korea Scholarship (GKS) program at the beginning of 2010 that made the scholarship program of the Ministry of Education what it is today. By 2010, the number of foreign students studying in Korea exceeded 75,000. However, given the fact that more than half of the foreign students studying in Korea were Chinese, Ahn Byong-man, Minister of Education, Science and Technology in 2010 expressed a need for a change in policy direction towards foreign students "to attract excellent foreign students and diversify their nationalities" (Ahn, 2010). Ahn claimed that, to attract even more students from all over the world, various government policy reforms were undertaken, such as the improvement of dormitory availability for foreign students, and the provision of medical insurance and assistance in finding employment after graduation. Furthermore, the government made plans to improve the support given to foreign students, at both a GKS level and at the university level. According to Ahn, "such efforts marked the shift of focus in Korea's national policies on foreign students from the quantitative expansion to the qualitative improvement." Thus, particular efforts were made by the Ministry of Education with the redesign of the KGSP, as well as the previously existing Government Scholarship Overseas Study (outbound) program into the new GKS program. With this, the government provided scholarships not only for incoming foreign nationals for bachelor or postgraduate degrees, but also expanded them to cover more specific and a wider range of short- and long-term financial support and training programs for exchange students, self-

financed students, science and engineering students from ASEAN countries, as well as outgoing Korean students. Ahn outlines three reasons which he claims make the GKS "the representative scholarship policy of Korea." For him, its most vital aspects are the integration of previous programs and the continual expansion of GKS, the availability of counselling and mentoring services, and the establishment of a post-graduation service to support graduates and maintain alumni associations. He concludes that "GKS is expected to contribute not only to the cultivation and utilization of quality human resources overseas by inviting outstanding foreign scholarship students to Korea but also to the establishment of a Korea-friendly global human network down the road" (ibid).

The GKS has indeed made various efforts to upgrade the quality of its program with a clearer vision, incorporating more aspects of public diplomacy. Firstly, the Ministry of Education is gradually increasing their student quota, number of countries, number of certified universities, and makes efforts to secure its budget every year. Since 2010, the budget has remained relatively stable, which speaks for the credibility and importance of the program. Secondly, KGSP alumni organisations have been established and are supported by the government. There are currently 41 alumni organisations, in 35 countries (KGSP Newsletter, May 2016). Furthermore, the KGSP alumni newsletter and NIIED newsletter have been introduced.[2] Since 2003 the government has hosted re-invitation programs for KGSP alumni, in which the government each year invites outstanding KGSP graduates who have returned to their home country and work as professionals (NIIED Newsletter, Dec. 2015). This not only serves to maintain good relationships between Korea and the respective alumni's home country, but also encourages alumni to become part and actively support the alumni organisations. Alumni networks are important because alumni become international public diplomats of the program. If they leave the program with a positive experience, they are likely to spread the word positively. Furthermore, if the government maintains a positive post-scholarship relationship, it can refer to alumni at any time for feedback, which speaks

2 NIIED has no accurate data as to when alumni organisations and the alumni newsletter were first established, but online data suggest since 2008.

for the credibility and sustainability of the project. Similarly, post-scholarship relationships can keep their alumni up to date on the latest information on the program, which then again serve to promote the program to future applicants. Moreover, to address the many difficulties encountered by students in adapting to life in Korea, NIIED set up a student service centre in 2010 with onsite consultation in seven languages, as well as online consultation. According to Lee Byung-hyun, the director of the International Student Support Team at NIIED, NIIED provided counselling to over 10,000 students alone in 2012 (Power, 2013). The Study In Korea website, which is the main portal for gaining information about studying in Korea and the available scholarships, is translated into 11 languages, and the website has an increasing number of visits and is constantly updated. In addition, various events have been organised in order to engage more directly with individuals and foster two-way interaction between current students. These have included a KGSP speaking contest, KGSP awards for outstanding students, KGSP sports events, and job fairs for KGSP students to name but a few. This not only motivates students to engage with the Korean culture and language, but also provides a platform for friendship, exchange and learning.

With the creation of feedback mechanisms and post-graduation alumni care, as well as improvements in student services and organisation of activities, the scholarship program has become more tailored for individual student experiences and thus lies at the heart of what public diplomacy is about: to address the needs and the wants of each individual stakeholder to create mutual understanding among all participants. These are extremely important elements of public diplomacy that increase the value, credibility and reputation of any project. It is against this backdrop of a clearer vision and quality improvements that the government scholarship program distinguishes itself from other similar programs and makes headway in its public diplomacy function.

A second aspect that makes the GKS distinct from other scholarships is its focus in line with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' foreign policy regarding ODA. According to NIIED, the program is referred to within the ODA plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 80% of KGSP beneficiaries come from ODA-receiving countries (NIIED staff, personal

communication, June 14, 2016). Furthermore, according to the latest KGSP graduate guidelines, one of the preferred qualities in considering KGSP applications is that "faculty members at a higher education institution from countries that receive Korea's Official Development Assistance (ODA) might be given preference" (KGSP Graduate Application Guidelines, 2016). Although it is difficult to find proof for these considerations, given that Korea's economic success is partially attributed to its education policy and given its recent strong focus on their ODA policy and leadership in international development cooperation, it would not come as a surprise that the Ministry of Education considers the selection of the KGSP students in line with the MOFA's ODA policy. After all, it clearly complements the stated objective of the GKS in enhancing Korea's status as an ODA provider in education to developing countries.

ISSUES, LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE GKS

Although the KGSP was first implemented nearly half a century ago, it was not until 2004 that the government actively sought to rebalance Korea's student mobility away from outbound Korean students towards attracting more foreign students to Korea. Also, it was not until 2010 that the GKS was restructured to further achieve this goal and actively improve Korea's nation brand. Yet, with this relatively recent focus on attracting students to Korea, with ambitions of becoming an "education hub of Northeast Asia" (Ahn, 2010), the GKS has also faced a range of soft power challenges.

Firstly, in 2016, the number of foreign students in Korea had nearly reached the 100,000 mark, and the government, with its 'Study Korea Project 2020', planned to double the number by 2020 (Oh, 2012). The GKS – and in particular the KGSP – is the core vehicle for the realisation of this goal. However, news such as "Korean universities neglect foreign students" due to "deepening conflicts" and "growing disharmony" between foreign students make headlines (Choi, 2016). Cultural differences and communication problems are given as reasons. Although the KGSP long-term study program addresses the communication problem by adding a full stipend for a one-year full-time Korean language immersion course, other interpersonal

problems at universities have been on the rise. The root cause lies in an over-focus on a quantitative increase of students without guaranteeing a smooth integration process. This news report considers the Ministry of Education's assessment of universities by means of the number of international students and English-language classes to be problematic. Another similar concern has been raised in the Ehwa Voice, the English online newspaper of Ehwa Women's University. The article explains that university scholarships are unequally distributed and favour foreign students due to lower eligibility standards despite already having lower tuition fee costs and that this would cause "a reverse discrimination against Korean students" (Hur, 2016). Again, the problem is that more government scholarships and funds are allocated for universities that have a higher number of foreign students.

Secondly, in attempting to attract as many students as possible, the KGSP has been designed to cater for a wide range of applicants from currently over 150 countries. Nevertheless, NIIED's broad approach of attracting students has sometimes been felt at the expense of an in-depth outreach, which has become apparent through the selection criteria. Until 2013, students who have ever been enrolled in study programs in Korea were unable to apply for the KGSP. In 2013 only, the restriction was also added to anyone who previously was on an exchange program in Korea. Effectively, anyone who had previously experienced Korea in any form as a student was not eligible to apply. This clearly shows the still quantity-based approach towards choosing students over an in-depth evaluation. This sparked angry responses from potential applicants (NIIED community board, 2013), and as a result, NIIED subsequently loosened the policy, such that in 2014 an exception was made for those who had "experienced an exchange program in Korea only for previous academic courses graduation, and if it was mandatory for his or her graduation of degree program" (KGSP Graduate Application Guidelines, 2014). This became obsolete in 2016 and thus students who were previously enrolled at a Korean university as exchange students are now able to apply freely (KGSP Graduate Application Guidelines, 2016). However, the rule remains for applicants to the undergraduate program (KGSP Undergraduate Application Guidelines, 2016).

It is important for the Ministry of Education to understand where it would like to put its focus in regards to coordinating student exchanges. It may have to reconsider whether exchanges are coordinated in support for reputational and qualitative outcomes such as the internationalization of universities with a high international ranking, or for its purpose of increased mutual understanding and respect as a basis for improved cooperation and quality outcomes. Clearer objectives on the part of the government would result in a clearer understanding for its own citizens, too. As Ma and Song (2012) have pointed out, gaining the support of one's own people is a vital part of foreign policy, and thus the government must understand the sentiments of its citizenry too (p.21). It is therefore important for the Korean government to pay attention to such tensions between foreigners, Korean students and other relevant stakeholders as mentioned above. Zaharna (2011) has pointed at the challenges of identifying all possible stakeholders as both agents and principals of a public diplomacy initiative. This helps to choose the right *type* of engagement strategy so as to strategically engage stakeholders to either *inform*, *influence* or *change behaviour* for more effective public diplomacy results (pp.208-209). In that sense, the Korean government can make efforts in identifying all relevant stakeholders so as to choose the right engagement strategy and to create effective interaction points between relevant participants. This can contribute to better mutual understanding among all and so becomes a means to address these issues and achieve better public diplomacy outcomes. Rapid globalisation and technological progress has led to the accessibility of a wide range of social and mass media platforms to share and exchange information. Such access offers an opportunity for the Korean government in opening up to the public to engage and create networks that serve for better shared understanding and communication.

Thirdly, a recent news article in The Korea Herald has revealed that more than 60 government-sponsored students annually quit their studies, such that 270 students between 2011 and 2015 were not able to graduate, with a growing number each year. Reasons highlighted were "family affairs, followed by health problems, language barriers, failure to adapt to studying in Korea and poor academic performance" (Ock, 2015). To improve soft power outcomes, these challenges need to be addressed. A successful public

diplomacy initiative can no longer just address the needs and wants of the government, but the government has to mutually address the needs and wants of the public down to the individual level. Riordan Shaun (2005) has argued for the importance of access and engagement in a "genuine dialogue and debate" between the government and the public (p.193). Saunders Harold (2013) defines dialogue "as one person listening carefully enough to another to be changed by what he or she hears" (p.140). As such, the government has to become a listener to the public and has to show willingness to learn from them. Given the short period of time since the inception of the scholarship program, the Korean government has already been responsive in addressing these challenges and has shown substantial efforts in engaging with various stakeholders, e.g. the setting up of student councils and use of surveys and other feedback mechanisms to improve the program, as well as clarify their own visions. Nevertheless, as the challenges above have shown, there is still the need for genuine dialogue so as to create mutual understanding and take seriously the interests of all stakeholders. Only in this way can the government program come to stand for commitment, credibility and trust. In regards to the many students quitting their studies it is important to identify the root cause of their departure. Regardless of their nature, these are challenges that can be carefully addressed or even avoided by showing NIIED's commitment to be fully accessible and supportive in any circumstance. However, it is important to note that personal problems as well as adaption problems cannot be solely the government's responsibility. While the government can certainly support foreign students to some extent, ultimately it boils down to how much an individual is willing to appreciate, enter into a dialogue and open up for the issues at stake.

CONCLUSION

This paper analyses the evolution of the KGSP, particularly in the context of its more recent developments since its integration into the GKS program, and examines the GKS as public diplomacy. The government scholarship program was initially established to internationalize education and attract foreign students to come to Korea to enhance its global image. Its basic

premise is that educational exchange will lead to a positive perception and evaluation of Korea among exchange students. Thus, the connection between the pursuit of the program and the evaluation into a global leader who serves to convey a positive image of Korea to the rest of the world rests on the broader vision of accumulative results expected over time.

Korea has consistently suffered from an imbalance in student mobility with many more Korea nationals leaving the country to pursue their studies than foreigners coming to Korea. To remedy this persistent imbalance, the government has undertaken several measures since its establishment of the government-led 'Study Korea Project' in 2004. It is through this project that the revitalisation of Korea's international education exchange has been framed and promoted. However, it was not until 2010 that the Korean government's scholarship project started to adopt a distinct public diplomacy path. Although the purpose of the scholarship remained the pursuit of the government's goal to attract students to Korea to increase the universities standing in international ranking and rebalance the outgoing student asymmetry, the GKS has also come to appreciate the importance of the concept of people-to-people diplomacy. Students are no longer just the target to address the needs of the government, but have become important stakeholders whose needs and wants must be addressed in the making of effective public diplomacy. Furthermore, the GKS ties its exchange program to the interests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' regarding its ODA plan so as to bolster Korea's recent focus on ODA policy and international development cooperation.

Nonetheless, there are challenges arising from this focus on bringing a large quantity of students to Korea, principally with regards to integration and wider hurdles to lifestyle adjustment once in Korea. Furthermore, as news articles have shown, not only foreign students are affected by this government initiative, but also its local people, universities and other stakeholders. Thus, it is important for the government to have a more comprehensive view on how the GKS initiative affects and influences various stakeholders and how each of them is interlinked. Creating interaction points through dialogue, social media platforms and the establishment of feedback mechanisms are effective tools to understand the needs and the wants of each stakeholder. It is advisable to identify these gaps and subsequently

address these issues, to continue the evolution of the GKS program with an even more coherent and distinct public diplomacy function. While it is too early and generally difficult to assess the overall outcomes of the program, further research on how the GKS is perceived among NIIED, GKS beneficiaries and the Korean public and how each stakeholder sees the role of the GKS could help to identify gaps and possible ways for improvement and would give an idea of the current face of the GKS program and NIIED.

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Turning on the Green Light in South Korea's Climate Change Diplomacy

Jian Lee

INTRODUCTION

The 18th century industrial revolution brought about unprecedented development in science technology, paving the way towards economic growth and prosperity. However, as climate change emerged as a prevalent threat, the global society started to recognize the flip side of human-led advancement. Carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary greenhouse gas of concern, used to account for approximately 280 parts per million (ppm), a level which remained steady for 800 years. But since the industrial revolution, CO2 concentration in the air has steadily increased, exceeding 400 ppm in 2015 for the first time in observational history (Oceanic and Atmospheric Research, 2015). This 400 ppm level is regarded as a symbolic benchmark, which manifests the rapid increase of CO2 emissions caused by human activities over the past century.

Climate change came to light as an international agenda during the late 1980s, as growing scientific evidence recognized its seriousness and anthropogenic nature. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was opened for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 1992. When ratified, 154 signatory states of the UNFCCC would be committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Convention has annually held Conferences of the Parties (COP) from 1995, and the Kyoto Protocol was concluded in 1997, which was the first agreement to mandate reductions in greenhouse

gas emissions from the period 2008 to 2012.

Despite these international efforts, South Korea had a passive stance on combating climate change. In the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, Korea was categorized as a "developing country." Here, a "developing country" does not mean an economically underdeveloped country, but one that is perceived to have less "historical responsibility" for climate change, in comparison to developed countries. Therefore, countries that were categorized as developing countries, such as China and India, were not mandated to curb emissions. After the establishment of the UNFCCC, most Korean administrations focused on maintaining its position as a developing country regarding the climate change regime; Korea's public diplomacy on climate change was practically non-existent (Kim, 2014, p. 1). However, from 2008, Korea's climate change diplomacy showed a significant shift, establishing "Low Carbon Green Growth" as the national vision during the Lee Myung-Bak Administration. From a passive actor, Korea became a "green" leader, making accomplishments that were recognized by the international society.

There are myriads of definitions for the term "public diplomacy," and nowadays, a wider scope of diplomatic actors has been recognized. At first, when the term was coined in the 1960s, public diplomacy was defined as "the actions of governments to inform and influence foreign publics (McDowell, 2008, p. 7)." Nowadays, it is seen to include not only governmental but also private activities "from popular culture to fashion to sports to news to the Internet—that inevitably, if not purposefully, have an impact on foreign policy and national security as well as on trade, tourism and other national interests (McDowell, 2008, pp. 7-8)." Public diplomacy also needs to have a conscious message or objective (McDowell, 2008, p. 8).

This paper aims to provide an analysis on Korea's public diplomacy on climate change issues, focusing on three main aspects. First, Korea's leadership in international climate change negotiations will be examined. Second, international organizations addressing climate change founded in Korea will be looked into. Third, the development of environmental provisions in Korean free trade agreements (FTAs) will be analyzed. These three aspects lead to implications on the role of various actors in Korea's climate change diplomacy: non-state actors, cities, and the government. Before delving into the question, this paper will start by explaining how

Korea, from a passive position, evolved to take on a proactive stance in addressing climate change issues.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF KOREA'S CLIMATE CHANGE DIPLOMACY

Korea's diplomatic position in the climate change regime can be divided into two phases: before and after the year 2008 (Kim, 2014, p. 1; Oh, 2010, p. 34). Most of the pre-2008 administrations did not take on a proactive role in addressing climate change issues. Upon the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, the first discussion on climate change took place during the Roh Tae-Woo Administration (Kim, 2014, p. 14). Chaired by the Prime Minister, the Ministerial Meeting on the Global Environment was held to respond to the international regime (Kim, 2014, p. 14). However, Korea had a low level of awareness on climate change.

In February 1993, the Kim Young-Sam Administration was inaugurated. At the time being, developed and developing countries stood at very different viewpoints; some leaders of developing countries even asserted that the request for greenhouse gas reduction grew from the conspiracy of developed countries to hamper economic growth in developing countries (Oh, 2010, p. 35; Koh, 1997, p. 242). Nonetheless, the importance of greenhouse gas mitigation was agreed on internationally, albeit based on the "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle," which considers the different historical responsibility between developed and developing countries on global warming. This enabled the UNFCCC to take into effect in 1994 upon the ratification of fifty signatories. Korea also ratified in December 1993 without much domestic debate and became a party of the UNFCCC. The treaty was hailed as a platform for Korea to have a say in the global stage, establish an energy-efficient industrial structure, and minimize mitigation responsibilities and costs by leveraging its status as a developing country (Kim, 2014, p. 14). Toward the end of the Kim Young-Sam Administration, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP3 in December 1997. At COP3, thirty-eight developed countries agreed to determine greenhouse gas mitigation goals over three periods. In the first

period from 2008 to 2012, they agreed to mitigate an average of 5.2% from 1990 levels. This decision reflects the argument that human activities are responsible for global warming, which is clarified in the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Korea also participated in the Kyoto Protocol, but was not mandated to reduce emissions, for it was classified as a developing country or Non-Annex I country. During the Kyoto Conference, Korea's representative criticized that the goal suggested by developed countries was unrealistic for developing countries to achieve, and called for a more "realistic goal (Oh, 2010, p. 36)." This period was when Korea was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis which placed the nation on the brink of sovereign default, leaving it no choice but to agree on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout. Likewise, Korea had other national priorities over the UNFCCC, and was concerned that greenhouse gas reduction could exacerbate the economic crisis (Kim, 2014, p. 15).

In February 1998, the Kim Dae-Jung Administration was launched, which led to piecemeal progress in Korea's climate change diplomacy. In April 1998, the Pan-governmental Organization for Climate Change Convention was established. In September 2001, the organization gained status as a committee and was renamed the Committee for Climate Change Convention. It was chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised representatives from various governmental agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy; Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Agriculture; and Ministry of Science and Technology (Kim, 2014, p. 15). However, bureaucratic politics hindered the body in fulfilling its function.

Korea started to take a more active position at COP5 held in 1999. The nation demonstrated its intention to make "voluntary and non-binding" mitigation efforts once an agreement has been reached on a new means for developing countries to participate in emissions reduction (Kim, 2014, p. 16). As developed countries increasingly pressured developing countries to take more responsibility for reducing emissions, Korea endeavored to protect national interests while maintaining its international stature at the same time. For the first time, Korea demonstrated its interest in international efforts to combat climate change during COP6 held in 2000 (Oh, 2010, p.

36). The nation proposed the unilateral Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), an instrument that awards credits to a developing country when the country's domestic investment or investment in another developing country results in emissions reduction (Kim, 2014, p. 24). Notwithstanding oppositions at first, the proposal was eventually agreed on, and the unilateral CDM was adopted by the parties to the UNFCCC. The Korean government also made a pledge to the international society that it will ratify the Kyoto Protocol as of 2002, which the government carried out in November in the promised year. However, Korea's industries continued to express great concern that the nation's pledge to ratify the Kyoto Protocol would weaken their competitiveness. Also, they criticized the United States' withdrawal from the Protocol as well as protectionist measures prevalent in Europe and Japan, justifying Korea's evasion of its mitigation efforts (Oh, 2010, p. 37; Oh, 2003, p. 238).

In February 2003, the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration took office. Korea's position on climate change was reflected in the third comprehensive national plan adopted in February 2005, which was revised in March 2006 after the Kyoto Protocol took into force (Kim, 2014, p. 16). The plan focused on voluntary greenhouse gas reduction, but was against policies, including emissions regulation and carbon tax, which would burden domestic companies and citizens. During the mid-2000s, Korea started discussions to prepare for upcoming negotiations on mandating mitigation efforts in the second commitment period of the Protocol. It was suggested that Korea should be exempt from binding mitigation commitments during the second period, and take on the obligation during the third period from 2018 to 2022 (Oh, 2010, p. 37). However, questions were raised on whether the decision is realistic, given the mounting pressure from other countries. It was suggested that Korea should decide on a non-binding commitment, but if it is only the case that Korea can establish a quantitative emissions reduction target, then it should decide on a time-bound target, considering the nation's economic level and capacity (Oh, 2010, p. 37). Though such suggestions implied the possibility of change in Korea's stance, in the meantime, the nation still did not have a greenhouse gas mitigation target. Moreover, related policies were in the hands of the business-friendly Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (Kim, 2014, p. 16). In short, before the

2007 Bali Conference, Korea's climate change diplomacy remained focused on safeguarding national interests to avoid mitigation obligations.

The Lee Myung-Bak Administration was inaugurated in February 2008. During the mid-2000s, it became clear that the Kyoto framework would not be the answer to global warming. The Fourth IPCC Assessment Report announced that over the past century, from 1906 to 2005, the average global temperature increased by 0.74˚C. It also reported that if the current fossil fuel-dependent structure continues to remain, the global temperature would increase by as much as 6.4˚C by 2100, from the level in the late 20th century. The seriousness of this outlook was supported by the warning that a 1.5˚C to 2.5˚C increase of global warming would endanger 30% of species, and exceeding 3˚C would raise sea levels, placing more than a million people per year at risk of flooding. The projected risks of global warming greatly influenced the 2007 Bali Conference, in which the parties adopted the Bali Road Map to discuss on new mitigation commitments in the post-Kyoto period after 2012. The Road Map provided a two-year process to finalize a binding agreement until the Copenhagen Conference (COP15).

In tandem with international efforts, Korea also made remarkable strides in climate change diplomacy under the national vision, "Low Carbon Green Growth." Under this guiding principle, the government founded the Presidential Committee on Green Growth and announced the National Strategy and Five-Year Plan for Green Growth in which the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth, Smart Grid Promotion Act, and Green Building Construction Support Act were enacted, and sector-based greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets were set (Kim, 2014, p. 16). Korea took on an active stance in the international stage as well: it made an ambitious pledge on mitigation commitments, suggested the establishment of the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) Registry and the NAMA Crediting, founded the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), proposed a green growth strategy at Rio+20, and won the bid to host the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Secretariat (Kim, 2014, p. 16). These significant achievements allowed widespread recognition of Korea's leadership in the climate change regime.

The current Park Geun-Hye Administration was launched in February 2013. During her keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the GCF in

December 2013 and the UN Climate Summit in September 2014, President Park reaffirmed that Korea will commit itself to reducing emissions and take the leading role in climate change cooperation. She underscored that climate change response should not be perceived as a burden, but rather as an opportunity to seek for a new future of alternative energy resources (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 2). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also established the "Climate Diplomacy Division" and the "Green Economy & Environmental Diplomacy Division," which was the first time the ministry used climate change diplomacy in its department name (Yeom, 2016). However, the regressive features of the 2030 Mitigation Target, submitted by the government to the UNFCCC on June 30, 2015, were contrary to the President's remarks, which astonished many (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 2).

Against this backdrop, this paper will look into the details of Korea's climate change diplomacy in terms of the three main areas: international negotiations, international organizations, and environmental agreements in FTAs. In addition, implications will be put forth on the role of non-state actors, cities, and the government in Korea's climate change diplomacy.

FEATURES OF KOREA'S CLIMATE CHANGE DIPLOMACY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS: KOREA'S LEADERSHIP IN CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS

ACHIEVEMENTS

The slow progress in international negotiations on climate change can be mainly attributed to two divisions among different groups over the responsibility of mitigation efforts: one among developed countries and the other between developed and developing countries (Kim, 2014, p. 19). Both conflicts surround the issue of emissions reduction by developing countries, in particular, advanced developing countries, such as China, India, and Korea, which are in the ranks of the world's ten largest greenhouse gas emitters. As a result, during the Lee Myung-Bak Administration, Korea adopted a strategy to take a "me first" approach (Kim, 2014, p. 19). In the keynote speech at COP15 in 2009, President Lee stressed Korea's stance:

"If we wish to make any real difference, the only way is to take action together. Instead of saying 'you first' we should start by saying 'me first.' Tackling climate change must begin with each of us doing our own part and once we do, we can start a truly positive cycle around the world (Kim, 2014, p. 19)." By underscoring the "me first" approach, President Lee declared that Korea will lead by example in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, albeit an advanced developing country exempt from the UNFCCC's binding commitments.

A noteworthy achievement in Korea's diplomacy took place by establishing a mid-term mitigation goal in 2009, which was put forth as one of the directions for carrying out the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth. In November 2009, Korea made an official announcement that it will reduce 30% below Business-As-Usual (BAU) levels by 2020 (a 4% cut from 2005 emissions levels). Among the three reduction scenarios - 21%, 27%, and 30% - the most rigorous goal was selected, despite opposition from domestic industrial stakeholders. The fact that the mitigation target recommended by the IPCC for developing countries range from 15% to 30% shows that Korea chose to meet the highest level. Korea's decision was assessed to have stimulated other developing countries; in practice, mitigation goals set up by several developing countries until January 2010 exceeded Korea's goal (Oh, 2010, p. 40). However, there was also criticism that Korea's target uses a "relative" reduction method, making it a 4% reduction from 2005 levels, which falls short of that of developed countries (Oh, 2010, p. 40).

In addition, Korea endeavored to make proposals that both developed and developing countries would agree on. Followed by the unilateral CDM proposed during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration, the Lee Myung-Bak Administration made two "constructive" proposals: the NAMA Registry and NAMA Crediting (Oh, 2010, p. 41). The NAMA Registry is a system in which developing countries can register voluntary mitigation efforts with the UNFCCC, and NAMA Crediting allows the countries to receive carbon credits for their actions. Through this system, developing countries can be motivated to voluntarily partake in the international effort to curb emissions by being rewarded with international recognition followed by financial and technological assistance. In order to secure transparency of the system, the Registry ensures that developing countries use the Measurement, Reporting

and Verification (MRV) system. Korea's proposals are underscored in President Lee Myung-Bak's keynote address at the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2009, "Korea has proposed to establish a Registry of NAMAs of developing countries at the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with a view to inviting developing countries to voluntarily participate in mitigation actions and providing the international support that they need (Kim, 2014, p. 23)." In short, Korea's diplomacy in climate change negotiations consists of making a "me first" pledge for an ambitious mitigation goal while putting forth NAMA proposals to narrow down the different standpoints of the North and South.

WHAT IS NEXT?

During the current Park Geun-Hye Administration, Korea released its Post-2020 Long-term Mitigation Target and Implementation Plan on June 11, 2015 to prepare for the Paris Conference (COP21). The plan released by Korea suggested four scenarios on 2030 levels, reducing 14.7%, 19.2%, 25.7%, and 31.3% from BAU levels, which all fall short of the goal established in 2009. The suggested scenarios created public debate, reflecting different viewpoints between environmental groups and industries. Environmental groups argued for the "No Backsliding" principle that was determined at COP20 in 2014, which supported their opinion that Korea's goal should be higher than the previous one. On the other hand, the government responded that its scenarios do not go against the "No Backsliding" principle, for only developed countries were mandated to curb emissions in the Kyoto framework whereas the new framework is a process in which all parties go under binding commitments, so no country can be seen to have violated the principle. In the same context, industries asserted that a country should build credibility by determining a realistic goal and carrying it out. The stance of the industries reflects suspicion that the government might not be able to fulfill the goal, while environmental groups show distrust for the government, for it broke its promise with the international society (Kim, 2015, p. 11).

The Korean government finalized the 2030 Mitigation Target to be 37%

below BAU by 2030 and submitted it to the UNFCCC on June 30, 2015. The government announced that the target reflects Korea's mitigation capacity as well as expected impact on the country's GDP growth rate. However, the target provoked negative feedback claiming that it is a regression from previous goals, maintaining an anachronistic approach prioritizing industrial development (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 2). Moreover, the Climate Action Tracker (CAT), an independent scientific assessment that measures the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of major emitters, rated Korea's 2030 Mitigation Target as "inadequate." This stands in stark contrast to Korea's climate change diplomacy in 2009 when it established itself as a "middle power" in terms of its influence in the climate change regime.

It can be assumed that the 2030 Mitigation Target was finalized without sufficient preparation from the fact that the "37% reduction from 2030 BAU" target was finalized in only twenty days (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 3). In fact, the target virtually equals the third plan (25.7% reduction from 2030 BAU) among the four scenarios that were first released; domestic reductions account for 25.7% among the total 37% mitigation, while the remaining 11.3% is to be purchased as carbon credits from "international markets." (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 3) However, such details were not included in the INDC submitted to the UNFCCC, which may have been intended to avoid criticism from abroad (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 17). Moreover, the exact role of the international market mechanism (IMM) in the new climate regime has not yet been decided, so the Korean government must be able to clarify how the IMM will be applied into its national plan (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 10). Also, the fact that the government referred to the IMM rather than the term, "New International Market Mechanism (NMM)" which has been used throughout UNFCCC conferences, raises doubt on whether the government took enough effort in conducting research for the draft, particularly regarding the future market mechanism in the climate change system (Choi, 2015, p. 9). The Minister of Korea's Ministry of Environment acknowledged that "not only has the 2030 Mitigation Target caused controversy domestically, but also it has received mixed reaction from the international community (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 17)."

The domestic dispute caused by the release of the 2030 Mitigation

Target led to a conflicting composition between industries and the civil society. This is, in part, because of the fact that the target lacks sectoral reduction commitments, providing the industrial sector an expanded emissions allowance (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 13). What is worse is that this will be enabled by government expenditure, passing the financial burden of carbon credit purchases to the public (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 13). The decoupling of economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions should no longer be overlooked. For instance, the European Union (EU) reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 19% and had a 1/4 reduction per capita, while still enjoying a 45% increase in GDP between 1990 and 2012 (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 14; European Environment Agency, 2014). Therefore, Korea should take on an alternative framework focused on the "participation of all economic actors" in combating climate change, in which all citizens strive to maximize efficiency in using natural resources (Kim, 2015, p. 12). It needs to reconsider the existing structure of discourse which illustrates that only the industries are responsible for emissions reduction (Kim, 2015, p. 12).

Regarding the reactions from the international community, Korea's release of the mitigation scenario led to an unfavorable attitude towards the nation during the UNFCCC negotiations held in June 2015 in Bonn, Germany (Kim, 2015, p. 11). In addition, even during the conversation on MERS between Korea-US leaders in June, US President Barack Obama referred to the new climate change framework, urging Korea to provide an ambitious long-term goal and take on a leading role during the upcoming Paris COP21. Likewise, Korea's regression might tarnish its reputation, resulting in "naming and shaming" in the international community. If the 2030 Mitigation Target is not met, Korea might not only stir internal dispute but also lose its leadership as a middle power internationally.

195 countries that participated in the Paris Conference have passed the landmark Paris Agreement. The climate agreement will replace the Kyoto Protocol when it expires in 2020, albeit at present it neither has legal force nor determined country-specific details. During the process of a new climate change regime being established, a nation's diplomacy is all the more crucial. Korea's climate change diplomacy is all the more important as it has received attention and support from the global society for its

leadership; a backsliding stance would bolster criticism (Choi, 2015, p. 15). Thus, Korea should take a holistic approach to not only consider the conditions of domestic industries, but also work in tandem with the international community (Kim, 2015 p. 13). The domestic conflict as well as the INDC which presumably may have been generated without full preparation demonstrates that Korea's climate change diplomacy calls for public-private cooperation and participation. Public forums and feedback should come before reaching any national planning decision.

CLIMATE CHANGE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOUNDED IN KOREA

ACHIEVEMENTS

Korea has two climate change-related international organizations located domestically: the GGGI and the GCF. The GGGI was the first international organization to be established within Korea under its leadership. The GCF is an international climate change fund founded to support developing countries, of which Korea won the bid to host the Secretariat.

To start with, Korea established the GGGI which aims for the realization of sustainable economic growth in developing countries and emerging economies. As a non-profit organization with eighteen member states, the GGGI was founded in June 2010, and gained status as an international organization in October 2012. The Institute is dedicated to the capacity-building of developing countries for domestic implementation of green growth. In less than a year after it became an international organization, it was awarded ODA Eligibility Status at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) meeting in June 2013 (Global Green Growth Institute, 2013; Kim, 2014, p. 31).

In addition to Korea's foundation of the GGGI, it is also noteworthy that Korea was in the forefront of disseminating "green growth (Kim, 2014, pp. 30-31)." The idea of green growth first emerged in January 2000, and was diffused in the international community through the World Economic

Forum in Davos (Kim, 2014, p. 29). A similar concept used worldwide is "sustainable development," which was first used in the Brundtland Report in 1987. There is almost no difference between the two ideas, but to make a distinction, while sustainable development is the discourse of environmentalists, green growth is that of policymakers (Kim, 2014, p. 29). It could be assessed that upon adopting green growth as a national strategy and brand in 2008, the Lee Myung-Bak Administration secured Korea's leading role in the global stage as a "norm diffuser" of green growth (Kim, 2014, p. 29).

Second, Korea's other achievement was winning the bid to host the GCF Secretariat. The GCF can be evaluated as a "bridge" in that it pools funds from developed countries for financial assistance to developing countries (Kim, 2014, p. 24). As it was decided at the 112th Ministers Meeting for International Economics held in November 2011 that Korea would make a bid to host the GCF Secretariat, the Korean government greatly endeavored for its victory (Kim, 2014, p. 24). During the keynote address at COP17 in Durban, the Minister of Korea's Ministry of Environment announced the nation's desire to host the GCF. In fact, Korea was the first nation to publicize such a bid. Korea's expression of its intention continued in unofficial discussions as well (Kim, 2014, p. 24). The nation's proactive and engaging stance was welcomed by a number of countries. A total of six nations made their bids to host the GCF Secretariat: Germany, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, Korea, and Switzerland (Green Climate Fund, 2012a, pp. 6-7; Kim, 2014, p. 24).

Korea presented six main reasons why it should be designated as the host for the Secretariat (Kim, 2014, pp. 24-25). First, Korea is optimized to bridge between developing and developed countries, for it understands the difficulties that the former faces as well as the concerns of the latter. Second, Korea has adopted green growth as the national vision, which is a benchmark in the global effort to combat climate change. Third, most of the major international organizations addressing the environment are located in Europe, North America, and Africa, whereas none of them are placed in Asia. Fourth, Korea made a voluntary pledge to support the GCF with $40 million, even though it has a developing country status. Fifth, Songdo, the city promoted for the Secretariat, located in Incheon, is environmentally

friendly and geographically convenient. In particular, the I-Tower in Songdo was available for permanent, rent-free, and immediate residence to the GCF (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2013, pp. 40-41). Sixth, Korea underscored its determination and capacity as a strong middle power in the climate change regime, confirming its role as a bridge on the international stage as well as its domestic early-mover approach.

The voting of the GCF Board was based on four categories: (1) legal status, (2) privileges and immunities, (3) financial arrangements, administrative and logistical support, and (4) local facilities and conditions. Mexico (yellow light rating in (4)), Poland (red light rating in (2)), and Namibia (yellow light rating in (1) and (4)) missed the cut, whereas Switzerland, Korea, and Germany received green light ratings in all four categories (Green Climate Fund, 2012b: pp.7, 10, 13, 16, 17, 20, and 23; Kim, 2014, p. 25). Even though chances were slim for Korea to win the bid, it became the winner to host the GCF Secretariat. The outcome of the bid could not only be attributed to Korea's geographical location and financial contributions but also to its active diplomacy recognized in the climate change regime (Kim, 2014, p. 25).

WHAT IS NEXT?

Recently, however, the heads of the two Korea-based international organizations have announced to resign (Yonhap News Agency, 2016). It was announced in April 2016 that Yvo de Boer, Director-General of the GGGI who began his four-year term in April 2014 has stated to step down in the end of September. His replacement is to be recruited through an international recruitment process. Hela Cheikrouhou, Executive Director of the GCF also has announced at the beginning of the year to step down when her three-year term expires in September, and has not offered to serve for another term. The fund is to select a new chief in its key conference slated for June. The news caused suspicion that they might have made their decisions partially due to the current government's lack of attention to the environment agenda (Yonhap News Agency, 2016).

Even though the government has emphasized that their resignation was

due to "personal reasons," Korea should take the responsibility to demonstrate continued commitment to climate change for the successful operation of Korea-based international organizations. The fact that Korea ranked 80th among 180 countries evaluated in the 2016 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) shows that this is a crucial task. In particular, Korea ranked 173rd in the EPI's Air Quality indicator, which includes ultra-fine dust and nitrogen dioxide (NOx) concentrations (Hsu, 2016). Korea's case reflects the alarming global trend found by the 2016 EPI that "half of the world's population breathes unsafe air (Hsu, 2016)."

Korea's poor air quality sheds light on the importance of addressing environmental issues particularly at the "urban" level. Cities account for 3% of the world's land surface, but are responsible for 60% to 80% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions (UNEP, 2012). The international society is also recognizing how critical urbanization and cities are to the environment. For instance, Goal 11 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was adopted on cities, and the upcoming Habitat III Conference is to focus on the implementation of a "New Urban Agenda." In addition, more than 450 mayors participated in the Paris climate talks and pledged to reduce emissions by more than 50% over 15 years (World Bank, 2015). Therefore, with two major climate change international organizations based in Korea, addressing environmental issues, especially at the urban level, is critical for the nation to achieve sustainable development. Cities are particularly vulnerable to climate change, but at the same time, they serve as a new opportunity to lower global carbon emissions and enhance Korea's climate change diplomacy.

DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS IN KOREA'S FTAS

ACHIEVEMENTS

Provisions in FTA texts can be a good indicator of a country's diplomacy in various sectors, such as investment, services, environment, and so on. This is because FTA provisions are the result of trade negotiations, which reflect

the national interests and direction of trade partners.

With the proliferation of trade agreements, trade and environmental governance has become a significant issue. In trade discussions, the environment had been initially addressed at the multilateral level under the World Trade Organization (WTO) system. However, as progress was slow in multilateral negotiations, discussions on the harmonization of trade and environment started to shift to the regional or bilateral level (George, 2014, p. 7). Recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) have increasingly established environmental protection as their main value, including considerations for climate change and sustainable development. Developed countries, especially the US and the EU, have been in the lead of addressing environmental issues in FTA negotiations. While the WTO Agreement is still in lack of an independent agreement for environmental issues, sustainable development is addressed as a separate agenda in RTAs (Shim, 2010, p. 7). In some cases, specific issues, such as climate change and biodiversity are separately addressed in the provisions. In addition, compared to the multilateral trade system, RTAs provide more legal opportunities for environmental protection (Shim, 2010, p. 7). Finally, countries that share similar environments or ecological backgrounds can use RTAs as an appropriate means to establish cooperative relations on environmental issues (Shim, 2010, p. 7), such as climate change.

Korea's position on environmental issues in FTAs can be divided into two phases, before and after the Korea-US (KORUS) FTA (Kang, 2015, p. 26). In the first phase, the environment was not addressed as the major agenda in trade negotiations, though not completely ignored. Environmental protection or sustainable development was merely referred to in the Preamble. Also, trade agreements included environmental exceptions modeled on Article XX (General Exceptions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), under which environmental policies may violate GATT rules. In specific, two grounds for environmental exception clauses are: "(b) necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health," and "(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." In short, during the first phase, environmental protection was addressed only in the Preamble or in exception clauses; there was no separate chapter exclusively devoted to environmental issues.

In contrast, in the second phase, Korea's FTAs started to incorporate advanced forms of environmental provisions that go beyond environmental exceptions and reference to environmental protection in the Preamble. The KORUS FTA and the following FTAs fall in this period, including agreements concluded with the EU and Peru. The KORUS FTA opened the door for subsequent agreements to include a chapter wholly devoted to the environment. The environment chapter includes a wide range of detailed provisions on: standards of environmental protection, enforcement of environmental laws, public participation, and relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Likewise, the KORUS FTA can be regarded as a breakthrough in environmental agreements in Korea's FTAs (Jung and Oh, 2015, p. 318).

The Korea-EU FTA also includes a comprehensive chapter on the environment, entitled "Trade and Sustainable Development," which covers environmental and labor issues. The agreement has been hailed as "ground-breaking" by the EU itself, as it was the first trade agreement concluded with an Asian country, containing comprehensive provisions on trade, outside the context of EU enlargement (Marin Duran and Morgera, 2012, p. 118). Similar approaches have been applied in subsequent Korean trade agreements.

During the period when Korea entered into the second phase, Korea established "Low Carbon Green Growth" as the national vision, and, in turn, sustainable development was one of the most important agendas during the Lee Myung-Bak Administration. It seems that the KORUS FTA and the subsequent FTAs with developed forms of environmental provisions reflect such concern (Kang, 2015, pp. 28-29). The specific environmental provisions included in each trade agreement are shown in Table 1.

WHAT IS NEXT?

The active incorporation of environmental provisions in the two benchmark FTAs were, however, led by the US and the EU (Kang, 2015, p. 144). It is ambiguous whether it was Korea's intention to include a separate chapter devoted to the environment. Thus, a more fundamental direction should be

Table 1. Environmental Provisions in Korea's FTAs

	Trade Partner (year of entry into force)											
	Chile (2004)	Singapore (2006)	EFTA (2006)	ASEAN (2007)	India (2010)	EU (2011)	Peru (2011)	US (2012)	Turkey (2013)	Australia (2014)	Canada (2015)	China (2015)
Reference to the Environment or SD in the Preamble	○	×	○	×	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Chapter Devoted to the Environment	×	×	×	×	×	○	○	○	×	○	○	○
Enforcement of Environmental Law	×	×	×	×	×	○	×	○	○	○	○	○
Environmental Standards	×	×	×	×	×	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Environmental Cooperation	○	○	×	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Information Sharing	×	×	×	○	×	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Relations to MEAs	×	×	×	×	×	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Environmental Exceptions	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	×
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms	×	×	×	×	×	○	×	○	○	×	○	×
Public Participation	×	×	×	×	×	○	×	○	×	×	○	×
Public Submissions	×	×	×	×	×	○	×	○	×	×	×	×

Source: Kim and Keum, 2011 (updated by author)

Note: The KORUS FTA was signed in June 2007 and the EU FTA in October 2010.

established with respect to incorporating environmental provisions into future trade agreements (Kang, 2015, p. 144). In the climate change discourse, the relationship between trade and environment is gaining more attention, which would promote further discussions on the issue and be an opportunity for Korea to clarify its position.

In addition, if an environment chapter is included in a newly negotiated FTA, Korea needs to have a consistent position on how it will address climate change. The KORUS and the Korea-EU FTAs are common in that they consider the environment as an important agenda, but at the same time they are different from each other regarding forms and details, including how they address climate change. In most EU agreements, climate change has gradually emerged not only as a cooperation priority but also as an ambitious issue-area of environmental cooperation (Jinnah and Morgera, 2013, p. 332). EU FTAs include detailed provisions addressing climate change, which cannot be found in US FTAs. To become a leader in the climate change regime, Korea should initiate future FTA negotiations on climate change with its own model text. In addition, maintaining consistency will contribute to minimizing confusion in subsequent trade implementations and dispute settlement (Kang, 2015, p. 145). An assessment of the FTAs that Korea has concluded is also needed in order to identify the problems arising from their implementation, which can be considered in future amendments and trade negotiations (Kang, 2015, p. 146).

Lastly, as Korea has already concluded FTAs with major developed countries, trade agreements with developing countries continue to be negotiated and concluded. Thus, Korea should all the more establish its stance on how it will deal with climate change issues in trade negotiations with developing countries. Korea did not include a separate chapter on the environment in FTAs concluded with developing countries prior to the Peru FTA. Therefore, the Peru FTA is expected to play a role as a turning point, which has brought Korea to a crossroads where it needs to decide its position and strategy in future FTA environment negotiations with developing countries (Kang, 2015, p. 145). In practice, it is noteworthy that the Korea-China FTA has a chapter devoted to the environment with developed provisions. China first incorporated a separate environment chapter in the China-Switzerland FTA which took into force in 2014, prior to the Korea-

China FTA. Moreover, the Korea-Colombia FTA which is expected to take force in July 2016 includes a separate chapter entitled, "Trade and Sustainable Development." This demonstrates the growing interest and consideration of developing countries on the harmonization between trade governance and environmental protection.

CONCLUSION

Climate change has been a prevalent international agenda since the late 1980s, as growing scientific evidence recognized its anthropogenic nature and serious impact. Before 2008, Korea's climate change diplomacy had remained to be weak, as it focused on maintaining its status as a developing country in relation to the UNFCCC (Kim, 2014, p. 1). However, from 2008, Korea's climate change diplomacy showed a significant shift, establishing "Low Carbon Green Growth" as the national vision. Once a passive actor, Korea became recognized for its climate change diplomacy in the international arena. This paper has focused on three main aspects: Korea's leadership in international climate change negotiations, Korea-based international organizations addressing climate change, and the development of environmental provisions in Korea's FTAs. Then, implications have been put forth on the role of various actors – non-state actors, cities, and the government – in Korea's future diplomatic strategies on climate change.

Firstly, with respect to international negotiations, Korea took a "me first" approach by making a voluntary pledge to satisfy the highest emissions target recommended by the international community, despite being a country exempt from binding commitments (Kim, 2014, p. 19). Korea also proposed to establish the NAMA Registry and the NAMA Credit System. This demonstrates Korea's role as a bridge between developed and developing countries, which is significant in that their conflicting stance on mitigation responsibility has been the main cause for placing climate change negotiations into gridlock (Kim, 2014, p. 22). Notwithstanding Korea's past accomplishments, the country's 2030 Mitigation Target released in June 2015 not only stirred domestic debate, but also led to mixed reactions from the international society, arguing that the nation has backslided from the

original mitigation plan (Choi and Lee, 2015, p. 2). In order to maintain international credibility, Korea should strive to meet the 2030 Mitigation Target through increased public-private cooperation efforts.

Secondly, Korea has taken on an important role in international organizations addressing climate change. A noteworthy accomplishment was its founding of the GGGI in 2010. Designated as an international organization in 2012, the Institute aims for the capacity-building of developing countries for their domestic implementation of green growth. The GGGI gained ODA Eligibility Status in 2013, in less than a year after it became an international organization (Global Green Growth Institute, 2013; Kim, 2014, 31). In addition to the founding of the GGGI, Korea won the bid to host the GCF Secretariat, even though the odds were slim with competitive candidates. However, recently, the heads of both the GGGI and the GCF offered to resign. Their decisions have stirred suspicion that they might have stepped down because the current government did not place a high priority on the environment agenda. The government has emphasized that their resignation was due to personal reasons, but as Korea's poor air quality has recently become a serious issue, it should all the more take the responsibility to demonstrate continued commitment on environmental issues, including climate change, especially at the urban level.

Finally, Korea has shown progress in inserting environmental provisions in FTAs. The KORUS FTA opened the door for subsequent FTAs to include a chapter wholly devoted to the environment. The Korea-EU FTA also includes a comprehensive chapter on trade and sustainable development that covers various environmental issues. Similar approaches have been applied in subsequent Korean trade agreements with other countries. However, the active incorporation of environmental provisions in the two benchmark FTAs were, in fact, led by the US and the EU (Kang, 2015, p. 144). Thus, Korea needs to establish its position on how it will deal with environmental issues in subsequent FTAs. In particular, as Korea has already concluded FTAs with major developed countries, trade agreements with developing countries remain to be negotiated and concluded. Thus, Korea should all the more take on a consistent and proactive role in future FTA environmental negotiations, especially with respect to the potential conflict between trade and climate change policies.

From an observer position, Korea took on a role as a "green middle power" in the climate change regime which has been in gridlock. However, what is now important is whether Korea's diplomatic accomplishment will end merely as a diplomatic rhetoric or continue on in the future. A more fundamental national goal is in need; Korea's climate change diplomacy should "start from the inside (Shin, 2012, p. 21)." This paper has suggested that non-state actors, cities, and the government should all be responsible for combating climate change. Internal capacity building as a green nation is crucial for the nation's survival and prosperity under the new climate change framework. Then, it will be possible for Korea to become an agenda-setter that can diffuse its norms through public diplomacy in the international climate change regime. Perhaps it is time for Korea to break the stereotype that the nation itself is a middle power (Park, 2016).

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Non-State Actor Participation in Korean Public Diplomacy: Case Study of Karandashi Project

Junghyun Cho

INTRODUCTION

Since the establishment of the Public Diplomacy Division in September 2011, the South Korean government has made significant efforts in creating and developing effective Korean public diplomacy. In the same year, the first South Korean public diplomacy ambassador was appointed, and in 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs designated 29th of October as the first 'Public Diplomacy Day'. In addition, 'Public Diplomacy Law' was enacted in February 2016. As such, a lot has been established in a very short period of time, proving the importance of public diplomacy as Korea's new diplomatic strategy. According to Article 2 of public diplomacy law, the Korean government defined public diplomacy as:

> *'Diplomatic activities conducted by the state directly or indirectly through collaboration with local governments or private sectors to enhance understanding and trust of foreign publics using culture, knowledge and policy.'*

As can be inferred from this definition, the Korean government does not consider public diplomacy to be only an instrument of the central government, but also as an activity that can be exercised by the private sectors in the form of collaboration. Furthermore, Article 4 'The Duty of the State', states the responsibility of the central government to enhance the

citizen participation through creating administrative and financial support as well as through education and promotion.

Following the trend of the 'new public diplomacy' that incorporates non-state actors as major stakeholders in public diplomacy, the South Korean government is trying to create a favorable environment for non-state actors, including private companies, NGOs, and even individuals to exercise public diplomacy as public diplomats themselves. To meet its objective, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created a program called 'All citizens are public diplomats' under the citizen participatory public diplomacy activities. The 'All Citizens are Public Diplomats' program that first started in 2013, is central government and citizen collaborative public diplomacy that selects ten or more teams consist of ordinary citizens based on their public diplomacy projects. Selected teams from various different fields, including cultural exchange, medical care, and education, receive funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct their own public diplomacy projects.

Within the eleven projects selected by the program in 2015, the Karandashi project consisted of eleven university students, publishing and distributing Korean folktale books to Korean Diasporas in Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States. On 29th of October 2015, the first public Diplomacy Day ceremony, team Karandashi was invited to receive the best public diplomacy case of the year award. How could the Karandashi project become the most effective case, among all the other public diplomacy projects, including the projects in 'All citizens are public diplomats'? Moreover, what factors have contributed to making the Karandashi project more effective? The answer to these research questions were found by conducting in-depth qualitative interviews of both the organizer of the Karandashi team and the director of domestic Korean Russian Diaspora organization who provided feedback and received the published books.

According to the findings, the project was effective firstly because the Karandashi project showed the ideal type of collaboration with the government, both acquiring accountability and legitimacy. Second, an effective network formed by multiple stakeholders worked from the publishing to the distributing processes at home and abroad. Third, the characteristics of successful cultural diplomacy were incorporated throughout the contents. The factors that had contributed to the effectiveness include

the Diaspora communities, advanced internet and SNS, media coverage, and others.

The in-depth theoretical analysis on the South Korean non-state actors' public diplomacy project has not been explored much in prior researches since the field of study has been introduced recently and is still at the initial stage. Therefore, this research on the successful non-state actors' public diplomacy program with a document review and in-depth interviews will provide the road map for future collaboration in Korean public diplomacy. Literature review on the previous studies will be conducted in the next section to provide general understanding of the non-state actors' involvement in public diplomacy, cultural public diplomacy and the importance of Diaspora communities.

LITERATURE REVIEW

NON-STATE ACTORS IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

According to the definition by Leonard, public diplomacy is about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; and looking for areas where we can find a common cause. In the past, public diplomacy had the limited meaning of being government foreign policy, with the central government being the exclusive player. However, as the role of non-state actors became more significant in international and domestic affairs, the role of non-state actors has evolved from being consumers of diplomacy to producers of diplomacy (Hocking, Melissen, Riordan & Sharp, 2012). Due to the advancement of media and social networking services, non-state actors are making use of the global networks to build relationships with foreign publics with higher credibility and transparency, free from the perception of exercising government propaganda. In addition, the involvement of non-state actors in public diplomacy includes citizen public diplomacy through people to people public diplomacy, which the citizens have defined as being the unofficial ambassador, with the responsibility of helping to shape the foreign relations of states (Mueller,

2009).

Through engaging in partnerships with non-state actors, the central government can utilize the advantages that the public diplomacy of non-state actors has. Non-state actors can also gain immediate access to power and opportunities provided by the government, which controls the important resources (Brinkerhoff, 2002). When the mutuality and separated organizational identity of the government and non-state actors are high, benefits for both organizations can be maximized which leads to high performance and effectiveness of the project (Brinkerhoff, 2002).

SIGNIFICANCE OF DIASPORA IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

According to the definition provided by Trent (2012), Diaspora is a category of people and their descendants originally belonging to in nation dispersed to another nation. In addition, these Diasporas retain attachment to both the homeland and the host countries (Trent, 2012) that can work as an effective bridge between the two countries. With the huge number of the Diasporas working within the civil society of the host countries, Diasporas can serve in the role of an effective public diplomacy campaign platform (Attias, 2012). In the case of Israel, which had been suffering from the disadvantages of its national image, the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs was established to make full use of the advantages that Diaspora can bring to Public Diplomacy.

In the article "Israel's New Peer-to-Peer Diplomacy," Attias (2012) explained how the government tried to strengthen and build a relationship between the government, domestic publics, and Diasporas to create an effective network to change the perceptions of foreign publics regarding Israel by conducting P2P public diplomacy. One of the greatest benefits of incorporating Diaspora for Israel was that it was realistic to expect strong willingness and cooperation from the participants (Attias 2012), making it possible to reduce the cost of convincing them to participate and act in alignment with the government's diplomatic objectives.

Furthermore, Diasporas in other countries can also be helpful in obtaining information about local culture and access to the relationship with the foreign publics and influential elites (Ayhan, 2016), in addition to

reducing the entry costs for partnerships and collaboration.

KOREAN-RUSSIAN DIASPORAS

In 1937, the Korean Russian Diasporas, also known as 'Koryo Saram', were deported from Yonhaeju[1] to Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirgizstan. The massive deportation of 182,000 Diasporas was the result of the conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union[2] (Ko, 1988). However, thanks to the 'Korean language enhancement policy' in the Far East from 1923 to 1937, most Koreans could maintain their Korean language skills along with their national identity to the Central Asian countries (Ko, 1988). As the Korean-Russians moved into the region, Diaspora communities formed in the region were also entering to politics, academia and business fields in the receiving state (Sung, 2009). However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Korean-Russian Diasporas experienced more suppression due to the nationalistic policies within the Commonwealth of Independent States (Sung, 2009). The number of Korean-Russian Diasporas that had received Korean language education declined, but still the affection towards the country exists within their minds.

Today, there are as much as 470,000 Korean Diasporas across Russia and CIS countries.[3] According to the national identity survey conducted, Korean Diasporas responded that they have high sense of pride in being of Korean descent and were willing to inherit their identity (Yoon, 2014). However, the results of the Diaspora's affection was symbolic and of psychological significance, lacking in actual exercise of collective activities

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1 Maritime province in the Far East, Russia | Korean Diasporas started to move into Yonhaeju after the Beijing treaty in 1860, sharing the border with the Russia for the first time. Many independence activists moved in to this province during the colonial period to conduct independence movements (Ko, 1988).

2 Because Japanese spies often disguised as Korean Diasporas and entered the Diaspora communities, the Lenin government faced difficulties in distinguishing Japanese spies from Korean Diasporas. This is considered to be the most realistic explanation for the massive deportation (Ko, 1988).

3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015, September 18) -*2015 overseas citizen index* | Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.kr/travel/overseascitizen/index.jsp?menu=m_10_40

within the community and low level of Korean language ability.

Only 17 percent of the Korean Russian Diasporas answered Korean as being their native language. As language has a significant impact in forming and continuing national identity, the lack of Korean language education in Russia and CIS countries can lead to a decrease in the number of Korean Diasporas with a willingness to partake in the role of a bridge and moderator between the countries. The number of registered Korean Diasporas in South Korean embassies and diplomatic offices is declining every year. To prevent such phenomena, language and cultural education for the next generation in these regions is necessary.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

According to Rhoads (2008), culture is best thought of as an important moderator of psychological effects. To win the hearts and minds of foreign publics, cultural aspects can play an important role in building positive a relationship between the domestic and foreign publics. Even though being marginalized in international politics (Schneider, 2009), cultural diplomacy can be very useful public diplomacy when the following conditions are met. The characteristics that can be discovered in successful cultural diplomacy projects include a two-way engagement involving collaborative activities, contextualization, enjoyment and flexibility in funding managements (Schneider, 2009). Sometimes the communication between different cultures can reinforce negative stereotypes. However, when the transactions are increased, such stereotypes often fade away (Schneider, 2009).

In the case of Korean public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy has played an important role under the name of 'Hallyu', the Korean wave. Hallyu, which refers to popular culture, including k-pop and k-dramas, has a huge influence on East Asian countries. The South Korean government places emphasis on the importance of cultural diplomacy using 'Hallyu' as an effective public diplomacy tool. While cultural diplomacy accounts for the major portion of public diplomacy in Korea, it is also pointed out as the limitation of Korean public diplomacy for concentrating too much on that field, disregarding other types of public diplomacy. However, it is evident

that Hallyu is playing a significant role in inducing the interest of foreigners towards Korea and works as the initial factor to attract the attention of foreign publics.

KARANDASHI PROJECT

Karandashi, meaning 'pencil' in Russian, is a Korean folk tale book translation project initiated by thirteen students from Korea University. The team was first started by an organizer's experience in an NGO called Friends Asia, where he worked in the journalist team. After working with Korean Russian Diaspora communities, he noticed the lack of language education for the Korean Russian Diasporas that returned to South Korea, causing them to face difficulties in adapting to South Korean society. Without support from the government, children who had failed to enter the multicultural schools had more difficulties obtaining Korean language skills and faced difficulties as the courses were conducted only in Korean. In addition, due to the expected low profitability of the translated Russian books, children could not read many Korean books to learn the language. To help this situation, a student volunteer group was established in January 2015 to publish the folktale books, written in both Korean and Russian to assist language education for children.

To collect the budgets for publication and domestic distribution of the books, students applied for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 'All Citizens are Public Diplomats' program. To be selected for the program, students studied public diplomacy through the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to write their proposals. As such, students had no initial purpose to exercise public diplomacy in the beginning with no prior understanding of the concept. As a result, they came to partake in public diplomacy without any intention from the beginning. However, while developing the project, the participants started to recognize themselves as public diplomats, feeling the responsibility to meet the promises made towards the 4th, 5th, and 6th generations of Diaspora communities. In the end, students expanded the target group from only the domestic Diaspora communities to Central Asia and Russia.

Team Karandashi did not only publish and distribute the books but also accompanied these with cultural exchange programs and activities by visiting the Diaspora community center at home and abroad. Furthermore, the organizers had held the conference 'The story of the Koryo Saram' to enhance the understanding of the domestic publics on Korean Diasporas.

METHODS

The research was based on the literature review of the prior research and analysis of the data sources, mainly from the report of the Karandashi projects to the other stakeholders and the interview of the participants. The data were used to analyze the effectiveness of the project and to categorize the factors that have affected the efficiency of the project. Borrowing the model of Zhang and Swartz (2008), on the NGO media diplomacy on the values, effectiveness and factors affecting the effectiveness, the collaborative public diplomacy of the Korean government and non-state actors will be analyzed.

DATA COLLECTION

In-depth interviews were conducted with the organizer of the Karandashi team and the director of the domestic Korean Russian Diaspora community organization 'Ner-mer', located in Ansan in Gyeonggi Province. Interviewees were not only the senders but also the receivers of this project. Each interview lasted for approximately one to two hours. Prior to the interviews, e-mails were sent to the organizers of the Karandashi program to explain about the study and to ask them for their agreement on the interview. After interviewing the organizer of the Karandashi team, the study was explained to the Diaspora organization, and a phone interview was conducted with the director of the Ner-mer.

The interview questions focused on three themes: the government's role and effectiveness in this project, communication and feedback during the procedures that are based on relationship building, and network formation.

In addition, the open-ended questions included whether the participants view the project as effective, which factors contributed or disrupted the effectiveness, and whether Karandashi members see themselves as public diplomats.

FINDINGS

Interviews and documents indicated the characteristics of the Karandashi project that made the project successful.

IDEALISTIC COLLABORATION

The partnership between the government and the Karandashi team provided idealistic collaboration with high mutuality and high level of identity of each organization. The effectiveness was maximized, preserving accountability of the non-state actor towards the foreign public and legitimacy of the government towards the domestic stakeholders simultaneously.

Different from prior researches on government activities perceived as propaganda, public confidence given by the central government through the partnership has benefited the Karandashi project hugely, making them a successful case, thus being elected as the best public diplomacy project of the year. Legitimacy, or often known as 'public confidence (공신력)', provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had played a huge role in all aspects, from fundraising to distribution of the books, especially with domestic stakeholders.

Being university students with no revenue, the most difficult part of the project was collecting the funding from the organizations. According to the organizer of the team Karandashi, he asserted the biggest weakness they faced domestically was lack of legitimacy: "When we sent out our proposals to receive funding to various organizations and institutions but, all of them got rejected, because they could not simply trust us, since we were just a small group of university students."

However, after being selected to the 'All citizens are public diplomats'

program, they started to receive funding from various institutions including individual donors. Just by the fact that they received the funding from the government, the legitimacy of the students became stronger, since they were government approved.

In addition, the government played a crucial role in the distribution of the books to CIS countries with nationalistic policies. In countries such as Uzbekistan, they have strict nationalism policy, even screening books that are imported from and exported to different countries: "Even the books that I received as a gift from the Diasporas were confiscated at the airport."

This was also one of the biggest challenges that the Karandashi team faced, but was solved with the help of the central government. Instead of shipping the books directly to the Diaspora organizations, Korean language schools, libraries and cultural centers, books were sent to the embassy first to ensure safe delivery without the screening procedure. According to the organizer of Karandashi, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the biggest and most reliable partner and supporter in their project.

Regarding the contents of the project, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained very passive, maintaining a stance of non-interference. In the initial stage of the project, the Ministry made a recommendation to the Karandashi team to expand the targeted audience from not only the domestic Diaspora communities, but also to the Diasporas residing in Russia and CIS countries. Recommendations were made without any forcefulness, but the team decided to incorporate that idea, receiving more funding including transportation costs. To maintain the organization's identity, and its comparative advantage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only required the students to submit monthly report about the procedure of the projects. There were several phone calls in between, giving pieces of advice such as which institution to contact; however, there were no significant requirements to make changes to the contents of the project.

Moreover, the government tried to decrease their visibility in the project. During the printing procedure, the Karandashi team asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whether to put the government logo on the cover of the books. However, the government refused to put the government logo on the books, so only the logos of other stakeholders, including Samsung Card and Pushkin house, were printed on the book.

Except for the recommendation made to enlarge the target audience, no further attempts of the government were made to change the project to be aligned with the government's objective. This may have been possible since the government had already chosen eleven teams of the 201 teams that applied for the 'All citizens are public diplomats' program which followed their objectives and shared the same goals. In this way, the government could successfully achieve its desired public diplomacy outcomes, without making too much effort to conduct checks or force the teams to perform activities that meets their needs.

EFFECTIVE CENTRALIZED NETWORK FORMATION

The Karandashi project started off with only thirteen university students wanting to create folktale books for the Korean Russian Diasporas to assist them learning Korean language. However, as a result, a huge network was formed at home and abroad, with diverse multi-stakeholders participating in the project from publishing to distribution, working flexibly in non-hierarchical settings. According to Zaharna (2013), an effective network depends on the alignment between public diplomacy goals and the network initiative's structure and communication/relational dynamics, thus understanding the alignment should be considered as a critical factor in network formation. By aligning both the goals and structures, the Karandashi project managed to generate a synergistic result through interactions as Zaharna pointed out (2013).

With the Karandashi team playing the role of a single network hub, placed in the center of the network, diverse stakeholders, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Samsung Card, Pushkin House, Korea University Language Center, illustrators, and Diaspora communities completed the formation. With the Karandashi team acting as the 'network weaver' (Zaharna, 2013), the roles of the stakeholders were largely divided into five categories which are directly linked with the Karandashi team, serving diverse roles for the project. The Karandashi project, a simple tasked-based project of creating and distributing the books, is suited very well to this network of high centrality and diversity.

Figure 1. Network structure based on the role of the Karandashi project.



During the network formation, media and internet has played a huge role in recruiting the stakeholders. After appearing in the 'Joonang-ilbo', one of the mainstream newspapers in Korea, through the network of one of the advisory professors, the Karandashi project started gaining attention from other media as well. After being exposed in the media several times, the Karandashi team started to get proposals from volunteers and institutions that wanted to receive the books or participate in this project through their Facebook page. Except for the main funding sources, including Samsung Card and the Ministry of foreign affairs, most of the network formation, especially the Diaspora communities abroad was formed by Internet social network services.

Influential bloggers in Central Asia posted Karandashi on their blogs and also recruited the Diaspora communities to help with the distribution of the books through providing transportation and accommodation, and holding collaborative cultural activities. Korean Diasporas in Russia and CIS countries were enthusiastic to form a network and participate in the program, with high willingness to make use of this chance to learn the Korean language.

As mentioned previously, internet social media played a significant role in the network formation by gathering diverse actors and enhancing accountability through uploading the progress of publishing and activities of the team. In addition, traditional one-way media has contributed by directing the initial attention of the public to the program, with the credibility the major news media holds. As such, traditional media, including news and articles, and more two-way communicative media, such as internet broadcasts and Facebook were simultaneously used for different purposes in the project. The Karandashi project was exposed to the media many times both at home and abroad, including 35 newspaper articles, six radio broadcastings, nine internet broadcastings, and three news reports, including one podcast. Internet broadcasting 'African TV', which was a relatively new instrument in the public diplomacy projects has made some significant achievements showing the potential as an effective public diplomacy tool with 260 hours accumulated through nine live broadcastings, approximately 30,000views and receiving 2.7 million collections.

In the case of Samsung Card, the purpose of the company was to successfully perform social corporate responsibility by holding the 9th Open Sharing Program Season 'Making an Enjoyable World for Children'. Receiving more than 500 votes, Karandashi was elected in the top seven programs and received half of their funding revenue from Samsung Card. By sponsoring the largest amount of financial resources to the project, Samsung Card could also achieve its objective in building a positive image of their company, which is aligned with the network. Unlike the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Samsung Card requested that its logo be printed on the cover of the books, and also requested an official meeting with the Korean Russian Diaspora organization in Korea. In addition, during the voting procedure, voters had to join as a member of their website, which made people hesitant, causing loss of legitimacy to some extent. However, it is difficult to measure how much legitimacy was lost due to the engagement of Samsung Card.

SUCCESSFUL CHARACTERISTICS OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Selecting six Korean folk tales that are most well known in Korea, the Karandashi team wanted the books to be not only language learning material, but also a way to deliver and share the stories with rich Korean traditional culture. These six stories, with different levels of language proficiency, are representative stories that all Koreans know very well or have least heard of at home or in school. After going through translation revision procedure four times, the Karandashi team published 3,100 books to deliver to Korean Russian Diasporas.

Regarding the characteristics of cultural diplomacy, Schneider (2009) provided four general characteristics that define successful cultural diplomacy: 1) a two-way engagement that involves collaborative performance mentoring or teaching, exchange of information, techniques, perspectives, 2) contextualization, 3) enjoyment, and 4) flexibility, creativity, and adaptability. A program that embodies any or all of these characteristics with a sufficiently positive impact on quality will be considered as the best practice but is difficult to measure (Schneider 2009). The Karandashi project embodies these characteristics of cultural diplomacy as well.

First, the two-way engagement was created when the team visited Diaspora communities located domestically and abroad. Beyond just shipping to the location, the Karandashi team tried to deliver as much books as possible by visiting the communities. Visits were always accompanied with cultural programs to communicate with each other, which included teaching and learning culture, and sharing their stories. Because the group of organizers was university students majoring in Russian language and literature, communication and relationship building were more easily achieved.

Second, contextualization was used when re-writing the folktales, especially in illustration. Since the Diaspora children are not familiar with Korean traditional culture, the team tried hard to keep the Korean language with cultural meanings preserved and added footnotes to give further explanations to enhance their understanding of the Korean culture as much as possible. Illustrators tried to add specific and realistic cultural details to

the costumes, properties and backgrounds of the drawings.

At the same time, the team wanted to make the book look similar to Russian fairy tale books: "We looked at other Russian children's' books and discovered that they are very colorful with lots of flowers and always had a frame for the titles, so we also made a colorful frame to the cover of the books to make the books feel more familiar."

For example, the number three, which is the favorite number in Russian culture, was used in the illustration several times. An illustration of three eggs in a nest was inserted in the book 'Grateful Magpie'. The team constantly sought the opinions of the Diaspora children book writers and the community organizers as to whether the book will appeal to the children. After receiving differing and diverse advice, the team actively incorporated the feedback into the book making procedure.

Third, the project attempted to incorporate fun through accompaniment of diverse cultural programs. Story telling of 'Heung-boo and Nol-boo'with participation of the children was done in both Korean and Russian. In addition, K-pop performance sessions were held as the children had huge interest in K-pop, which often works as a strong motivation for them to learn Korean language and visit Korea. Not only the kids, but parents and families also participated in these cultural programs and enjoyed the events together.

Fourth, the project was conducted flexibly throughout the entire procedure. The Karandashi project could remain flexible through the use of the network with high centrality. With the Karandashi team located in the center as the net weaver, changes and feedback were made and applied directly and quickly. Also, the Karandashi team, which was organized only by university students, had added more creativity to the project incorporating other cultural programs.

MODEL OF KARANDASHI PROJECT

Through the in-depth interview and document review of the Karandashi project, the three main characteristics that contributed to the success were identified. Results show that collaboration with the government contributed

Figure 2. Characteristics and factors that affected the effectiveness of the Karandashi



to the success of the program, by both acquiring accountability and legitimacy at the same time. In addition, the network with high centrality had added flexibility and efficiency to the process. Also, the cultural aspects of the project added more understanding and enjoyment to the program. Other various factors affected the effectiveness as well, such as media coverage, social network service, Diaspora communities, and organizers being university students with Russian language proficiency.

CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

This qualitative research has explored the characteristics and factors that contributed to the success of the Karandashi project, which was selected as being the best public diplomacy case of the year by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the first 'public diplomacy day' event. Because it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness or the success of the public diplomacy program in such a short time period, the award was an indicator as to the effectiveness of this project. To figure out which factors made the project effective and

why, in-depth interviews were conducted with the participants of the project.

The results identified three major characteristics of the program. The first characteristic is the ideal collaboration of non-state actors and the state. Unlike the perception that government involvement could cause loss of the legitimacy of the program, public confidence (공신력) was provided to the Karandashi project. Due to the government becoming one of the stakeholders in the project, the university students could gain public confidence, thus were able to secure more sponsors with relative ease. The second characteristic is the network formation with high centrality, with the Karandashi team being in the center as the gatekeeper and network weaver. With a horizontal relationship network, ideas were shared within the network and changes were adopted quickly. Also, with the help of the social network services and media coverage, the Karandashi team could easily attract volunteers and Diaspora communities willing to cooperate in the publishing and distribution of the books. The objective and purposes of the multi-stake holders were aligned, resulting in efficient and successful network formation.

Third, the cultural characteristics that are found in the best practice of cultural diplomacy were embodied in the Karandashi program. Two-way communication and relationship building occurred through the delivery process. With high language proficiency of the staff members, communication went more smoothly. Contextualization of the contents of the books was also successful through receiving consistent feedback from Diaspora communities. Cultural programs accompanied the delivery, which has brought about more enjoyment around the project.

However, there some problems that needs to be solved in this project, such as copyright issues regarding future distribution of pdf files of the books. Furthermore, sponsorship can be an issue since the biggest funding revenues were from Samsung Card and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which provided for a one-time event. To continue this project, these issues of copyright and sponsorship need to be solved for future publications. The government should attempt to play the role of moderator, connecting the Karandashi team with other stakeholders of the network, and should take care of the copyright issues. Furthermore, the distance between the Diaspora communities organization that is in Russia and Central Asia is very far, and

the transportation costs are high. Active use of internet technology such as Skype should be adopted to help maintain communication and relationship building.

By listing the characteristics and factors that have contributed to the efficiency of the Karandashi project, this paper offers a road map for the future cultural diplomacy programs that the government of citizens can initiate. However, there are a number of limitations in this paper. First, the number of interviewees is small. Also, interviews of children and their parents in the Diaspora groups abroad are missing due to low accessibility. Furthermore, quantitative documents as empirical evidence of the program had difficulty in measuring efficiency. Thus, the award given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used as evidence of the effectiveness of the Karandashi project instead. Second, analysis on long-term effects was insufficient. Future analysis must incorporate the duration of the network and its future effectiveness as well.

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South Korean Public Diplomacy via Development Cooperation: The Cases of Bridge Diplomacy at the International Development Agenda and the Knowledge Sharing Programme

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The practice of public diplomacy is not limited to the organization of nation branding campaigns. There exists a multitude of government activities which can be viewed as containing public diplomacy components but may not be perceived as such by some publics. This can be due to these activities having less overt public diplomacy components or multiple purposes which extend beyond the sphere of public diplomacy. For instance, government-led development cooperation initiatives can be viewed through the lens of public diplomacy. Indeed, part of the purpose of development cooperation and foreign aid has been tied to improving the image of the donor country abroad and reaching strategic foreign policy goals by influencing recipient governments. This is particularly evident when looking back at the history of foreign aid after the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War. Foreign aid programmes in the present are not very different in this sense from those of the past. For example, the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade explicitly mentions the importance of aid in creating economic linkages and positive relationships with recipient countries (Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014).

South Korea is well aware of the importance of incorporating development related issues into its public diplomacy considering that it is one of the few countries which has managed to economically develop and

transition from being one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the richest. The accession of South Korea to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) is often portrayed as representative of South Korea's remarkable transition. Naturally, this rather unique experience has greatly influenced the form and orientation of South Korea's development assistance. Among other factors, this has resulted in the country adopting a mix of more "traditional" Official Development Assistance (ODA) channelled principally through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) along with signature quasi-official programmes such as the promotion of Saemaul Undong[1] in developing countries. The latter programme is a relatively recent initiative that attempts to draw on the legacy of Saemaul Undong, promote it as one of the key factors behind South Korea's "developmental miracle" and replicate certain aspects of it abroad (Kim, 2016, p84-85).

Alongside this, South Korea has been attempting to secure and promote development partnerships with international organizations and other actors in the field of international development. This paper will argue that South Korea's push towards bridge diplomacy in the field of development fits in with its pursuit of a "middle power diplomacy" strategy and that Korean efforts in the field of international development cooperation can be viewed as partial public diplomacy programmes aimed at achieving its national interest. To support this assertion, this article will examine the case of Korean bridge diplomacy in international forums such as the Seoul G20 Summit and the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), in whose creation South Korea played a leading role. The study will also overview South Korea's efforts aimed at sharing and branding its development experience in partnership with certain countries through the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP).

In essence, South Korea seems to perceive that development partnerships can be utilized as a form of public diplomacy which grants it soft power through name recognition and legitimacy on the international stage. These partnerships also allow it to build closer ties with countries that are also

1 Saemaul Undong or the New Village Movement was a government-led initiative created in the 1970s that sought to "modernize" Korean villages by promoting self-help and communal competition in the interest of development.

"middle powers" or emerging economies from which it can potentially benefit in the form of increased trade or stronger diplomatic ties.

The article will commence with a brief explanation and history of development cooperation in order to demonstrate that development cooperation programmes can be viewed as partial public diplomacy initiatives due to their focus on achieving foreign policy objectives, which are shared with public diplomacy. Then, the concept of South Korea's middle power diplomacy in general will be examined. Following this, it will be argued that South Korea's focus on development cooperation at international forums can be considered to form a part of its middle power diplomatic strategy. This will be done by using the cases of the important role played by South Korea in the G20 Seoul Summit and the 2011 Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. Finally, the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) will be used as an example to demonstrate the bilateral and collaborative aspect of Korea's bridge diplomacy.

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND FOREIGN AID AS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

> *[…]By working side by side with United States personnel, other nationalities will have an opportunity to become acquainted with the American way of life and the democratic way of doing things. Furthermore, the demonstration of this country's willingness to help, coupled with the visible evidence of their progress, should increase the good will of the recipient peoples toward the United States and their readiness to support American policies and ideals. In short, the various, benefits of Point Four ultimately converge in a major contribution to the United States policy objectives of building a stronger structure of international order and justice.*
>
> - *Benefits to the United States,* Committee on Foreign Affairs, Point Four Background and Program (International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949), July 1949.

The history of development cooperation and related concepts of foreign aid

are similar in many ways with the history of public diplomacy. The above quote from the report on the Point Four programme illustrates some of the similarities between both disciplines, particularly when it comes to their goals, while foreign aid may have had some roots in the period prior to the beginning of the Cold War, it can be said that foreign aid only became important, in both financial and political terms, in the context of Cold War diplomacy (Lancaster, 2008, p25). Indeed, much like public diplomacy, foreign aid as we know it has its roots in the post-World War II ideological battle between US-led capitalism and Soviet-style communism. This can be easily seen when examining the US-supported Marshall Plan, which aimed to rebuild Europe after the War in order to counter the influence of communist-aligned groups gaining power in Western Europe (Griffin, 1991, p645). Following this, the United States targeted aid at strategically located countries outside of Western Europe in order to win their "hearts and minds" and entice newly independent countries to refrain from aligning with the Soviet Bloc. Similarly, the declining colonial powers of Europe targeted their aid towards their ex-colonies in order to retain political and economic influence without having to resort to intimidation or violence.

Additionally, foreign aid was used by the Soviets and the West as a way to reward foreign governments for their loyalty (Griffin, 1991, p647, 668). The amount of official bilateral aid programmes established by Western countries ballooned in the 1960s until most major states were equipped with a governmental department specifically in charge of managing developmental aid. Of course, foreign aid was never able to fully win the "hearts and minds" of targeted countries and the Europeans, Americans, Soviets and their allies continued to employ more traditional methods of gaining influence such as political manipulation, funding of rebel groups in opposing states and so on. Nonetheless, much like public diplomacy today, foreign aid constituted a "soft" tool employed by countries seeking to gain influence in a region when compared to the "hard" tools of influence like military intervention or diplomatic pressure.

In the context of the Cold War, it could be said that the ultimate aim of both development aid and public diplomacy was essentially the same. The Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy's classic 1965 definition of the term may have proclaimed that public diplomacy "deals with the

influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy: the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries […].” (Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, 1961, cited in Waller, 2007) However, the goal of American public diplomacy via the United States Information Agency was admittedly to “further the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives as enunciated by the President and the State Department.” (Murrow, 1963) This was not so different from one of the goals of U.S. development aid, which was also to further U.S. political interests abroad and complement U.S. foreign policy (Dratler Finney, 1983; USAID, 2015). The United States is referred to as an example here due to the fact that it was one of the first countries to develop and incorporate both foreign aid and public diplomacy into their foreign policy in a serious manner. The United States’ subordination of development aid and public diplomacy to its foreign policy and strategic interests was in no way unique and other countries adopted similar models during the Cold War.

One of the factors which led to increased distance between the two disciplines was the types of discourse serving to legitimize and support public diplomacy and development aid during their early days. While the objectives of both public diplomacy and foreign aid were quite similar, high level discourse on the topic of foreign assistance tended to present development assistance and humanitarian government-led programmes as “universal goods” of sort. For instance, during his inaugural speech, U.S. President Harry S. Truman presented his “Point Four” programme, a major economic and military development assistance initiative as a way to liberate the world from poverty and want:

> *I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development. Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to*

lighten their burdens (Truman, 1949).

This type of universalistic rhetoric clearly differed from the more restrained rhetoric serving to justify and explain public diplomacy. Indeed, the public discourse surrounding early public diplomacy was less focused on presenting public diplomacy as a universal good of sorts and more focused on achieving domestic foreign policy objectives. This may be a result of the top-down or "one-way" communication nature of early public diplomacy. Nonetheless, this does not minimize the importance of proclamations about the universal nature of the values which practitioners aimed to embody and transmit in their practice of public diplomacy. It is in these types of discourse that clear parallels between public diplomacy and international development can easily be seen. Once again, Edward R. Murrow's statement addressed to the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements is emblematic of this:

> *…There are, of course, many common denominators. Everywhere we seek to encourage constructive public support for what the President has described as "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others." We present the United States as a strong, democratic, dynamic nation qualified to lead world efforts toward that goal. We emphasize ways in which U.S. policies harmonize with those of other peoples and governments* … (Murrow, 1963).

Despite the relatively different types of discourse serving to legitimize and support the disciplines of foreign aid and public diplomacy, when it comes to actual practice, there are many commonalities between both fields. For example, several of the common types of capacity building programmes employed by foreign aid agencies are very similar to those employed by public diplomacy professionals. For instance, the tools of scholarship provision, educational exchanges, public or specialized education provision are both well known to development and public diplomacy professionals. The overlap is particularly obvious in the field of development communi-

cation (Pamment, 2015). Pamment is very right in underlining the fact that there are several intersections between public diplomacy and aid and that these need to be studied in a more systematic and in-depth manner (Pamment, 2016).

Furthermore, the fact that both development assistance and public diplomacy aim to support a country's foreign policy does not erase the fact that both of these vehicles can result in mutual benefits and promote engagement. The relational approach to public diplomacy, which holds that the process of public diplomacy can be essentially boiled down to building relationships between actors, makes this fact very clear. By managing and sustaining positive interactions among a network of participants and publics, participants are able to achieve their own goals in harmony with those sought by the state sponsoring the initiative, resulting in a win-win situation. Bilateral development projects can be conceptualized as this type of public diplomacy and can serve to bolster the image of a country, create positive and constructive relationships between its citizens and participants abroad while also naturally materially benefiting aid recipients through the improvement of their living conditions (Zaharna, 2014, p153). The application of this concept to international development projects is not difficult and is consistent with recent pushes towards accountability and local ownership of development cooperation efforts. While the application of this is clearer when it comes to bilateral programmes, multilateral development cooperation strategies can also be conceived and analyzed on the model of relational and collaborative public diplomacy. This brings us to the case of South Korea's middle power "bridge diplomacy."

MIDDLE POWERS AND BRIDGE DIPLOMACY

Defining the concept of "Middle Power" is not simple. There does not seem to be any substantial agreement on what defines countries which can be classified as middle powers. Some scholars believe that the material endowments of states are what matters when it comes to classifying them in the middle power category. Others believe that middle powers are defined by their focus on multilateralism in foreign policy and their attempts to

legitimize and work within the international system to solve global issues. Some distinctions were also drawn between "traditional" middle powers and "emerging" middle powers (Jordaan, 2003). Traditional middle powers are described as being stable democracies while emerging middle powers are often new democracies or unstable and weak democracies. Domestically, traditional middle powers are described as being egalitarian states, while emerging middle powers are presented as societies that are significantly stratified domestically. Importantly, traditional middle powers are cast as having relatively little political or economic influence overall in their region and seek to conform to existing international norms. This is contrasted with emerging middle powers that are often the economic and political powerhouses of their region, heavily involved in regional politics and active in organizations and initiatives seeking to moderately reform the international order (Jordaan, 2003). Overall, Eytan Gilboa's summary of the middle power concept is very helpful in clarifying the idea in its simple form: "A synthesis of existing approaches and definitions suggests that states are viewed as middle powers if they have less material resources than great powers, and if they exercise good global citizenship, work through international organizations and agencies, promote mediation and peaceful conflict resolution, and participate in peacekeeping operations." (Gilboa, 2010)

Some scholars have described South Korea as an emerging middle power by referring to its regional engagement (Lee, 2012). There is no doubt that historically, South Korea cannot be considered a "traditional" middle power. However, the country seems to fit more comfortably in Jordan's traditional middle power category when its characteristics and foreign policy orientation since democratization are examined. Indeed, South Korea has been a stable democracy for over 10 years, is relatively egalitarian, and is also one of the smaller states in the East Asia region. However, the size of the Korean economy is very significant on the global scale and is only considered small regionally due to the country's geographic location between the two Asian giants that are China and Japan. Furthermore, like traditional middle powers, South Korea has been active in the international arena and has sought to present itself as a good citizen of the international community by participating in multilateral institutions without

really seeking to work outside the system led by the United States.

Overall, regardless of whether South Korea constitutes a traditional or emerging middle power, there is no doubt that South Korea can be considered a middle power in the general sense. Most importantly, South Korea publically identifies itself as a middle power and has sought to increase its ties with other middle powers while staying relatively close to major powers such as the United States. This can be seen from South Korea's attempt to lead the way in the creation of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia), an informal network of middle power countries which Korea hopes will be able to cooperate in order to resolve large-scale international issues. This marks a change from South Korea's foreign policy prior to democratization which heavily relied on the United States. Since democratization, South Korea has gradually taken more distance from the United States and sought to find its own identity and role in the international order (Sohn, 2015). Bridge diplomacy is a reflection of this as South Korea seeks to position itself in a way that allows it to act as a link between the developing and developed world at the international level. Some scholars have described this strategy as a form of "networked power." The concept of a network is very useful to illustrate the Korean strategy as it does not solely rely on the characteristics of countries to describe them but also takes into account their linkages to others which may provide them with a form of influence (Sohn, 2012). Essentially, international society can be conceived of as a type of network in which actors form individual nodes. While the nodes themselves may have specific characteristics, their connections and positioning when compared with others are also truly important (Kahler, 2015). Concretely, the usage of middle power diplomacy allows Korea to increase its connections with other actors and potentially benefit from collaboration at the international level (Sohn, 2015). Once again, the MIKTA constitutes a good example of this aspect of networked power.

The Korean push towards more inclusive development partnerships can be seen as a reflection of South Korea's middle power diplomacy and networked foreign policy orientation. While South Korea has continued to focus on bilateral official development assistance via the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), it has also pursued a strategy of engaging

other actors. Concretely, South Korea has been positioning itself as a "bridge" between actors and facilitators in the field of development. This "bridging" strategy motivated South Korea to lead the discussion on development issues in the context of the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit.

By positioning itself as a bridge or mediator between actors, South Korea is also to reap the benefits stemming from increased proximity to actors. For instance, South Korea has sought to use its position in the global network to mediate between the developed and developing world in international arenas (Sohn, 2015). This can be seen in the fields of financial reform, development cooperation and environmentalism (Sohn, 2015) (Pandey, Watson, 2014, p10-11).

In the sphere of international development, bridge diplomacy aims to manoeuvre South Korea into the role of mediator between the interests of developing and non-OECD DAC countries and the interests of OECD DAC countries and traditional donors (Kim, 2015). Since South Korea itself has been a part of the OECD DAC since 2010, the importance of Korean official development assistance (ODA) has increased almost every year although it is still below the OECD DAC average (OECD, 2015). There have also been several discussions and critiques about the Korean bilateral aid provision model, namely that it is too focused on "top-down" approaches and contains too much "tied aid" (Kalinowski, 2010). However, the impacts of this strategy cannot fully be understood by examining ODA characteristics and statistics. Particularly when it comes to public diplomacy via development cooperation, it is important to underline that South Korea's strategy is not limited to ODA provision as it aims to do more by creating partnerships and act as a model for developing countries aiming to grow. It also aims to shape the international discourse surrounding the field of international development in order to better reflect the lessons learnt from the Korean development experience. By doing so, Korea is able to make itself known as a leader in the field of development and a potential non-radical alternative model to the Western-led development consensus. An example of this would be the role that South Korea played during the 2010 G20 meeting which took place in Seoul.

BRIDGE DIPLOMACY IN THE FIELD OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AT INTERNATIONAL SUMMITS

The 2010 G20 Seoul Summit can be seen as one of the prime examples of Korea's bridging strategy in the field of development. While the summit itself was not focused on issues related to international development, the Korean government was able to bring these to the table which eventually led to the creation of the "Seoul Consensus." Considering that the G20 consists of countries which may not have the same interests or point of view on several issues due to their vastly different situations and positions in the global order, the presence of a "bridge" between actors was crucial. South Korea was able to do so for the 2010 Summit by using rhetoric emphasizing its unique experience as a country which transitioned from poverty to wealth to position itself as a valuable partner for both developed and developing countries (Lee, 2010, p10-13) (Il, 2009) Sustained engagement in relevant international forums can help Korea increase its soft power and brand itself as an intermediary between traditional donors, such as most of the OECD DAC and other merging donors or developing countries (Kim, 2015).

Beyond the usual items on the agenda of the G20, Korea formally introduced development issues as a part of the G20 Summit (Presidential Committee for the G20 Summit, 2010). Concretely, this meant that Korea would push for the development issues-related section of the Summit to focus on the importance of economic growth via trade, infrastructure building, human resources development, governance, food security and financial inclusion. The goal of this was to convince the G20 to shift some of its resources into these fields and play a more significant role in the field of international development beyond aid provision. To do this, the South Korean government proposed to create a working group including regional development banks and other relevant non-G20 actors in the field of development, such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The aim of the Korean government in proposing this was to ensure that developing countries would be represented in order to improve the legitimacy and feasibility of resolutions (Presidential Committee for the G20 Summit, 2010). There are clear problems with the Korean

proposals, notably related to the government's chief focus on economic growth as a driver of development, an idea which is hardly radical or representative of a major shift in discourse (Kalinowski, 2010, p85-86). Additionally, much of what the Korean government proposed at the Summit could be interpreted as being contradictory with the actual development experience of Korea, which developed in a manner contrary to what orthodox economists and development experts of the time had proposed. Nonetheless, the rhetoric and discourse adopted by South Korea emphasized its capability to act as a bridge between nations and it promoted itself as such in order to create linkages between itself and developing countries. It was also able to contribute to shifting the discourse from focusing nearly exclusively on the importance of foreign aid to focusing on other factors such as infrastructure and the domestic governance of developing countries (O'Neil. 2015, p84). By doing so, South Korea was able to use public diplomacy to steer the agenda of the meetings (Melissen, Sohn, 2015). Ultimately, this led to the emergence of the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth, which proposed a softer alternative to the much-maligned Washington Consensus. The Seoul Consensus was consistent with the propositions that the Korean government had brought to the development discussion at the forum and also stressed the importance of developing countries in the development process. The success of the G20 meeting led to the 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the formation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, in which Korea once again sought to play a leading role.

At the 2011 High Level Forum, South Korea was able to further shift the development discourse from focusing on the effectiveness of aid to the effectiveness of development in general (Howe, 2015). By further employing its bridge diplomacy strategy, the Korean government was able to include BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) in the discussion and act as a mediator between developing and developed countries in order to secure an outcome that would satisfy all parties (Howe, 2015). In addition to this, private companies and relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were invited to attend and participate in the forum. Ultimately, Korea's bridge diplomacy strategy paid off and it was able to significantly change the discourse at the forum from focusing solely on the effectiveness of aid in

fostering development to the inclusion of other forms of assistance such as knowledge sharing, South-South cooperation, and the importance of factors other than aid in fostering development. The forum was considered a success and participants signed onto the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), which states the importance and diversity of all participants in creating development, domestic ownership of development priorities, transparency and accountability and the importance of external interventions having a real sustainable impact in recipient countries. Out of this, GPEDC was incorporated as a more inclusive forum in which governments, international organizations, civil society representatives and private sector actors can pool knowledge and ensure that development cooperation efforts across the world respect the principles agreed upon at the Busan Forum. Several of the principles that Korea had pushed at the Busan forum, particularly regarding the importance of non-traditional actors in development cooperation were incorporated in the foundation of GPEDC and provided the Korean development model with a source of legitimacy.

RELATIONAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY VIA DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS: THE KOREAN KNOWLEDGE SHARING PROGRAM (KSP)

Throughout this article, much has been said about Korean bridge diplomacy. The previous cases focus more on Korea's efforts to act as a bridge at the international level but its public diplomacy orientation in the field of development cooperation can also be seen in the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) which aims to "modularize" and share Korea's development experience in a more direct manner with demanding countries. The Knowledge Sharing Program was created in 2004 and is supported by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance but managed by the Korea Development Institute (KDI). It aims to provide other countries with policy recommendations and potential solutions to problems based on Korea's development experience. Korea believes that this creates "win-win" relationships between itself and its partners. KSP has become a signature Korean programme in the field of development cooperation and the country has been able to draw

a significant amount of soft power and economic benefits from its existence (Kalinowski, Cho, 2012, p250). Indeed, a section of the KSP FAQ justifies the relevance of the program as follows:

> *Economic cooperation is not a program that unilaterally aids its partner countries but aims to share mutual benefits. KSP not only increases Korea's national status by enabling partner countries to naturally become accustomed to Korea's technology or contents but also connects Korean companies to the implementing stages. This benefits Korea's national interests in the mid-long term. However, the real purpose of KSP is the sustainable development of partner countries and common prosperity and not the direct or indirect interests of Korea* (Knowledge Sharing Program, 2016).

KSP is a particularly good example of relational public diplomacy in the field of development cooperation due to its focus on localization, sustained interaction between participants and mutual benefits. An important aspect of the Policy Consultation segment of KSP is that it is only provided at the demand of partner countries. The aim of this requirement is to ensure that the specific needs of partners are adequately reflected throughout the consultation process and that each policy recommendation is tailored to the unique circumstances of the partner country (Kim, Tcha, 2012). This constitutes a marked difference from traditional "top-down" ODA initiatives. As of now, there are 37 countries participating in the bilateral KSP, most of these countries are developing countries but there are also some emerging donors and middle powers such as South Africa and Brazil.

Once suitable partners are chosen, Korean experts in areas related to the topics submitted by the partners are put into contact with local experts and institutions in the partner country in order to perform a pilot study. Once the study is completed, a delegation of experts and officials from the partner country is invited to Korea in order to present their contribution to the pilot study and obtain first-hand information and experience about the topic for consultation from relevant Korean organizations. Following this, a Korean delegation travels to the partner country and enters into dialogue with the relevant local authorities in order to present their tailored policy recom-

mendations, and the KSP's final report is published. The entire process is designed to require the sustained involvement and interaction of both Korean and foreign actors in order to ensure that a genuine collaborative relationship is built between both groups.

CONCLUSION

South Korea's attempt to adopt a bridging role between developing and developed countries in the field of development cooperation is an extension of the middle power diplomacy orientation of its foreign policy. By adopting this bridging role as a form of high level public diplomacy, South Korea is able to benefit in several ways. The country benefits from increased recognition and prestige at the international stage through its contributions to the development agenda and benefits from increased economic and diplomatic linkages with developing countries. Consistent with middle power focus on multilateralism, South Korea believes that promotion of itself as a bridge between both worlds contributes to creating relationships in which all participants are able to cooperate and achieve their own objectives.

However, it is uncertain whether this strategy will be sustainable over the long term. If Korea is able to continuously demonstrate that its development experience is locally adaptable and worth sharing abroad, it will certainly be able to further build on its bridging role and remain relevant. This is unlikely if the country decides to give in to the temptation of providing developing countries with developmental lessons that are more a reflection of the historical narrative being pushed by the government in power than reality. In the eventuality that Korea is unable to continually demonstrate its usefulness as a bridging actor and developmental model on the international stage, it is highly possible that the actors in the networks it built will lose interest and look elsewhere for partners. In such case, Korea will have squandered all the resources and genuine effort it put into branding itself as a "bridging" middle power.

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Part II

KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Hallyu (*Korean Wave*) as Korea's Cultural Public Diplomacy in China and Japan

Seungyun Oh

INTRODUCTION

This study aims to conduct an exploratory case study on *Hallyu* or *the Korean Wave* as an example of Korea's cultural public diplomacy in comparative contexts of China and Japan. *Hallyu*, which signifies popularity of Korean media products (K-Pop music, Korean TV dramas, and Korean movies) among foreign publics, can be considered as part of Korea's public diplomacy for two reasons: 1) *Hallyu* contributes to winning the favor of the public overseas for Korea; 2) the Korean government is involved in promoting *Hallyu* through collaboration with non-state actors. The *Hallyu* phenomenon was not limited to one country, and as many other public diplomacy initiatives show, developments of *Hallyu* revealed distinct characteristics according to different countries. The causes of different *Hallyu* developments in China and Japan were found to be stemming from a combination of factors - ranging from political structure, domestic media environment, historical relations with Korea, and public opinion. However, *anti-Hallyu* movements in the two countries shared one main triggering factor: that the popularity of Korean cultural media products became too large an influential force so as to be perceived as a threat. Therefore, the findings indicate that sustainability of *Hallyu* depends on 1) employment of specific context-based strategies according to different countries, and 2) consideration of mutual interests to go beyond pursuit of Korea's national interests.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Though the employment of the term "*Hallyu*" tends to be expanded beyond popular culture in Korean media discourses, such as "medical *Hallyu*" or "educational *Hallyu*," this study will focus on the field of popular culture in using the term "*Hallyu*" – limiting the field to Korean dramas, movies and Korean pop (K-Pop) music. The reason for directing attention towards pop culture is due to it being where *Hallyu* first originated around twenty years after *Hallyu* came into existence in popular culture. Thus, chronological developments of Korea's 'cultural' public diplomacy towards publics overseas could be accounted for the longest term possible. Not only is it valuable in terms of duration, but also in regards to environmental changes, *Hallyu* in popular culture shows a varying nature – widespread continuing popularity of around ten years and has also received backlash by sparking *anti-Hallyu* movements.

With regards to geographical region, while the term *Hallyu* tends to be applied throughout the world regarding Korean media, the East-Asian context will be studied since it is where *Hallyu* became manifested on the scale of national-level mainstream media and not limited to special interest groups as in the European region. Among numerous nations in East Asia, China and Japan will be the nations used for comparative studies. Due to their unique historical and diplomatic relations with Korea, China and Japan are the contexts where *Hallyu* phenomenon has had most wide-ranging political, economic and cultural effects. China and Japan diverge on core values of national interests since they have different political ideology, levels of economic development and cultural assets, yet they both were impacted by *Hallyu*, which makes them viable for comparative case study on the issue.

Developments surrounding *Hallyu* phenomenon in China and Japan after *anti-Hallyu* movements will be comparatively analyzed as cases for Korea's cultural public diplomacy. The primary reason for adopting the case study method concerns the importance of practicality in the field of public diplomacy, which has to engage people affected by numerous environmental conditions. Case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemp-

orary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 1994: 13), which serves on-the-site purposes of public diplomacy researches.

Three specific types of case studies defined by Yin (1994) includes exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive. Out of the three types, this study will take the exploratory case study method since multiple types of factors - ranging from politics and economy, to culture, were expected to take effect in differentiating contextual patterns of *Hallyu* developments in each foreign society. Rather than setting limits to determine the causal relationship of a certain factor, except from setting topical and geographical boundaries, the study aims at exploring possibilities that affect public diplomacy in different foreign societies.

Documentary analysis and content analysis will be used for collecting data on cases. Previous researches on *anti-Hallyu* in the field of Area Studies will be the basis for local insights, which will be combined with diverse methods of data collection from government documents, media discourses on both traditional news outlets and new online mediums, to reports of interviews or surveys with local audiences. Facts about what has been done as Korea's cultural public diplomacy following *anti-Hallyu* movements will be gathered through a mix of government publications, news articles, and produced cultural contents. In this study, production of Korean cultural media contents affecting and affected by external foreign environment will be the main target of analysis rather than reception of *Hallyu* by foreign audiences.

There have been many prior studies on 1) success factors of *Hallyu* in line with trans-nationalism, 2) effects of *Hallyu* as relating to Korea's economic and cultural national interests, and 3) problem identification regarding *anti-Hallyu* movements as an example showing clashes of economic and cultural national interests in the East-Asian region, which have been manifested through politics in different nations.

Most studies on *Hallyu* tend to take the disintegrated approach of arguing either from the Korean perspective or from the perspective of publics overseas regarding *Hallyu*. However, considering how *Hallyu* was made possible in the current Information Age as an interactive process between Korea and foreign publics, taking only one of either side of the

viewpoints to conduct research on *Hallyu* would be similar to painting only half of a portrait. Therefore, this study will try to account for what actually has been done by Korea's state and non-state actors in charge of *Hallyu*, and how such actions have led to what kind of outcomes in different foreign societies.

In this paper, motivations and design of Korea's cultural public diplomacy initiatives will be accounted for in detail. Context-based situations on developments of the *Hallyu* phenomenon, including the aftermath of *anti-Hallyu* movements, will be analyzed to delineate possible causal factors. Changes following *Hallyu* and *anti-Hallyu* movements are expected to show a blend of political, economic, and cultural factors involving relations between Korea and China, and Korea and Japan.

EFFECTS OF CONTRIBUTION BY *HALLYU* AS KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Hallyu, or *the Korean Wave*, signifies the rise of Korean popular culture among foreign publics other than Koreans overseas. The history of *Hallyu* dates back to the late 1990s in China as it spread across East Asia with media liberalization in the region. A phrase in *the Associated Press* summarizes the significance of the phenomenon: 'Call it "Kim Chic." All things Korean – from food and music to eyebrow-shaping and shoe styles – are the rage across Asia, where pop culture has long been dominated by Tokyo and Hollywood' (Visser, 2002).

Korea has never been a hegemonic nation in the international world for hard power capacities of military or economy, nor had it been an exporter of popular culture just a few years before *Hallyu* first appeared. Therefore, the sudden popularity of Korean popular culture has gained attention both from international scholars and media.

There are two conflicting dimensions of *Hallyu* which have been documented. One characteristic of *Hallyu* is its nature of trans-nationalism. As for the spread of *Hallyu* into Asian markets, the process is defined as "emerging intra-Asian popular cultural flows under globalizing forces" (Iwabuchi, 2002, 16). Korean pop star Rain, who entered the U.S. entertainment

market, identifies himself as an "Asian" in an interview with *the New York Times* (Sontag, 2006). After all, success of *Hallyu* can be attributed to cultural hybridity found in Korean pop culture appealing to East Asians, who share cultural proximity, not distinctive Korean culture (Jung, 2009).

Another characteristic of *Hallyu* is as a means for Korea's national interests. Joseph Nye, the scholar who first coined the term 'soft power' meaning "the ability to shape the preferences of others" (Nye, 2004, 5), which is different from coercing hard power, has noted on *Hallyu* as being one of the impressive soft power potentials that South Korea has (Nye, 2009). Not only does it make the country culturally more attractive, a Korean government report estimated that *Hallyu* produced total exports reaching up to a total of US $7.03 billion in 2015 alone, with export of cultural media products accounting for US $2.82 billion (Jeon et al., 2016).

The conflicting aspects of *Hallyu* between trans-nationalism and Korea's national interests seemingly make it look as though unable to be linked directly with Korea's public diplomacy. However, in fact, the contradiction has rather served better to enable it to become a means for winning the favor of publics overseas regarding Korea. If a certain public diplomacy initiative is perceived by a foreign public as state propaganda, the projects are bound to fail in attracting foreigners. On the other hand, the seemingly blurry nature of the *Hallyu* phenomenon through popular cultural contents produced by the commercial sector, as is mentioned often as the key for obtaining soft power, helped foreign publics not to question as to underlying intentions of state propaganda. In this way, the spread of *Hallyu* has caused foreign publics to voluntarily form more favorable attitudes towards and perceptions of Korea as a nation compared to before by viewing Korean popular cultural contents, and thus has ended up being effective for Korea's national interests.

PROMOTION OF *HALLYU* BY STATE AS KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

On the surface, *Hallyu* appears to be a totally private initiative not receiving any help from the Korean government. Private companies seeking economic

profit have managed to gain members of foreign publics as consumers, and the Korean government is happy to reap the benefits from the unintentional contribution to Korea's national interests.

However, from the onset, *Hallyu* has been a collaborative project between the government and companies. Viewed from the Korean perspective, the development of *Hallyu* has been political struggle against foreign influences for the national interests of the country's economy and culture, where state and non-state actors willingly cooperated with each other.

As is the case with other industry sectors that have been systematically promoted by the state in collaboration with the economic authorities of *chaebol*, the Korean government embarked on projects to strengthen the cultural industry in the early 1990s after realizing the potential of the entertainment business for Korea's national interests.

A government report in 1994 by the Presidential Advisory Board on Science and Technology wrote that the Hollywood blockbuster movie of *Jurassic Park* was worth the foreign sales of 1.5 million Hyundai cars, and suggested media production as the national strategic industry to be promoted. Family-owned big business groups of Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo followed suit to invest in the media sector. However, the investments did not continue for long after the IMF-directed restructuring mandate during the Asian financial crisis (Shim, 2002).

Despite the withdrawal, the media industry boom in the mid-1990s contributed to development of the Korean media industry through the introduction of advanced business strategies, such as audience research and marketing tactics. Each film-producing stage became more sophisticated, for example, the script of the movie *Friend* – a Korean blockbuster movie released in 2001, was revised twenty-one times and even invited audience for the scriptwriting process (Shim, 2001).

During late-1990s, around when *Hallyu* first started in China, President Kim Dae-Jung established the Basic Law for Cultural Industry Promotion and allocated a total budget of US $148.5 million to the project (Choe, 1999). With this support, numerous international film festivals started taking place in Korea, such as the Pusan International Film Festival, where foreign buyers would be exposed to Korean films (Shin, 2003). During President Kim's term, the cultural sector's budget relative to the total

government spending per fiscal year increased from 0.60% in 1998 to 1.15% in 2002 (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003).

Korean entertainment companies returned the government's favor by successfully producing cultural contents to export overseas, which was a merge of efforts to learn from Hollywood and to add the unique touch of Korean traits. Media liberalization threatened Korean media companies with foreign competition, but it also brought them commercial freedom from state regulations. Facing erosion of cultural particularity after media liberalization, cultural hybridization occurred in the Korean media industry. Korean media companies could pursue maximization of profits to export overseas with the cause of serving 'national interests', and was backed up with governmental support (Shim, 2006).

President Roh Moo-hyun, who took office after President Kim from 2003 to 2008, also acknowledged the cultural industry's economic utility, but with an ideology of spreading the cultural values throughout different segments of society. However, the policy lost vitality in the middle of his presidential term (Lee, 2005) – around year 2005 when *anti-Hallyu* movements began to appear throughout East-Asian nations.

During President Lee Myung-bak's term from 2008 to 2013, *Hallyu* was designated as a 'new growth engine' by the government and was strongly supported by diverse actors, ranging from government agencies, big corporations, and local governments, to academe. Economic and political powers cooperated extensively under the objective of creating cultural exports to target foreign markets (Choi, 2013).

Current President, Park Geun-hye, is also continuing to take a corporation-like approach to the cultural industry, emphasizing the overall economic benefits it brings to the nation and included the industry as part of the 'creative economy' slogan posed by the administration.

As can be seen from the different terms of Korean presidents discussed above, promoting *Hallyu* overseas has continuously been a joint project between state and non-state actors. Though the focus of cultural policy has differed as governments have changed, projects for supporting *Hallyu* have been a part of Korean government policy throughout. The underlying assumption of promoting the media industry through involvement of the government has been that *Hallyu* would benefit Korea on a national level.

Due to the government's involvement through collaboration with private entertainment companies and the effects of winning the favor of foreign publics through use of cultural media as mentioned in the previous section, *Hallyu* serves as a case for Korea's cultural public diplomacy.

CHANGES IN KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOLLOWING *ANTI-HALLYU*

Korea's cultural public diplomacy marked a new turn after facing *anti-Hallyu* movements when new varieties of initiatives were attempted in a bid to sustain *Hallyu*. With the Korean market being too small for economic survival, *anti-Hallyu* movements did not discourage Korean entertainment companies from targeting foreign publics. Also, the Korean government supported the companies' activities since Korea's economical and cultural interests were at stake. *Anti-Hallyu* movements did not stop Korean cultural policies from viewing the cultural media industry as the nation's strategic industry to be promoted.

To sustain the appeal of Korean cultural products towards foreign publics, Korean state and non-state actors embarked on changes. Their initiatives, therefore, were in line with the two-way symmetrical model by Grunig & Hunt (1984) – listening to the public in a two-way interactive dialogue, and taking their interests into account to reflect mutual interests.

Korean entertainment companies conducted extensive research on foreign audiences, which meant listening to the public using the two-way model by inquiring as to their needs and obtaining feedback. Afterwards, the companies launched new varieties of projects for localization to reflect the interests of foreign audiences, and in areas where the companies alone have problems exerting influence, such as state regulations; they have received help from the Korean government.

To view the projects as a whole, collaborative public diplomacy between state and non-state actors aims for most desirable results by achieving added value in joint projects. Brinkerhoff (2002, 22-24)'s typology of partnership describes how to conduct joint projects for effective implementation of a public diplomacy program when state actors collaborate with weaker non-

state actors: 'mutuality' for interdependence in partnership to pursue mutual interests of both organizations, and 'identity' for maintaining the core characteristics of weaker organizations to preserve their comparative advantages in conducting public diplomacy work.

In light of Brinkerhoff's typology, Korean state and non-state actors satisfied the 'mutuality' criteria per state actor pursuing national interests and non-state actor acting for profit maximization. On the point of 'identity', the Korean government did not intrude on the business of private companies by letting them be free in the process of producing contents, which resulted in maintaining the weaker party's competitive edge for effective implementation of cultural public diplomacy projects.

Korean entertainment companies realized changes after conducting extensive research on foreign audiences to ascertain their needs. They challenged themselves with content-wise changes to heighten appeal to foreign audiences, such as adopting parts of foreign stories. They also initiated access-wise changes to take foreign media personnel's interests into account, engaging them through diverse ways of joint production.

The Korean government provided support for entertainment companies, but the activities were conducted in an indirect way for foreign audiences. Instead, the state actor engaged with foreign governments and linked media personnel across borders.

To cite examples, the Korean government arranged state-level agreements, such as FTA discussions for entering foreign markets against threats from regulations. Also, the Korean government launched cultural exchange projects to facilitate cooperation between media personnel of Korea and other Asian countries, such as the Asia Song Festival to bring Asian pop singers together for concert, and the East-Asian broadcasting writers' exchange seminar.

Hallyu is a rare case allowing for the effectiveness of public diplomacy programs to be evaluated. Foreign audiences can demonstrate their attitudes towards Korean cultural products through their choices of economic consumption. Thus, through popularity of Korean cultural contents, the extent of success in achieving two-way symmetrical relations effectively with foreign audiences is measurable. In the following sections, upon analyzing contextual situations of China and Japan, the results of Korea's

cultural public diplomacy initiatives will be evaluated through the degree of continuity in *Hallyu* in the two settings.

ADVENT OF *HALLYU* IN CHINA AND JAPAN

China was the very first country where *Hallyu* started in late-1990s, and it was Chinese media that coined the term '*Hallyu'* to denote the popularity of Korean cultural contents. *Hallyu* in China came into being between 1997 and 1998 with the popularity of a Korean drama entitled *What is Love All About*. The drama was broadcasted on the national China Central Television Station (CCTV) two times to meet the public demand and recorded the second-highest ratings ever in the history of Chinese television (Heo, 2002).

Clearly, without the Chinese public's choice to be consumers of Korean cultural media contents, *Hallyu* could not have appeared in China. However, it is also true that without the Chinese state government's permission, *Hallyu*'s potential would not have had any chance to bloom in the first place, considering the Chinese Communist Party's extent of control on the cultural industry inside of China.

In the late-1990s, the Chinese public's demand for cultural contents was high following rapid economic growth since reform and opening up policy by leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978, but China's own media industry lacked cultural infrastructure to meet the demands.

Importation of Korean cultural media products was permitted by the Chinese state decision that they were less threatening than Western capitalist culture. The Chinese state viewed Korean cultural media products as being safer than those from the West for they combined the Chinese traditional culture of Confucianism and the global culture of modernization. Korean society shown in Korean dramas gave China a chance to reflect on its past when the Confucian identity was discontinued due to the Cultural Revolution and to visualize its future of material affluence upon achieving economic development. Such a characteristic appealed widely to large numbers of the Chinese public, especially when they had limited choice in domestic cultural products (Yun, 2009).

The beginning of *Hallyu* in Japan was relatively late compared to China.

Japan became the main market for *Hallyu* around the early to mid-2000s, following the significant popularity of Korean drama *Winter Sonata,* aired from 2003 to 2004 (KOFICE, 2011). Japanese middle-aged women were the main consumers of *Hallyu,* and the fandom was recognized as a sort of social phenomenon to draw attention from both Korean and Japanese news media.

As was the case in the Chinese market, the cultural contents themselves have appealed to Japanese consumers, which has enabled the phenomenon of *Hallyu* to enter the country. However, in terms of enabling Japanese consumers to access Korean cultural media products, the government did not play the main role like in the case of China. Diverse commercial broadcasting networks in Japan have imported Korean dramas since they have been lucrative for their business, especially when the Japanese economy entered into stagnation since the 1990's.

With the Japanese economy entering recession of the Lost Decade, the stronger Yen's value pressured Japanese commercial media personnel to increasingly turn to importing Korean dramas. For Japanese broadcasting networks, importing Korean dramas proved to be more cost-effective than producing their own contents, since it lessened their expenses and also attracted advertising profit due to high ratings.

Not only did it benefit broadcasting companies, the *Hallyu* phenomenon also contributed to the Japanese economy by inducing additional consumption of related products. For example, the economic effects within Japan caused by the Korean drama *Winter Sonata* reached as much as 122.5 billion Yen, according to a Japanese research institute's estimates (Dai-Ichi Life Research Institute, 2004).

To summarize, the causes of *Hallyu* phenomenon in China and Japan were determined mainly by the structure of each media environment. In the case of China, with state regulations existent to decide on what constitutes safe cultural content, Korean contents were allowed thanks to the cultural proximity of traditions. In Japan, with private broadcasting networks free to decide on their programming, Korean contents were imported due to the economic value they brought. Such characteristics are responsible for the difference in terminology used to refer to *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon in the two countries, which will be discussed separately in the following sections.

ADVENT OF *ANTI-HALLYU* IN CHINA AND JAPAN

Differences in naming of the *anti-Hallyu* in China and Japan reflect their key nature. 抗 (*kang* in Chinese pronunciation) is the Chinese character used in *anti-Hallyu* discourses in China, which denotes the rebelling against pressures. It has been used with regards to Communist struggle movements – as in fighting against Japanese imperialism during the 1930's (抗日战争: pronounced as *kang/ri/zhan/zheng*).

The Japanese term for *anti-Hallyu*, 嫌 (*ken* in Japanese pronunciation), emphasizes sentiments of hatred, which do not have to be backed up by logical reasons. The Chinese character is mostly used in the word 嫌惡感 (ken-o-kan in Japanese pronunciation) in Japan, which has the meaning of 'feeling of hatred'.

The Chinese character that Korea uses often to denote *anti-Hallyu* movements across other countries is 反 (*ban* in Korean pronunciation), which has a relatively value-free characteristic to mean 'against' or 'on the opposite side of something'. For instance, 反對 (*ban-dae* in Korean pronunciation) is commonly used word, which means Con side of argument – as opposed to Pro side in a debate.

Unlike other Chinese characters that open possibilities for negotiations, such as 反 meaning opposition with logical arguments and 抗 signifying rebellion against pressures with a cause; 嫌 concerns individual feelings of disgust, which is outside the realm of persuasion. Therefore, Japan's *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon would be the hardest kind to deal with, since the sentiments lack any clear directional objective.

To start with viewing specific chronology on *anti-Hallyu* in China, it appeared when *Hallyu* phenomenon reached its peak in 2005 following the record-breaking popularity of the Korean drama, *Jewel in the Palace*. Whereas *Hallyu* was more about idolizing certain Korean entertainers, the success of *Jewel in the Palace* marked a different turn for *Hallyu* in China when interest expanded to overall Korean culture. The most significant difference of the drama from other previously popular contents is that it features more elements of traditional Korean culture. The setting is in the Chosun Dynasty, pre-modern society of Korea, and the main subject item is

Korean cuisine.

Therefore, there was a tendency in Chinese society for perception of *Hallyu* to change from understanding it as a Korean variant of modern culture to a modern variant of Korean indigenous culture. China started to think of *Hallyu*'s essence as being distinct Korean culture, not on broad modern culture adopted from the West. Cultural proximity between Korea and China used to be the main appeal of Korean contents for Chinese audiences, but it then worked in reverse ways to make the Chinese feel threatened and needing to protect the originality of traditional Chinese culture, especially when the popularity of *Hallyu* extended over the world. Combined with the long legacy of Sino-centrism and historical disputes between Korea and China, *anti-Hallyu* sentiments began to appear (Park, 2013).

Logic of argument in *anti-Hallyu* movements of China called on nationalistic sentiments to protect the cultural originality of Chinese traditions facing Korean threats for winning wider public support. But behind the surface of slogans to provoke public sentiments, *anti-Hallyu* movements in China have their roots in economic reasons - for growth of the Chinese cultural industry against the dominance of Korean contents over the Chinese market.

The main motives of the *anti-Hallyu* movement can be seen from the occupation and comment of its primary initiators. *Anti-Hallyu* voices were started by Chinese media personnel opposing the prevalence of Korean cultural media products inside China. Celebrities like Jackie Chan noted on the imbalance of cultural exchanges between China and Korea, and raised awareness of the need for protectionism on the industry.

On the other hand, the Chinese public's anti-Korea sentiments were only shown at a dispersed rate online, not as a systemized collective action (Kim, 2011). Instead, evidences hint at a response of the Chinese government through 1) regulations on importation of Korean cultural products and 2) propaganda by state-controlled news media outlets.

Since the year of 2006, the Chinese government strengthened regulations against importation and broadcasting of Korean dramas. The Chinese state agency overseeing the broadcasting of television networks started to control the number of drama imports from each foreign country, while

alleging that the purpose was to achieve diversity in the programs.

As a result, according to unofficial internal regulation guidelines, the Chinese state permitted only one-tenth of time previously allocated for Korean dramas before the regulations – that is, from 2000 hours in 2006 to 200 hours in 2007. As a result, 13 Korean dramas were allowed for broadcast in 2007 as opposed to 17 from Japan and 16 from Hong Kong. It is a drastic drop considering how Korean dramas used to account for 80% of all foreign dramas broadcasted through Chinese broadcasting networks (Yun quoting KOFICE's internal documents, 2009).

Public propaganda on *anti-Hallyu* was distributed through state-controlled news media. For instance, an article published by state-run Chinese *Renmin Newspaper* called it a "Humiliation to China" to have Korean popular culture sweeping across China, when Korea has historically been a semi-periphery region on the receiving end of China-produced culture, and it ultimately went against Chinese sentiments to feel "uncomfortable." Such discourses spread widely among the Chinese people through various state-controlled news outlets ranging from mainstream media to Internet platforms.

For data on the Chinese publics' perception of the issue, a survey conducted reveals the key points of *anti-Hallyu* in China. 34.5% of respondents answered *anti-Hallyu* occurred "Because spread of Korean culture prevents development of Chinese culture," and 15% answered "Because Korea earns money using culture." Other than these top two answers, the responses also reflected focus on the cultural media industry – 8.4% answered "Because the contents of Korean drama are inappropriate for Chinese people," 5.6% answered "Because the quality of Korean contents is low," and 5.4% answered "Because of dislike towards certain Korean entertainers." Hatred against Korea itself other than the cultural industry was relatively low, with 12.5% answering "Because of dislike towards Koreans," and 3.4% answering "Because of dislike against Korea's image" (Kang, 2008).

As with the case of the Chinese, *anti-Hallyu* in Japan appeared when *Hallyu*'s popularity was at its zenith in 2005. In the year of 2004, importation of Korean cultural media contents to Japan reached as much as US $36,080,000, which increased to US $66,370,000 in 2005. Japan accounted for 61.9% of the total export market share of Korean cultural media products, ranking #1, and a huge gap existed in comparison with #2 in the

rank, which was Taiwan with 11.3% of the market share (KOCCA, 2006, 221).

However, main actors engaged in Japan's *anti-Hallyu* movement differed from those in China. In the case of Japan, the government's involvement through regulation or propaganda was not to be seen, since the media industry is run through commercialism by private non-state actors rather than state controls. Instead, Japanese '(online) network rightists' launched and led *anti-Hallyu* public campaigns. The collective movements by such civil groups expanded their influence over time through online mediums and the democratic election system of politics.

Definitions on Japanese 'network rightists (*neto-uyoku* in Japanese pronunciation)' are diverse, and a consensus has not yet been made due to their fluid characteristics. Some of the main traits include that they are active online anonymously, their arguments are nationalistic and conservative – to an aggressive extent of racism and chauvinism, and they tend to show hatred against Korea and China (Hwang, 2014).

The first visible *anti-Hallyu* movement in Japan took place with the publication of a comic book entitled '*Hating Hallyu* (*ken-kanryu* in Japanese pronunciation)' by a private publishing company in 2005. The aim of publication was to target 'Japanese who did not have high degrees of interest in Korea' using their most familiar media form of the comic book.

Despite the title including *Hallyu*, the actual contents of the book were focused on historical disputes between Korea and Japan rather than the popularity of Korean cultural contents in Japan. The main themes of the series included criticism against South Korean government's diplomatic policies towards Japan, denouncement against North Korea, racism against people with Korean nationality and Korean-Japanese living in Japan, and attacks against so-called 'pro-Korea attitudes' shown by Japanese left-wing politicians and mainstream Japanese media as unpatriotic acts that are 'anti-Japan'. Only thirteen pages were given for *Hallyu* to criticize Japanese mass media's excessive reporting on rise of Korean pop culture (Jung, 2009).

The publication of the comic book *Hating Hallyu* created sudden attention to the *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon in Japan whose origins were a Japanese online community called *2 Channel*. In 2006, it boasted the second largest number of users among Japanese online communities. The website's

anonymous posts include sensational racism towards neighboring countries, discussions of social issues based on fake information, and slanders against famous people. The comic book *Hating Hallyu* was centered on false information from such Internet websites as *2 Channel*.

Thus substance of the Japanese *anti-Hallyu* movement was characterized by lack of logical arguments. To illustrate, the absurdity of arguments in the *Hating Hallyu* comic book were as follows: "Korea fabricates that Japanese culture such as Karate, Judo, and Sushi actually originated in Korea, not Japan."

However, according to the publisher of *Hating Hallyu*, the book recorded selling a number of 200,000 just over a week after publication. With its popularity, subsequent series of *Hating Hallyu* were published in the years of 2006, 2007, and 2009. The publisher announced that the total number of sales of the series reached up to 900,000 in 2009, but the fact that the comic topped in Amazon Japan as a bestseller revealed the main consumer segment of online users, considering how only 1% of all Japanese book consumers used the online market at the time (Dentsu Institute, 2008).

Despite the popularity of comic book *Hating Hallyu* and websites like *2 Channel*, the arguments of network rightists' were too extreme to win support from mainstream Japanese society. Therefore, Japanese mainstream newspapers rarely covered them in the initial stages of the movement. For example, *Yomiuri Newspaper*, which has the most number of readers in Japan, only started to cover network rightists from 2010.

Then, *anti-Hallyu* in Japan took a major turnaround into a more active stance around 2010 when Korean media contents in Japan started to recover popularity. K-Pop stars like Girls' Generation and Kara reached the top in the Japanese music charts, while dramas and movies were increasingly produced through joint projects between the two countries.

Whereas Japanese nationalistic online communities engaging in *anti-Hallyu* movements used to act only online anonymously, after 2010, they came out to the streets in protest. Through systemized street protests, the network rightists aimed to have their voices heard by the general Japanese public and to strengthen their political power.

In 2011, large-scale *anti-Hallyu* protests in front of Fuji TV were held a total number of four times, and the protest site was broadcasted through

blogs, YouTube.com, etc., and related books were published. After 2012, Korean President Lee's visit to Dokdo Island fueled *anti-Hallyu* movements once again, and *anti-Hallyu* protests in front of Korean Town at Tokyo's Shin Okubo region continued.

Another change in the *anti-Hallyu* movements of network rightists after 2010 was that the popularity of Korean cultural products within Japan was directly under attack, whereas it used to be treated as a secondary problem following historical disputes. Specifically, the ratio of Korean dramas broadcasted by Japanese national television channels was problematized. But as was shown in the denunciation of the Korean actress Kim Tae-hee for her campaign on Dokdo, making an issue out of the prevalence of Korean cultural products was used to link with historical conflicts between the two countries, reflecting their continued concern on broad diplomatic issues against Korea.

Over time, the network rightists have expanded their reach to mainstream Japanese society. Their extreme arguments, even including racial discrimination, would not win majority support, as was seen through the passing of anti-hate speech law in May 2016. But network rightists have played a key role in supporting the Abe cabinet to take power in the 2012 elections using their expertise in collectivization, and attained a heightened status of political influence.

To comprehend the advent of network rightists and how they managed to set the tone in mainstream Japanese society, scholars turn to mainly two environmental factors: historical ignorance and economic recession (Han, 2013).

After the Second World War, there was intentional avoidance of teaching Korean history in Japanese society that led to ignorance regarding Korea among the Japanese public. The fact that the comic book *Hating Hallyu* sets the objective of informing the Japanese people that did not have much interest in Korea, and its usage of false information on history reflect the ignorance regarding Korean history among the Japanese.

The historical legacy of creating a negative image of Korea was combined with Japan's economic recession so that anxiety was vented as hatred against Korea based on nationalism sentiments. Especially when both of the factors are commonly shared by all Japanese public, there exists the high probability

that the general public can be affected by the false arguments regarding Korea online.

According to political systems, the *anti-Hallyu* movements appeared in different forms in China and Japan. Though the initiator of the movement in China was media personnel driven by economic interests since the state has control over media, the state's political power was used for imposing regulations and launching advocacy campaigns through news media. On the other hand, the Japanese *anti-Hallyu* movement was brought about by the voluntary collectivization of citizens online. Lacking in regulation of the type of measures it could use, the network rightists were devoted to trying diverse means of advocacy, from using the Internet to street protests and elections. Given such different examples of *anti-Hallyu* movements, Korea's strategies to tackle such have differed according to each example also.

KOREA'S STRATEGY FOLLOWING *ANTI-HALLYU* IN CHINA AND JAPAN

Years following the *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon in China, which occured from 2006 to 2009, Korean cultural products have suffered a period of stagnation in the Chinese market. The main reason for stagnation could be attributed to access-related regulations imposed by the Chinese government. Korean cultural contents, however, returned to Chinese market after 2010 with Korea's new cultural public diplomacy initiatives.

After identifying problems with regards to the *anti-Hallyu* movement in China, Korean entertainment companies and the Korean government have cooperated in responding to Chinese needs. Since the main focus of *anti-Hallyu* in China was against the pervasiveness of Korean cultural products and demanded opportunities for growth of Chinese media industry, the needs of the Chinese were to be addressed in a more economic perspective than cultural.

In essence, attempts at localization inside China had to be focused mainly on access-related changes than the contents. Korean entertainment companies arranged for talent swapping and made more opportunities to incorporate Chinese media personnel in production, while the Korean government

looked for ways to loosen regulations and funded *Hallyu*-related researches to seek ways for market entry.

Various attempts have been made regarding participation of Korean media personnel in Chinese production of cultural contents. Popular Korean actors and actresses played main roles in Chinese dramas and movies with Chinese scripts and Chinese staff. This was made possible especially since dubbing is commonly used in Chinese dramas and movies for tailoring to numerous dialects spread out across the vast Chinese territory. Thus, despite lacking in Chinese language skills, many Korean actors and actresses have been playing main roles as Chinese people, sometimes even as historically famous figures. For instance, Korean actor Park Hae-jin played the male protagonist role of a Chinese native speaker with Chinese nationality in Hunan TV's drama entitled *Qian Duo Duo Jia Ren Ji*.

Many skilled Korean producers and directors of dramas and movies have gone to China to create Chinese versions of their trademark contents. Either through official permission or illegally pirated versions, numerous creators of Korean dramas and movies which have enjoyed huge popularity in China, have been invited by Chinese media industry leaders to produce Chinese versions of their genre of expertise. For example, Korean movie director Kwak Jae-yong, who made the mega-hit movie *My Sassy Girl (2001)*, produced a Chinese version of the romantic comedy movie titled *Meet Miss Anxiety (2014)*.

In the K-Pop sector, major Korean entertainment companies have included Chinese members when producing idol groups. S.M. Entertainment's idol groups of EXO and f(x) had Chinese members, both in terms of ethnicity and nationality, without any Korean affiliation. Other entertainment companies have followed suit, for example JYP Entertainment's idol group Miss A which features two Chinese members. Producing K-Pop stars with Chinese citizenship has not only increased familiarity for Chinese public, but has also opened up more possibilities to go beyond regulations.

Forms of joint productions have been tried in other diverse ways as well. One of the types is selling the formats of successful Korean TV programs to produce Chinese versions of them, usually also including cooperation of personnel from original Korean broadcasting systems. The formats of entertainment programs, such as *Running Man / I am a Singer / Dad! Where*

are you going? / *Abnormal Summit,* were sold to Chinese broadcasting networks. Rather than directly selling the original Korean programs, selling the formats was preferred since it involved more active participation from Chinese media industry's personnel and provided opportunities for them to learn from successful cases of Korean contents.

Another type of joint project between Korean and Chinese entertainment companies consisted of separation in roles. For example, the drama *The Descendants from the Sun (2016)* was a joint project with investment from a Chinese company and production by a Korean company. Distribution in each country was managed by local companies separately in Korea and China.

From the planning stage, the drama *The Descendants from the Sun (2016)* was aimed at both the Korean and Chinese publics. To meet the censorship requirements of Chinese state authorities, the drama marked a turn in history of Korean drama production with whole episodes produced before broadcast. Traditionally, Korean dramas had been produced alongside broadcasts, with every episode finishing on a tight schedule before airing. Now, with subsequent Korean dramas targeting the Chinese market lined up, pre-production is becoming more commonplace.

The success of the drama *The Descendants from the Sun (2016)* in China also reflects a new platform strategy by Korean companies. Since 2006, regulations by Chinese authorities have hampered exports of Korean drama to Chinese broadcasting networks, and thus, relatively less regulated online streaming websites became the alternative from the 2010s. After beginning to be distributed online, record-breaking successes of Korean dramas followed - *The Heirs (2013), My Love from the Star (2014),* and *The Descendants from the Sun (2016)* (Yoon, 2015).

The involvement of a Korean state actor was visible in addressing China's state-level protectionist measures. Major progress in high-level talks was officially signing Korea-China Free Trade Agreements on November 10th, 2014 that included the media contents business.

Tackling access-related changes against regulations proved to be successful for sustaining *Hallyu* since the taste of the Chinese public still favored Korean cultural contents. But again in August 2016, *Hallyu* is facing the threat of a possible ban from the Chinese state owing to a

diplomatic problem (Qin & Choe, 2016). Following the Korean government's decision to employ the U.S. missile-defense system, THAAD, on South Korean territory, rumors regarding retaliation from China against *Hallyu* have been abound. Though perhaps coincidental, several events in China starring Korean celebrities were cancelled. For example, a fan event in Beijing with Korean entertainers Kim Woo-bin and Suzy Bae was postponed after a Chinese police bureau's notice suggesting the Chinese host delay the event. A possible link between traditional and public diplomacy which can be seen through relations between politics and *Hallyu,* shows that spillover effects are likely to come from traditional diplomacy and affect public diplomacy, and not vice versa.

On the other hand, figuring that *anti-Hallyu* sentiments in Japan were more aroused by cultural factors than economic motivations, Korean cultural media product producers made attempts at more changes in terms of contents rather than access.

Many Korean dramas and movies were produced using Japanese original stories from novels and comic books. Examples include dramas *White Tower (2007)*, *Boys over Flowers (2009)*, *Master of Study (2010),* and movies *200 Pounds Beauty (2006), Fly Daddy Fly (2006),* and *Journey under the Midnight Sun (2009)*.

Korean entertainment company CJ E&M's movie *Sayonara Itsuka (2010)* serves as an example of content-related total localization. Though produced by Korea since the planning stage and created from Korean investments, the movie was based on a Japanese novel featuring Japanese characters played by Japanese entertainers, and no sign of Korean culture can be seen anywhere in the content of the movie. The film achieved success in Japan by triumphing over what had been the most successful Korean movie in Japan at the time: a box-office profit number of 10 times more – reaching up to 1,077,234,100 Japanese Yen (Cho, 2010).

In the K-Pop sector, Korean singers entering the Japanese market released localized albums of songs entirely sung in Japanese. Korean singers' localization efforts include producing new songs exclusively for the Japanese market, not limited to translating their Korean songs into Japanese. For example, the boy group Big Bang released their first Japanese album in 2008 with six new songs, and continued releasing new songs tailored to the

Japanese public in 2009 and 2010.

However, resulting changes in the Korean media sector were not enough to rectify the *anti-Hallyu* problem in Japan, which stretched beyond Korean cultural media products to diplomatic problems concerning history between the two countries.

On the other hand, joint projects between Korean and Japanese broadcasting networks were not welcomed and rather backfired. For example, Japanese TBS broadcasting system participated in joint production with Korean counterparts on the drama *Iris (2009)*, and decided to air it at primetime. Despite being a joint production project, the drama was scripted and acted in Korean, and TBS had to be overwhelmed by complaint calls from rightists pressuring to cancel the plan to air it at primetime.

Another example surrounds Korean actress Kim Tae-hee's appearance in Japanese Fuji TV's drama *Boku-to Star-no 99 Nichi (2011)*, where she played the role of a top-star Korean actress who falls in love with her Japanese bodyguard. Even before the drama was broadcasted, actress Kim had to face street the protests of the network rightists against her appearance on Japanese TV after being labeled as an 'anti-Japan figure' from her past participation in a Dokdo-related event in 2005.

With Japanese public and government increasingly taking a conservative turn, from 2011 onwards, diplomatic tensions between South Korea and Japan have continued at state level. The combination of such factors has resulted in marginalization of *Hallyu* in Japan.

Now in the year 2016, no Japanese national broadcasting system airs Korean dramas. Fuji TV, the national TV channel targeted the protests of the network rightists in 2011, stopped broadcasting Korean dramas from August 2012. TBS stopped from March 2014, and lastly NHK substituted all Korean dramas in October 2015. Though satellite networks like BS still air more than 200 Korean dramas on a monthly basis, the audience reach is much smaller than that of the national networks (Tokyo Newspaper, 2015).

In the case of Japan, power over opinion that linked 'preference for Korean pop culture' and 'unpatriotic acts of going against the Japanese nation' was enforced to restrict consumer choice of cultural contents. No outright ban exists, but social stigma still prevents Japanese people from choosing freely. Political power not on hard power entailing coercion but on

setting the tone of the society through defining what should be the mainstream discourses is acting as an implicit ban.

Revitalization of *Hallyu* in Japan calls for approaches both on traditional and public diplomacy. With regards to high-level political meetings, true normalization of relations between the two countries beyond historical conflicts would be necessary in the realm of traditional diplomacy. Agreements between politicians, however, would be useless should the citizens of the two countries not accept them. Therefore, on the public level, ways to lessen the perception gap between people in the two countries would be required with long-term prospects in mind.

IMPLICATIONS FROM ANALYSIS OF *ANTI-HALLYU* IN CHINA AND JAPAN

In the mid-2000s, as *Hallyu* continued in East Asia for about 10 years, the view that it contributes to Korea's national interests has gained widespread recognition in the region, and movements of *anti-Hallyu* have followed. *Anti-Hallyu* movements have gained traction in combination with nationalism, and exports of cultural media products dropped in the ensuing years, as can be seen in the official number of export scale of Korean dramas. Exports had been increasing at a yearly rate of 90% until 2005, but in 2006, declining rate of -15.5% appeared (KOCCA, 2006).

As for evolution of *Hallyu* in China, the Chinese government allowed importation and broadcasting of Korean cultural products mainly for cultural motivations, guarding against U.S. media imperialism and feeling familiarity with the Korean blend of traditional and modern traits. But what the Chinese state unexpectedly had to meet was the Chinese public's overriding enthusiasm for Korean cultural products, since consumer choice cannot be dictated by the state.

At first, *anti-Hallyu* started to spread among Chinese media industry personnel, who had personal financial interests at stake facing *Hallyu* pressures. The Chinese state's response backed up their claims both through trade protectionist measures to block access of Korean cultural products inside China and public propaganda through state-controlled news media

outlets to gain societal consensus in the name of national interests.

In short, the Communist struggle movement of rebelling against pervasiveness of Korean cultural products - named as one of the foreign pressures to be overcome, was launched in a top-down process from special interest groups and the government to the general public. The Chinese national interests to be pursued were economic and cultural, with more emphasis on economy since protection of the media 'industry' was the main goal, and the Chinese state's role in the whole process showed the political power structure of Chinese society.

Though initial problems after regulations on exporting to Chinese broadcasting networks were solved by finding other ways for market entry, continued success cannot be ensured for Korea since Chinese state is expanding on areas of regulation and is showing a defiant attitude in protecting its national interests.

Japan's importing of Korean cultural contents was made possible with profit maximization pursued by Japanese broadcasting networks, which was inherently economic. The unexpected popularity of Korean cultural contents among the Japanese public turned out to be even more lucrative for the TV channels. But commercial television broadcasting systems not having control over politics, had to face anger from ultra right-wing groups that made use of collective action effectively to attain political power in a democratic society.

Unlike the Chinese *anti-Hallyu* movement being economically motivated to protect the Chinese cultural industry, the main incentive of the Japanese *anti-Hallyu* movement has its roots in a cultural aspect, as Japanese resented 'inferior' Korea, which is catching up with Japan in terms of economic development and dynamism. The Japanese public were frustrated with anxieties of continued economic stagnation and the feelings combined with historical ignorance to create chauvinistic *anti-Hallyu* sentiments.

With the alleged objective in ending anti-Japanese sentiments in Korean society, the network rightists have come out to the streets following online systemization. The street protests made them famous, drawing coverage from mainstream Japanese media. They utilized expertise in collectivization for elections and have managed to expand political influences. Japanese society has been swaying to the right during recent years, and *Hallyu* seems

to be far away from recovering its popularity, unless a major political breakthrough happens between the two countries.

Despite the differences described above and outlined in Table 1, *anti-Hallyu* phenomena in China and Japan have shown common grounds as well. Firstly, exchanges of cultural products were not free from traditional state-based relations in both contexts. Foreign publics can make individual choices when selecting cultural products to enjoy. However, their selection is not completely of their free will, and they are bound by the political powers of society. *Anti-Hallyu* examples have shown how traditional power relations can jeopardize successful public diplomacy programs, rather than public diplomacy contributing positively to traditional power relations.

In light of traditional diplomacy's influence over public diplomacy initiatives, Korea's new strategy after *anti-Hallyu* can be evaluated as missing the core of the problem. Korea's public diplomacy embarked on access-related changes in China and content-related changes in Japan, but limited actions to the boundaries of the cultural industry. When viewed solely from the media industry's perspective, the changes were appropriate measures that took mutual interests into account.

However, since public diplomacy does not exist in a vacuum, in order to have strategies for sustaining a long-term relationship with foreign publics, a broader understanding of foreign society as a whole, encompassing areas like politics, economy, and history would be necessary. In other words, Korea's public diplomacy – especially the state actor, would require a bird's-eye view in conducting contextual researches on foreign societies, rather than fixating on promotion of cultural contents.

The second common characteristic was that, though the nature of *anti-Hallyu* differed according to contexts, one common line of reasoning was shared on threat perception for protecting their own culture against the dominance of media market share by Korean cultural media products that led to major political campaigns.

Therefore, we can see the importance of efforts to incorporate mutual interests in public diplomacy. Sustainability of *Hallyu* would be determined on whether the two-way symmetrical model is perceived by foreign publics as being implemented. If driven by self-interests only, sooner or later, *anti-Hallyu* will triumph. Instead, constant attempts to reflect foreign interests

Table 1. Comparison between Characteristics of *Anti-Hallyu* Movements in China and Japan

	CHINA	JAPAN
TARGET	Dominance of Korean Contents in China	Anti-Japanese Feelings in Korea
MEANS	State Regulations, Media Propaganda	Internet, Street Protests, Election
MOTIVES	Promote Cultural Industry (Economic)	National Confidence (Cultural)
CHANGES	Access-related (Market Entry Strategy)	Content-related (Localized Stories)
RESULT	Popularity Recovered with New Attempts	Marginalization of *Hallyu*

would end up being beneficial for nourishing the Korean cultural industry by incorporating diversity as well.

CONCLUSION

Some tend to question the necessity of the government's role in public diplomacy, especially when it comes to *Hallyu* since government involvement is likely to arouse nationalistic sentiments of foreign publics. Such a caveat certainly has grounds to be backed up universally regardless of societal differences, given that we live in an international world with nation states as its main units. People can oppose a certain regime or political power structure in their own country, but that does not mean they do not value their own distinctive cultural traditions nor are they unpatriotic. When preference for Korean media products is deemed to be against whole value systems of their own country, consumption of Korean pop culture can only decrease, as was seen in the *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon across East Asia.

Still, there exists another side of the coin in that because different nation-states can enforce political power to place regulations and form public discourses, the government's role in public diplomacy is necessary. Development of *anti-Hallyu* phenomenon in different contexts of China and Japan revealed a link between *anti-Hallyu* movements and major political powers of foreign governments. Since there were issues to be dealt with on a state-to-state level, *Hallyu* as Korea's cultural public diplomacy called for Korean government involvement as well, beyond what the private sector

could deal with on its own.

Comparative case studies of Korea's cultural public diplomacy in China and Japan following *anti-Hallyu* revealed implications for public diplomacy in general. *Hallyu* as public diplomacy showed a blend of political, economic, and cultural factors working together to create a scene of distinctive international relations, which calls for interdisciplinary researches in the field. Also, context-specific researches should be done to oversee environments of media, politics, history, economy, cultural traditions in foreign societies and to effectively design public diplomacy initiatives accordingly. Lastly, cultural public diplomacy cannot be separated from other more traditional areas of diplomacy, such as security, economy, and identity. Cultural public diplomacy's effects of creating a favorable national image were stalled when other more serious diplomatic issues involving history or economy became a barrier between the exchanging nations.

Nationalism itself is not something new and is not limited only to the East Asia region. But a distinct characteristic in the region's nationalism is that culture plays a big role to be linked with political power and serve as a means for competition. In this sense, the drive for Korean national interests by the Korean government and companies through *Hallyu* was bound to clash with opposition from neighboring Asian countries on the receiving end off *Hallyu*.

Though the case of *Hallyu* in China and Japan seems to signal limitations of cultural public diplomacy when met with political powers, still, when we turn our attention back to accounting for factors of the advent of the *Hallyu*, great potential for mutual understanding and shared identity exists in culture.

Korea's cultural public diplomacy with *Hallyu* has taken an idealistic path as a two-way symmetrical model is sought after for engaging foreign publics. If the two-way symmetrical approach is expanded to include the national interests of foreign states as a whole, keeping in mind that they impact foreign publics, and focus on pursuing Korea's national interests becomes less salient, *Hallyu* would have significantly higher chances of sustainability in the future.

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Making Friends with ASEAN Countries through Korea Foundation's Educational Programs

Seksan Anantasirikiat[1]

INTRODUCTION

The year 2014 was critical for ASEAN and South Korea relations because of their 25th anniversary of cooperation and partnership. Initially, South Korea and ASEAN started their connections through economic and socio-cultural exchanges. Lee & Lee (2015, pp. 219-220) points out that ASEAN countries were some major recipients of official development assistance (ODA) from South Korea while South Korea won the second rank of ASEAN's largest trading partner. Conversely, ASEAN ranked South Korea's second largest investment target in 2013. Currently, South Korea has been a strategic partner of ASEAN in strengthening developing regional mechanisms. Several regional platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit have been addressed as a prospectus for future political-security cooperation (Lee, 2015, pp. 207-209).

With regards to the socio-cultural dimension, Kim & Hong (2015) demonstrates that people-to-people linkages of this partner have been increasingly significant. Toward the 1990s, the 'Korean Wave' spread

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throughout the region alongside an accelerating number of Korean tourists to ASEAN countries as they are one of the main targets for South Korean retirees due to low cost of living. In addition, there have been a large number of people exchanges such as labor and marriage ASEAN migrants working in South Korea and ASEAN students studying in South Korea while having a few academic exchange programs.

Fostering ASEAN and South Korea relations in advanced areas of collaboration, ASEAN and South Korea reached a new agreement in 2010. That agreement was the 'Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity'. It asserted newly added programs to increase understanding and awareness between ASEAN and South Korea, culture and arts-related interchange, exchange of mass culture, expanding youth exchanges, education cooperation, and sports. The examples of added programs comprise promoting ASEAN and Korean studies through scholarships for ASEAN and Korean students, raising awareness on ASEAN-Korea relations through a wide range of activities, networking beyond government and private institutions, etc (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010). The vitality of these programs was reinforced again as the key outcomes from the 2014 ASEAN-Korea Summit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

Realizing these multi-dimensional interconnections between South Korea and ASEAN countries in the globalizing world, the Korea Foundation, a prominent government organization in supporting initiative of public diplomacy programs under the government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 28), has played an essential role. The objective of the Korea Foundation is to raise awareness of South Korea throughout the world by implementing educational and cultural programs in four areas: global networking, support for Korean studies overseas, support for media, and culture and arts exchange (Korea Foundation, 2015b, p. 6). These activities will help South Korea 'makes friends with the world'.

The Korea Foundation has continuously supported educational programs for ASEAN countries and people since 2006 as a part of promoting Korean studies abroad by providing graduate/postgraduate scholarships, financing Korea-related international conferences/research and bilateral forums such as the Korea-Singapore Forum, Korea-Indonesia Forum. ASEAN fellowship for Korean Studies was initially an area-based full scholarship founded in

2013. Alongside this initiative, the Korea Foundation established the ASEAN-Korea Next Generation Leaders Program responding to the growing interconnectedness (Korea Foundation, 2015b, pp. 6-9).

The working definition of public diplomacy in this paper is Gregory's (2011, p. 353): "Public diplomacy is 'an instrument used by states, *associations of states* and some sub-state agencies, and *non-state actors* to understand cultures, *attitudes*, and behavior; *build and manage relationships*; influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values" (emphasis added).

Considering educational programs as an integral part of public diplomacy implementation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 10; Lindsay, 1989, p. 424), it will help the government build and maintain relationships with the foreign publics. As a result, the argument of this paper is that Korea's public diplomacy has been generated through soft power. Also, an example of the Korea Foundation's educational programs to people from ASEAN countries assist the Korean government in framing positive attitudes or perceptions of South Korea as well as building a network and the long-term relationship of ASEAN youth in South Korea.

This article consists of three main sections. It will firstly describe the Korean concept of public diplomacy by analyzing two samples of the Korea Foundation's educational programs to ASEAN countries. Next, it will provide an analysis of these programs by applying the methodology that fits the research design. Lastly, it will formulate some suggestions for theoretical discussion and future research on educational programs in public diplomacy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This section handles the very important question of how educational programs relate to public diplomacy. Lindsay (1989, p. 424) offers three perspectives to comprehend educational programs, which are: autonomous entities, an integral part in public diplomacy, and products of American propaganda. To find some correlations, this paper starts with the definition

of public diplomacy. Taking euphemism of Delaney (1968, p. 3); Malone (1985, p. 199); and The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy (2002), they structure public diplomacy under the Cold War context by stressing its influence on the foreign policies of other states. Expanded by Leonard, Stead and Smewing, (2002, pp. 8-9) and Gregory (2011, p. 353), the abstraction of public diplomacy has been developed by adding a relational dimension and communication as tools. Nonetheless, Gregory's definition is relevant to this paper because both public diplomacy actors and the objectives are regarded.

Building on the actors and objectives of public diplomacy, one scheme is to explain the organizational dimension or values of the programs. Snow (2009b, pp. 242-243) argues that the programs themselves have values in sharing international knowledge and learning the experiences together. Scott-Smith (2008, p. 173) engages the educational programs as a part of public diplomacy by positioning the political collisions that can be investigated by the multi-dimensional theory of international relations. Mueller (2009, p. 103) provides three fundamental reasons why U.S. government-sponsored programs are effective; reflection of culture of a host country, partnership development with private sectors, and practical economic consideration. Schneider (2009, p. 260, 276) draws attention to how one state can make cultural diplomacy successful. A strong inter-organizational synergy with clear strategic vision is required. Pooling financial resources from both public and private sources is another key issue.

This leads to another scheme of educational programs in public diplomacy, which are culture matters. If public diplomacy has the primary goal of influencing foreign governments or publics, Rhoads (2009, p. 181) argues that culture has the paramount repercussion of influencing others. It also has a strong result in one's decision-making and perception under one context. Yun (2008) and Zaharna (2010, p. 128) also emphasizes the primacy of context in shaping effective communication and perception. Furthermore, culture helps construct one state's perception of soft power (Zaharna, 2012, p. 11). Therefore, this paper will apply these concepts in setting a research design.

CASE STUDIES OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

After reviewing the general ideas on educational programs and public diplomacy, this section will outline the previous academic works which deal with the educational programs as a practice. The first scheme of literature analyzes the macro-level programs. Bettie (2015) explains the evolution of the Fulbright program parallel to the reorganization of the US information agency. In conclusion, Bettie suggests that academic characteristics reinforce moderation, legitimacy, and credibility in devising the programs (Bettie, 2015, p. 370). These make the participants aware ambassadors. Adding another case to the study of educational programs in public diplomacy, Byrne & Hall (2013, p. 419) pointed out Australia's international education. Colombo Plan has been operated in order to advance the foreign policy and national interests by raising foreign public awareness. They put it clearly that international education significantly contributes to soft power. The perception and experiences of students could affect the projection of soft power in the international arena. This article, however, remains focused on the government-level program.

Another scheme deals with the educational programs in public diplomacy at the micro-level or program-based analysis. Yang (2015) explores the effectiveness of the Jean Monnet program in China through designed qualitative research after disseminating the relations of public diplomacy and educational programs while considering the context as an important factor in shaping one's perception and ideas. Kim (2016) concerns the effects of responsible staff on project participants by a coorientational model. According to this article, staff awareness of public diplomacy is lower than that of the participants. This brings a problem in the communication process as the relationship building process demands relationship maintenance at the same time (Kim, 2016, p. 144). To summarize, these works have offered a new analytical approach or model regarding educational programs as a part of public diplomacy while further studies should be explored in the future. Kim's (2016) article, however, stimulates the deliberation of public diplomacy correlating with public relations because

of their engagement with publics. How should the public diplomats communicate with publics? The next session will confer this subject.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (PD) MEETS PUBLIC RELATIONS (PR)

The discussion on how PD meets PR can outline the appropriate position of relationship management in the realm of public diplomacy. Grunig's (1993b) article is one example displaying some linkages between these two disciplines before 9/11. While 9/11 has been widely accepted by many scholars as a new environment for public diplomacy (Cull, 2009, p. 23, 42; Hocking, 2005, p. 36; Melissen, 2011, p. 8, 2005, p. 8; Snow, 2009a, p. 7; Zaharna, 2010) including new actors (civil society) (Riordan, 2005, pp. 184-186) and new media (Arsenault, 2009). Kelley (2009, p. 72) points out that the message exchange capacity of international communications contributes to driving the direction of public diplomacy. Under this context, public relations will play a key role as a managerial function of public diplomacy (Ledingham, 2003; L'Etang, 2008). Excellence theory and relationship management are two examples of normative public relations implemented in a public diplomacy case study. Yun (2006) and Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, and Kendrick (2013) apply the statistical models to test the applicability of the excellence study as well as to interpret the attitudes of professional diplomats on cross-cultural communication. Yun (2006, p. 308) raises the idea for 'comparative public diplomacy' considering the various disciplines in social sciences, such as comparative politics, organizational theory, international relations, etc. Meanwhile, Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, and Kendrick (2013, p. 18) suggests that further research should cover political functions where PD meets PR.

In response to the request mentioned above, this paper will take the location of educational programs on public diplomacy into account, particularly the implications regarding relationship building in the realm of policy. As reviewed by Fitzpatrick (2007, p. 205),

Effective public relations produces supportive public relationships that are built on *trust and accommodation* created through *genuine dialogue* produced by *two-way symmetrical communication* that is designed to accommodate dual interests (Emphasis added).

In the two-way symmetrical model, the assimilation between the purposes of the agency and its strategic constituents' conjectures is constructed by forming successful conditions and sustainable correspondence with tactical fellows (Grunig, Grunig, and Ehling, 1992, p. 86), while Zaharna (2009, pp. 93-96) divides relationship building into three stages: exchange programs and visits, building initiative, and policy networking strategy and coalition building. As Zaharna (2009, pp. 87-91) points out, relational framework focuses more on long-term and sustainable relationships through collaboration than control by seeking commonalities, mutual interests, and more interactive relations. Snow (2015, pp. 84-85) reinforces that international exchange programs are very good examples of the two-way symmetrical model putting 'strategic communications' at the center of implementation. She states:

Relationship building in public diplomacy places an emphasis on engaging populations rather than winning arguments or selling a brand. Engaging requires that your public diplomacy strategy *increase contact and interaction impacts that enhance others' appreciation for one's country in the long term*. This includes strengthening educational, scientific, and sports ties and increasing tourism, *international study*, trade, and support for your values (Emphasis added).

The long-term goal of educational programs on public diplomacy will help the policymakers shape an appropriate program in building relationships. Still, there are some challenges regarding the question: What kind of 'educational' activities can form a long-term relationship in public diplomacy except scholarship?

KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The topic of this article is very new to both public diplomacy in general and Korean public diplomacy. Yoon & Kim's (2014) article analyzes 'Korea Festival in ASEAN' by applying the concept of public relations and public diplomacy. An attitude survey was used during the research in order to examine how ASEAN people perceive the 'image' of South Korea after attending the Korea Festival. The result shows that ASEAN people see South Korea in positive ways, particularly regarding traditional culture and

food. This research could be counted as one evaluation of the 2010 South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs' manual for cultural diplomacy. It acknowledges 'cultural' dimension which is a foremost source of soft power, while putting public diplomacy under the umbrella of cultural diplomacy and nation-branding (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, pp. 10-13). Kim (2012, pp. 534-535) theoretically puts soft power in the position of an important source of Korea's public diplomacy. The description of middle power here can be clarified as a country having restricted hard power but forceful in soft power assets. South Korea is a good example. Connecting public diplomacy to the foreign policy can be an effective tool and an 'emerging niche realm' with no domination in international relations and diplomacy. Supporting soft power in Korea's public diplomacy, Lee (2011, p. 158) refers to the Korean notion of other East Asian countries. As put forth in this article, the appreciation of soft power matches with comprehension of a country's influence.

Educational programs do matter in this context because it reflects soft power assets as a part of promoting 'forum diplomacy', 'knowledge diplomacy', and 'Korean studies diplomacy' (Kim, 2012a, p. 7; Kim, 2012b, Kim, 2014, p. 3). Apart from the relations between soft power and Korea's public diplomacy, it is also noted in the cultural diplomacy manual regarding the Korea Foundation's missions in supporting public diplomacy initiative consisting of promoting Korean studies abroad, cultural exchange, scholar exchange, forum and policy research, and media production (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, 28). These actions reinforce South Korea in the global setting as a bridge between great powers and small powers (Lee, 2013, pp. 10-11). To achieve this purpose, the Korea Foundation established the Global Public Diplomacy Network (GPDNet) (Korea Foundation, 2015, p. 5) Therefore, it is explicit that the Korea Foundation is one of the public diplomacy actors exercising its programs in line with the foreign policy goals of South Korea. Still, similar to the Australian case mentioned in Byrne and Hall (2013, pp. 432-433), some scholars demand policy coherence or a 'control tower' in order to solve the 'redundancy' (Ma, Song, and Moore, 2012, p. 1) and improve government capabilities in developing effective public diplomacy actions (Kim 2012a; Kim 2012b, Kim, 2014).

RESEARCH DESIGN

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

There are two research questions here: Why and how do KF implement the educational programs for ASEAN people and how could these programs influence the participants? These questions are cohesive with the objectives of research, which are: to understand the characteristics of Korea's public diplomacy through Korea Foundation programs, to offer a practical analysis for educational programs, and to provide suggestions to the Korea Foundation. To respond to these questions effectively, it is vital to understand the appropriate methodologies.

Literature review helps the author find the position of this research in public diplomacy. Building on a similar research will be useful (Maxwell, 2013, p. 65; Silverman, 2010, p. 73). A valuable analysis is Yang's (2015) study on the Jean Monnet Program in China which is a program-based analysis and qualitative methodology. One section of this paper deals with the conceptualization of public diplomacy. Another section analyzes the effectiveness of the program through interview. Considering the construction of research methodology by Yang (2015), this paper will follow by devising both documentary analysis and in-depth analysis.

Studying documentation such as books, websites, newsletter, etc., gives clues on the rationale and objective of the programs. In-depth analysis by interview will fill the gap of knowledge and help collect 'primary data sources' (Mason, 2002, p. 56). Yin (2009, p. 108) emphasizes the importance of interview in one research by touching upon the general features of social sciences. Case studies are kinds of 'human affairs'. They can be rated as behavioral experiments. Including a comprehensive research design, Figure 1 below shows an interactive model used by Ayhan (2016) based on Maxwell (2013).

This interactive analysis is very useful in constructing qualitative research. There are four categories in validity concerns, which are: long-term involvement, rich data, respondent validation, and triangulation (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 126-128). This paper will engage respondent validation

Figure 1. Research design



Source: Adapted from Ayhan (2016, p. 96) which is based on Maxwell (2013, pp. 4-10)

and triangulation as this is a cross-check of the interaction between the events and the participants in order to ensure that the participatory observation of the author is not biased. In addition, being a stakeholder of both programs helps the author easily access the key informants and discuss freely with them with 'critical subjectivity' (Creswell, 2014, pp. 97-98; Maxwell, 2013, pp. 44-47).

SAMPLING

A justification for choosing the two cases, which are KF-ASEAN Fellowship for Korean Studies and Korea Foundation-ASEAN-Korea Centre Workshop on Unification, is due to the author's main research focus for a master's degree at Seoul National University. These two programs are in the same line because they were conducted for both graduate and undergraduate students currently staying in South Korea. It implies that there is no 'contextual difference' in the communication process. However, this article will examine these two cases in the realm of the Korea Foundation's

educational programs for ASEAN people in order to apprehend the characteristics of Korea's public diplomacy and influence on ASEAN people. At present, there are four fellows from ASEAN countries (Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand) receiving a full scholarship from the Korea Foundation.

For the workshop on Korean Unification, there were 44 participants (29 ASEAN students, 8 Korean students, and 7 diplomats from the embassy of ASEAN countries). All of the participants were separated into five groups. There were both ASEAN and Korean students plus one diplomat for each group. Given the number of participants, the author considered choosing one student from each country on a voluntary basis.

DATA COLLECTION

As a KF-ASEAN fellow who has received a full scholarship from the Korea Foundation, the author has had the chance to personally meet with the executives and officers of the Korea Foundation at the welcome dinner which is annually arranged. At that dinner, the author had a chance to meet other fellows. After exchanging some information, the interview was conducted via e-mail because each fellow had to prepare for their thesis and graduation.

Regarding the workshop jointly organized by the Korea Foundation and ASEAN-Korea Centre, the author had a chance to attend the workshop as a participant. The author conducted personal interviews with the representative from each country. However, there are no students from Lao PDR and students from some countries did not attend the interview. All communication exchanged during the activity was conducted in English or with immediate interpretation by a qualified interpreter.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Examining the two research questions of this paper, three analytical frameworks will be applied. The first approach is the combination of hard

and soft power by emphasizing cultural dimension (Kim, 2012a, 2012b, 2014; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). Building on Kim (2012a, 2012b), Kim (2014, pp. 10-12) explains soft power as a linkage between resource power and relational power. Cultures and values policies will help South Korea build an 'appeal' to foreign publics. Aiming at collaborative power, which is the highest goal of Korea's public diplomacy, appeal will bring to social power and communication power by setting standards norms as well as framing agenda. Kim's conceptualization of public diplomacy is not different from the main scheme of public diplomacy that is to establish and maintain relationships through 'communication' (Kim, 2014, p. 9).

South Korean Parliament has passed the 'Public Diplomacy Law' which will be enforced from August 4, 2016. In this law (National Legal Information Center, 2016, informal translation by the author), public diplomacy encompasses activities aiming at the development of mutual understanding between South Korea and foreign publics through 'culture', 'knowledge', and related policy implemented by the government and private sector. Adding to this definition, the basic principles of this law note that public diplomacy should; reflect the universal values and 'special characteristic' of Korea (Koreanness), emphasize ongoing collaboration with the international arena, not to draw heavy attention to one country or region. Concerning the whole explanation of Kim (2014), this paper will also apply Kim's (2012a, p. 11, 2012b, p. 547) 'strategic mapping' to Korea's public diplomacy betraying the ultimatum in transforming soft power resources into effective diplomatic tools in order to analyze how the Korea Foundation has implemented educational programs.

Generally speaking, Korea's public diplomacy should build on the existing resources reflecting Korean specificity in parallel to the universal values. Apart from the content, the issue of the implementing body which Kim (2012a, 2012b) and Ma, Song, and Moore (2012, p. 2) has been raised. The law requires the establishment of a coordinating committee aggregating the representative from each ministry under the supervision of the president. Coordination between government and private sector is also mentioned in Article 2 and Article 6 of the law and the enforcement.

It is clear that Korea's public diplomacy is transforming to more effective management while focusing on knowledge and culture as main

sources of Korea's public diplomacy. To build on Kim's (2014) conceptualization of Korea's public diplomacy, Pamment (2015, p. 376, 2014, p. 58) provides some useful tools in evaluating the influence of the public diplomacy's programs on the participants. In these scholarships, Pamment proposes that 'evaluation must be considered within the context of how and why actors employ PD' (Pamment, 2014, p. 57). There is no single best approach for comprehensive assessment of efficiency and effectiveness of public diplomacy programs. To prove influence over ideas and values, he proposes a perception analysis through surveys, attitudes, and favorability with the theoretical groundwork of reputation management. However, he puts testing of soft power influence under outcome analysis measuring efficiency and effectiveness of the public diplomacy programs. The reason why Pamment's approach fits the case of this paper is that it posits a wide range of influence analysis in public diplomacy programs.

DATA ANALYSIS

RQ1: How and why do KF implement the educational programs for ASEAN people?

KF-ASEAN FELLOWSHIP FOR KOREAN STUDIES

This program was established in 2013 as a part of the 'promoting Korean studies' pillar in the Korea Foundation's missions because "Demand for Korean studies among leading universities in Southeast Asia has been expanded rapidly in recent years due to the stepped-up interaction and mutual exchange between Southeast Asia and Korea" (Prof. Yu Hyun-seok, former president of the Korea Foundation) (*The Korea Times*, 24 September 2014). The scholarship is provided to faculty members and outstanding students who are expected to come back to their universities as lecturers on Korea-related issues. The fellow will be provided with round-trip airfare, full tuition fee, and monthly stipends for 2 years (Master's) and 3 years (Ph. D.). The Academic institution where the applicants can choose is (1) a

university at home, (2) a university in Korea, or (3) a university abroad under 'exceptional circumstances'. The fellow is required to submit a final report and thesis as a result of this program, and writing a progress report and academic records at the end of the semester is also compulsory. Excluding these general requirements for the fellow while studying, all of the fellows are committed to work at the previous university for at least 5 years after graduation. The Korea Foundation will receive compensation in the case of a student not fulfilling this commitment (KF Newsletter, 2013; Korea Foundation, 2015a).

The scholarship applicants are classified into six groups which can be divided into two main categories: Asia and Non-Asia. Russia, Northeast Asia, Asia Minor, and ASEAN are included in Asia while Non-Asia refers to North America, Europe, and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). Interestingly, the selection method for Non-Asia is open competition while partner institutions play an important role in the selection process for students from Asia (Korea Foundation, 2016a). In case of ASEAN, the Korean Studies Association of Southeast Asia (KoSASA) has continuously collaborated with its partner institutions. This association was founded in 2003 by the Korea Research Institute, University of New South Wales (KRI@UNSW), Australia. The charting members comprise the president and vice president of each partner university. According to the KoSASA's website, there are currently ten partner institutions (Korea Research Institute, 2016). Each partner university is a part of the ASEAN University Network (AUN), a grouping of forefront universities of each of the ASEAN countries (ASEAN University Network, 2016). From the author's point of view, a visible network and expertise in Southeast Asia makes KoSASA an appropriate partner for the Korea Foundation.

KF-ASEAN KOREA WORKSHOP ON UNIFICATION

This workshop was jointly organized by the Korea Foundation and ASEAN-Korea Centre from May 20 to 21, 2016 at Goseong province, South Korea. The objective of this workshop mentioned in the application and orientation documents is to discuss key issues related to the significance of Korean unification as well as the key role that youth can play in promoting the

cooperative efforts of Korea and ASEAN to enhance peace and prosperity in Asia. Another objective is to foster the friendship of the participants (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2016a, 2016b; Korea Foundation, 2016b). These points are reinforced by H.E. Mr. Kim Young-sun, Secretary-General, ASEAN-Korea Centre. He says "The youth of ASEAN and South Korea will play a critical role in future cooperation and harmony between the two regions." (H.E. Mr. Kim Young-sun, Secretary-General, ASEAN-Korea Centre) (Lee, 2016; *Yonhap News*, 20 May 2016). The ultimate goal of the workshop clarified by the Secretary-General is "to see the participants contemplate the issue of Korean reunification and build friendships, thereby contributing not only to cooperation between our regions but also to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia." (Lee, 2016; *Yonhap News*, 20 May 2016).

During two days of workshop, the participants had a great chance to learn from experts from Korea Unification Policy Research Institute and North Korean refugees. Then, the discussion was arranged in order to disseminate knowledge and share the experiences of each participant. It should be noted that the North Korea-related issues is one of the first priority in Korean foreign policies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). A number of interesting issues were raised during the session ranging from international relations issues such as military capabilities, the role of ASEAN in Korean unification, US election and effect on the Korean peninsula to demographic issues such as aging society and Korean demography after unification, social welfare and health policy for North Koreans, the formation of the job market after unification, etc. Interestingly, the diplomat in each group is helpful in mediating the results of the discussion without domination. Excluding the academic session, participants had a chance to visit the Inter-Korean Transit Office, Unification Observatory, Hwajinpo, the retreat of Rhee Syngman and Kim Il-sung, etc. in order to enhance understanding. Along the way, a knowledgeable tour guide provided some information. She was ready to reply to the questions from participants. However, this program is the first coordination between the Korea Foundation and ASEAN-Korea Centre in building a valuable result by sharing goals and resources. A critical conclusion of these two programs in line with the implementation of public diplomacy is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Korea Foundation's programs in the realm of public diplomacy

Issues	KF-ASEAN Fellowship for Korean Studies	KF-ASEAN Korea Workshop on Unification
Subject	Network (KoSASA)	Network (ASEAN-Korea Centre)
Resource	Language & Academic	Values (peace and prosperity) Culture & Arts
Asset	Korean studies diplomacy	Knowledge diplomacy Cultural diplomacy
Medium & Careers	Korea Foundation's activities (Lectures,Conferences, Exhibitions, Concerts, etc.)	Lectures Discussions Site-visits
Object	Opinion leaders Main public	Opinion leaders Main public

Source: Developed from Kim (2012a, p. 11, 2012b, p. 547)

RQ2: How could these programs influence the participants?

Despite the fact that the author had an opportunity to meet some of the participants face-to-face through the workshop and dinner, it was not easy to conduct interviews at the same time due to the locations and schedules of the participants. An email interview with a consent form was sent to the participants who expressed their willingness to partake in this research. There are two of three KF-ASEAN fellows who are willing to partake in the research, including the author. Meanwhile seven of eleven expected representatives from each country (nine ASEAN students and two Korean students) responded to the questionnaires. The questionnaires are open-ended. They allow the attendees to reply without any indication. The interviews were conducted in order to understand how they perceive the objective of the programs, particularly the influence on their views and attitudes. The questions 1-4 were about the purposes of the program while questions 5-8 were asked to understand the perception or attitude of the attendees. Samples of Kim (2016, p. 144) and Hjalmarsson (2013, pp. 44-45) are very useful in preparing these interview questions.

Seven questions were asked to the KF-ASEAN Fellows: (A1) How can you give an explanation of the intentions of the scholarship? (A2) What is

the benefit or receiving this scholarship in your opinion? (A3) How does this program have an influence on your networks or attitudes or skills or otherwise? (A4) After finishing the program, what is the provided role in your home country? (A5) How can you contribute to your home country as a scholarship recipient? (A6) In your opinion, what are the expectations of the Korea Foundation for you while studying in South Korea? (A7) In your opinion, what does the Korea Foundation expect of you following the program? 'Why' questions were also annexed in the question (A1) and (A3) where clarification was needed.

The attendees of the KF-ASEAN Korea Workshop were required to answer seven questions: (B1) What do you believe to be the intentions of this workshop? (B2) What is the benefit of attending this workshop in your opinion? (B3) How does this program have an influence on your networks or attitudes or skills or otherwise? (B4) How do you think that your participation could be of benefit to Korea or ASEAN? (B5) What do you believe the organization expects you to do after the workshop? (B6) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the program in your own view? (B7) Please identify the 'characteristics' and 'results' of this program in three words. Similar to the interview mentioned above, 'why' questions were asked for more elucidation.

The results from KF-ASEAN Fellows show that all interviewees understand the characteristic of the program as a 'means to facilitate the spread of Korean culture and knowledge concerning Korea as a nation'. Another point agreed on by all of the interviewees is that they have a good chance in expanding their networks for their future careers. One interviewee made it clear that the Korea Foundation would be a future partner supporting their careers after returning to their home countries. Realizing the expanded role of the Korea Foundation, they can play a key role in bridging South Korea and ASEAN. However, when discussing attitudes and perceptions, one fellow did not think that the scholarship 'influenced' or 'changed' their ideas because he/she realized that the objective of the scholarship is to build 'long-term relationships'.

Concerning the results from KF-ASEAN Korea Workshop's attendees, all of the interviewees recognized their salience of building peace in the region. The ASEAN interviewees felt the sorrow of being apart. Most of

them considered a session with North Korean refugees helped improve understanding on what is going on and why unification is essential. One Korean participant reflected this feeling very well. He/She stated:

With this program, I realized how many ASEAN students are concerned about Korean Unification and other domestic political issues in Korea. Even though they are not fully fluent in speaking Korean, they feel sympathy and responsibility since they are living in Korea.

Touring the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and observatory areas appealed to most interviewees as they could feel that they would be policy supporters. "Seeing different generations of Koreans on a family trip coming to visit the observatory park made me realize the cause of unification from the personal people-centered point of view not just economic or security matters.," one participant expressed. Regarding the organization of the program, all of the interviewees thought that the duration was short but the strengths of this program accepted by most of the interviewees were 'networking'. This was a very good chance to meet ASEAN people and 'make friends'. One participant suggested bringing Europeans and Americans to attend as well.

One student, who has received the scholarship for descendants of the Korean War, raised an interesting topic on how ASEAN can learn from South Korea which is relevant to the formation of Korea's public diplomacy. He stated:

Obviously, *economic partnership, tourism and ODA* are the most tangible. Although, I would also like to emphasize that Korea has a lot to share with ASEAN in terms of ideas and experiences, such as *its development policies* that produced *the Miracle of Han River*, the success of its *cultural promotion* around the world, and *the new technologies and innovations*. It should be kept in mind that sharing such ideas is different from imposing them on ASEAN, as the context of ASEAN is very different. The idea is to collaborate with ASEAN to come up with more creative and better-informed solutions (Emphasis added).

Image 1 displays word clouds from the answers of participants to question 7. It is interesting that the word 'public diplomacy' is addressed two times by different people. At least, these words assume the influence and positive perception of the attendees. Most of these words reflect the characteristic of the program which is designed for building a network and

Image 1. Results of question 7 in Word Cloud

Source: Interviews with the attendees of KF-ASEAN Korea Workshop

relationships between ASEAN students and Korean students. The results express that the KF-ASEAN fellows realize in long-term relationship building because they see an opportunity in the future. This is different from the participants of KF-ASEAN Korea Workshop which focuses on influencing people for the short and medium term. It can be concluded that all the interviewees perceive the Korea Foundation's educational programs positively even though there are some differences in perception.

DISCUSSION

KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This article argues that these educational programs are created to enhance awareness of South Korea as a part relationship building in line with foreign policy goals. Considering the message-sender's point of view, the South

Korean government created the messages from soft power assets such as Korean studies and cultural heritage while engaging strategic stakeholders to the programs both in South Korea and ASEAN countries, particularly scholars and researchers in educational institutions as the main message-receivers. Still, the ultimate goal of these programs is to build networks for sustaining people-to-people interconnections.

Apart from the communication process, the organizational dimension of Korea's public diplomacy is interesting, especially following enforcement of Public Diplomacy Law. South Korea is one of middle powers that can respond effectively to this new trend of foreign affairs. Engaging strategic stakeholders is the key of collaboration between the Korea Foundation and partners (ASEAN-Korea Centre and KoSASA in this analysis). This way of practice will help the Korea Foundation achieve the attainment of bridging South Korea and the world easier by either sharing expertise and resources or collaboration, not control.

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Generally speaking, the implementation of educational programs in public diplomacy tends to devise culture and knowledge as sources or assets in building the public diplomacy programs. After reviewing literatures comprising this research, educational programs are anticipated to build a long relationship at a high cost with uncertain return. This is a very important point when a public organization has to defend its own budget to the parliaments. It has to calculate on a cost-benefit analysis while the organization has to confirm the principle of promoting universal values that helps one country improve its soft power. Attitudes of participants could change in the future. Organizational puzzles and change of attitude triggers 'sustainability' as one key to add in contemplating educational programs in public diplomacy.

From Korean experiences, both public diplomacy and the Korea Foundation has been consecutively institutionalized. Being a fellow under KF-ASEAN Fellowship for Korean Studies would bring great opportunities in the future, such as research funding, strong networking with other scholars or institutions, and attending special programs arranged by the

Korea Foundation at home and abroad. This makes it clear that this is long-term relationship building. Being a part of a short program such as KF-ASEAN Korea Workshop would build a network in the future as perceived by some respondents. At least, the attendees have 'access' to the Korea Foundation and ASEAN-Korea Centre as main organizers. They will receive news and invitations for upcoming events from these organizations once they are registered. This is a mutual benefit both the attendees and organizers could enjoy together in the future.

LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH

This research is designed as a 'niche' project. It aims to reply to some specific questions from what interests the author. The surveys conducted here do not represent all of the participants, but it can give some clues as to how they perceive the influence of these programs. The author proposes that Kim Tae-hwan's explanations are the most appropriate to this research because they were constructed in the Korean context. Also, Pamment's perception analysis plus the pathways of connection are selected due to lack of suitable tools in describing educational programs on public diplomacy while it is overlapped. However, this research will be open to other explanations or approaches in order to test and develop better arguments and modeling.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE

POSITIONING SOFT POWER IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Starting from Nye (2008, p. 95), understanding this relation draws on two measurements of power; behavioral outcomes, and resources. Nye argues that one country's soft power can be created through culture, political values, and foreign policies. This contention has been developed in Kim (2012a, 2012b, 2014) while being elaborated and adapted to the Korean context. Lee (2011, pp. 141-142) goes further by accepting a strategic advantage of soft power in East Asian countries. Public diplomacy will help

foster the awareness of soft power as a positive image of one country. This article is a good effort in perceiving soft power as a two-way interaction among East Asian countries.

Nevertheless, Vibber & Kim (2015, pp. 137-139) brings us further by discussing a deeper dimension of a positive model of 'Antecedents of soft power'. This model was summarized by Kim & Ni (2011). According to Kim & Ni (2011), soft power is an interacting process through hard (political and economic links) and soft (people exchanges and cultural associations) in political and social activities. Both sources and interaction of soft power have an essential spot that should be considered. This is a chicken and egg issue. What makes soft power? What kind of soft power should be accepted as a source of public diplomacy? This paper acknowledges the discussion of Vibber & Kim (2015) that the 'positive' interaction in building soft power does matter.

ARTICULATING INFLUENCE IN LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP-BUILDING

According to Lee (2011, p. 158), soft power comes along with influence. How can influence be measured effectively? There is no single answer for this question. One can be Sevin's (2015) 'pathways of connection' to the evaluation of the Korea Foundation's educational programs which derives from sources of 'soft power' and expects to promote mutual understanding with the foreign publics. However, Sevin's approach is firstly created to deal with influencing the elites (Sevin, 2015, pp. 564-566). A need to develop application of a new approach through new actors and new environments still exists.

Another way can be adding social media as an assessing tool in the analysis of perceptions and attitudes. Public stories and symbols of an interconnected world have been narrated through social media (Gilboa, 2000; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992) as equipment of communication in a new environment. Both government and corporations draw attention on the effective social media use as a tool in forming credibility and positive image (Eyrich et al., 2008; Hathi, 2009; Park & Lim, 2014). Fisher (2010) is a very useful guideline in applying different modes of communication through social media.

PAVING THE WAY FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Four schemes of future research will be suggested. First and foremost is the measurement of the economic value of scholarships. This would help educational public diplomacy actors evaluate their programs based on empirical research. It will help respond to domestic concerns when the question of 'why should we provide scholarships to the foreigners' arises. A cross-country analysis of similar programs is encouraged to be a second scheme of future research for scholars and researchers who acknowledge the role of the government in fabricating public diplomacy aimed at influencing and engaging foreign publics. To see efficiency and effectiveness and other comparisons such as the sources of public diplomacy, narratives, target audiences, the achievement of foreign policy goals, etc., a comparative analysis of central power's public diplomacy can be one potential research in this area.

Thirdly, the author would like to recommend a comprehensive analysis of public diplomacy of individual countries. This work will provide the whole picture of one country's public diplomacy. It will help decrease the redundancy of implementation. One scholar can create the concept of a 'public diplomacy mix' for one country. For example, finding the relations between Kim Tae-hwan's explanations and the practice of Korea's public diplomacy consisting of Korea Foundation, KOICA, Ministry of Education, and other related organizations. Theoretical research should be included as a final recommendation. It is interesting to investigate North Korea's public diplomacy. What will it look like? Or why North Korea needs it or not? Some fundamental questions - 'What is public diplomacy?' / 'Who are the actors?' / 'What are the roles of educational programs playing in public diplomacy?' - are still important and worth studying.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE KOREA FOUNDATION

This research has shown that the attitudes of the participants are positive. The Korea Foundation is correct to adapt strategic engagement through 'genuine dialogue' in the case of KF-ASEAN Korea Workshop and long-

term relationship building through an 'institutionalized' network in case of KF-ASEAN Fellowship. It is exactly these fellows that will come back as a 'network-weaver' of ASEAN and South Korea relations. At the time of writing this paper, the Korea Foundation has successfully arranged the ASEAN-Korea next-generation leaders program which is planned to be covered in this research.

The regional formation of the East Asia region has been disseminated by several prominent scholars. Pempel (2005, pp. 3-4) proposes that East Asia is a 'geo-psychological' region. The identity of this region has been formed by cross-border cooperation while national sentiments are still ongoing. He also argues that not only governments but also the private sector and 'ad-hoc problem-oriented coalitions' play key roles in driving regional integration (Pempel, 2005, p. 6). Given a bigger web of regional interconnectedness, Evans (2005, p. 197) puts forward that the track-two process, which emphasizes the non-governmental actors, is of importance in strengthening the East Asia region through congruous formulation of ASEAN and East Asia. Adding to that, Rozman (2008, p. 89) points out that ASEAN is well-positioned in bridging East Asia.

Recognizing the importance of emerging East Asian regionalism as well as working at the ASEAN Studies Center, Chulalongkorn University, for three years, the author would personally like to share some ideas on how the Korea Foundation can boost ASEAN and South Korea associations through the educational programs. First of all, the Korea Foundation should work together with ASEAN-Korea Centre and other related organizations in building a strategic track-two platform, learning from Korean experiences. Three areas that ASEAN can learn from Korea are infrastructure, technology & innovation, and the energy sector. It should be noted here that the first policy report on ASEAN energy is the cooperation between the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) and Korea Energy Economic Institute (KEEI) (ASEAN Centre for Energy, 2013). If one of public diplomacy attainments is to influence foreign policy, these areas can help South Korea engage more with ASEAN.

Next, not only supporting the policy platform but also building relationships with related opinion leaders in those areas will help 'bridge' South Korea and ASEAN countries. Cho (2012, pp. 288-289) makes a point

on 'network-based activities', citing sustainability and inter-agency coordination as the keys to success in implementing public diplomacy programs inside and outside the country. To partner with ASEAN, KoSASA is a good platform where ASEAN scholars and focal points have gathered. The Korea Foundation can pick this strength as an area of expertise of the region in improving ASEAN and South Korea relations through academic activities and scholar networks. GPDNet is another source of relationship building. The Korea Foundation could support public diplomacy-related activities in ASEAN countries and input Korean success stories.

Last but not least is the youth exchange program. Japan established the Ship for Southeast Asian and Japanese Youth Program (SSEAYP) in 1974. The nickname of this program in Thailand is the 'Ship Project'. It is time for South Korea to develop its own project, perhaps a 'car project' instead of ship, in mainland Southeast Asia, which is the main target of Korean investors, by tracing the route named 'East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC)', starting from Tiên Sa Port of Viet Nam. Ending at Myanmar, the participants can learn about Korea's presence in Southeast Asia through the investment of large Korean enterprises.

Driving along the road from Viet Nam to Myanmar, ASEAN and Korean attendees will have a chance to engage the public in rural areas. The significance of this area has also been discerned by the Korean government. The Mekong-Republic of Korea Plan of Action (2014-2017) has been implemented by focusing on infrastructure, green growth, people-to-people connectivity, ODA policy, etc (Korea.Net, 2013). These policy objectives can be translated into the program contents and activity designs. While the Korean wave is seemingly declining in ASEAN, this program will help sustain public awareness of Korea for the ASEAN youth. Youth is the best public diplomatic tool in raising awareness and building engagement as the Korea Foundation has realized through its own programs.

CONCLUSION

Studying the implementation of the Korea Foundation's educational programs for ASEAN countries is a significant contribution to a future

research in public diplomacy. This research topic is a pioneering one. It has characterized Korea's public diplomacy through a relational perspective. Two programs run by the Korea Foundation are anticipated to engage foreign publics, particularly ASEAN students in South Korea. The KF-ASEAN Fellowship for Korean Studies is explained as long-term relationship building, while KF-ASEAN Korea Workshop is formed to shape perception of unification issue through discussion. Networking among students is also an important goal of the program. At this stage, the Korea Foundation has been on the right track in making friends with the outside world, especially ASEAN countries. There are opportunities and challenges in the globalizing world that we can learn and share experiences due to "ASEAN-Korea, we are friends - 한국과 아세안, 우리는 친구" (the motto of ASEAN-Korea relations).

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South Korea's Public Diplomacy towards China under the New Media Environment: A Case Study of the Sina Weibo of the South Korean Embassy in China

Di Huang

INTRODUCTION

The rise and development of Weibo (microblog) is certainly one of the most popular social network phenomena in China. Nowadays, Weibo has developed into one of the most active platforms for display and dissemination of various views. Many embassies also use Weibo to carry out their public diplomacy, which is not only a new public diplomacy pattern, but also causes international communication to present many new traits, such as personalization, adaptation, and interaction. It is a mode of transmission that doesn't need a medium and it links with audiences directly. It has played a significant role in the public diplomacy activities of every country.

Theoretically, the study of South Korea's public diplomacy towards China under the new media environment contributes to the study of South Korea's diplomatic policies. From the new medium Weibo perspective, to study a country's public diplomacy also provides a new perspective of the research of public diplomacy.

The Sina Weibo of the South Korean Embassy in China was established on September 14, 2011. "What did it say," "How did it say it" and "with what effect" - such questions are beginning to concern some Chinese citizens. Therefore, this paper intends to use the South Korean embassy's Sina Weibo as an example and analyze South Korea's public diplomacy towards China under the new media environment.

Table 1. Some embassies' Weibo index ranking

Name	Posts	Followers	Activeness	Comments	Reposts	Concern	PR	Influence
South Korean Embassy	10th place (3769 pieces)	6th place 370,000	18th place	2nd Place	4th place	0.51%	2.66	8th place
US Embassy	2nd place (11632 pieces)	3rd place 940,000	4th place	7th place	7th place	2.7%	2.12	2nd place
British Embassy	9th place (6254 pieces)	5th place 410,000	20th place	14th place	11th place	0.99%	2.65	3rd place
EU in China	4th place (6720 pieces)	11th place 150,000	7th place	39th place	25th place	0.4%	2.14	10th place
Russian Embassy	12th place (3127 pieces)	10th place 160,000	23rd place	9th place	16th place	0.37%	2.6	11th place
Japanese Embassy	11th place (3631 pieces)	7th place 340,000	26th place	3rd place	6th place	0．91%	2.23	5th place

Notes: 1. Source: Sina tfengyun http://www.tfengyun.com/rankings.php?sortid=1005

2. PR (people-rank): follower quality index, if PR>1 that means follower quality is above average quality.

3. Concern: refers to the proportion of active followers.

In China, almost all main websites, such as Tencent, Netease, Sohu and Sina have a microblogging function. Sina Weibo, however has the largest number of users, giving it greater influence to make it possible for a microblogging diplomacy. According to statistics, the embassies of more than thirty countries have Sina Weibo accounts, and many of them have close economic ties with China, therefore have huge interests in China, such as the United States, Japan, and the EU.

According to the statistics from tfengyun.com,[1] we can see the Weibo index ranking of the South Korean embassy as well as another 108 similar

1 Because Weibo communication has a life cycle, so the data of the ranking is based on the last two weeks. Please visit http://www.tfengyun.com/rankings.php?sortid=1005. Date: 05/28/2016

Weibo accounts.

It can be seen that the US Embassy is far ahead than other similar Weibo accounts. In terms of the effects of economic strength for the Weibo utility, economic capacity of a country and the influence of its embassy have a positive correlation with its Weibo account. As for South Korea, its rankings were relatively higher than other similar Weibo accounts, which is related to the South Korean Embassy's self-positioning and its posts. What we should pay attention to is that the South Korean Embassy's Sina Weibo comments ranked in second place, which proved that the South Korean Embassy's Weibo posts were exactly what the Chinese public was interested in.

In consideration of the characteristics of microblogging diplomacy, the author chose one year as a period and collected the South Korean Embassy's 928 posts on Sina Weibo from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013 in order to analyze them.

CORE CONCEPTS DEFINITION

In 1965, Gullion defined public diplomacy in the following words The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at The Fletcher School, 2002):

> Public diplomacy… deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.

Microblogging diplomacy is the research object of this paper, but there is no unified definition. This paper suggests that utilizing Weibo to implement diplomatic activities is a form of public diplomacy. Specifically, it refers to

a government as well as authorized local authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals release information on the Weibo platform, so that they can communicate with target audiences directly and promote interaction between home governments and foreign people, domestic public and the public of other countries, home governments and target governments as well. The object is to expand the scope of information dissemination, shape positive national images, affect the public's opinions, and create a public opinion basis as well as policy outputs in favor of the home country.

RESEARCH METHODS

In this paper, the research methods are data statistics and text analysis. With Lasswell's communication model (Wikipedia, 2016), namely, the "Who" (Communicator), the "Says What" (Message), the "In Which Channel" (Medium), the "To Whom" (Audience), and the "With What Effect" (Effect), the author analyzed the 928 posts. Firstly, the author collected data: ① general information of the South Korean Embassy in China, including its fans, the people it followed, and the links it shared; ② microblog contents, including contents categorization, Weibo release form, and originality distribution; ③ information on audiences, such as age, gender and district; ④ interactions between the Sina Weibo of the South Korean Embassy in China and its fans, including fan comments, forwarding, and dialogue with fans. Then, the author summarized the data and made different charts using said data, and based on this, convened a phone interview with the staff of the South Korean Embassy in China so as to summarize the characteristics of the South Korean Embassy's microblogging diplomacy. Next, the author evaluated South Korea's microblogging diplomacy towards China, and finally, compared microblogging diplomacy with traditional diplomacy.

ANALYSIS ON COMMUNICATION FACTORS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN CHINA

THE MAIN PART OF THE MICROBLOG OF THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN CHINA

(1) General Information Overview

The Sina Weibo of the South Korean Embassy in China was established on September 14, 2011. On October 12, 2011, it officially began operations. By June 10, 2016, a total of 4,379 posts had been released with 394,051 followers and 443 people followed.

Due to the privacy restrictions of Sina Weibo, it is only possible to see some of the users followed by the Weibo of the South Korean Embassy. According to the data in Table 2 and the interview[2] of the staff at the embassy's Weibo team, the main targets followed by the Weibo of South Korean Embassy are cultural celebrities, well-known scholars as well as the media and media professionals. These people have one thing in common: they have a relatively big influence on Weibo and/or in other fields. They are not only the receivers of information, but also the communicators of information. The majority of them are closely related to the South Korean Embassy. The author has noticed that the Weibo of the South Korean Embassy has followed some postgraduate entrance exam institutions and teachers such as the "Kuakao Postgraduate Entrance Exams" and the "Zhonggong Postgraduate Entrance Exams." The reply of the embassy is that these Weibo accounts might be automatically followed due to Sina Weibo's system, which does not belong to the targets followed by the embassy.

(2) Microblog Framework

The embassy of every country in China does not only carry out a simplex form of microblogging diplomacy, but instead they form a microblog group

2 Interview time: March 5, 2015; Interviewee: the Weibo team staff of South Korean Embassy in China

Table 2. Classification of some people followed by the Sina Microblog of the South Korean Embassy

Classification	No. of People	Typical Representatives
Microblogs of Korean subordinate consulates and institutions as well as the staff in the embassy	8	Republic of Korea's Consulate General in Guangzhou
Microblogs if Korean enterprises and their subordinates	4	Mamonde
Chinese government officials	1	Wang Yusong
Cultural celebrities and well-known scholars	54	Zhang Guoqing, Fang Zhouzi and Lang Xianping
Celebrities in business circles	15	Wang Shi
Media and media professionals	36	Chinese website of Yonhap, Chai Jing
Celebrities in the industry of entertainment and sports	14	Choi Siwon, Li Bingbing
Universities and their students' organizations	7	Beijing Foreign Studies University, Tsinghua University
Non-government organizations	3	Hunan Overseas Exchange Association, Israel Plan
Others	51	Kuakao Postgraduate Entrance Exams, Zhonggong Postgraduate Entrance Exams

with a common propagation objective by mutually following the microblogs established by its subordinate consulates and the directly subordinated sectors (such as the cultural institution, national tourist organization etc.) and even the staff at the embassy. Comparatively, the typical microblog group of the South Korean Embassy in China includes the Republic of Korea's consulates in China, the Korean Cultural Institution in China and Korea's Tourism Organization etc.

(3) Blogroll

Four blogrolls can be seen at the Weibo home page of the South Korean Embassy, which are the official websites of the Republic of Korea's Embassy in China, official blog of the Republic of Korea's Embassy in China, website of the Korean Cultural Institution in China and Korea's

Tourism Organization. The information in these links is not only important support for the microblogging diplomacy carried out by the embassy, but also a more detailed supplementary instruction of its contents.

(4) Videos

From the first half of 2014 to June 11, 2016, the Weibo page of the South Korean Embassy has been playing a Chinese-version of a video named *Korea's Beautiful Territory—Dokdo*. According to an interview from the Weibo team at the embassy, this video would not be changed within a short period of time, which is consistent with the policy at the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Dokdo.

WEIBO CONTENTS OF SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN CHINA

(1) Quantity of Weibo Publications per Month

Within the time period of the article's publication, the monthly Weibo release quantity was relatively stable with only a slight fluctuation. The average monthly release was about 85, of which the release quantity reached its highest point (120) in January, 2013 and with the lowest being only 54 in June, 2013. The details of this situation can be seen in the following figure:

Figure 1. Quantity of Weibo Publications per Month in 2013



(2) Weibo Contents Categorization

As is required for this form of research, the Weibo contents will be divided into the following categories: ① politics and diplomacy, such as reports of Korean internal political events, activity information of important politicians and Korean relations with neighboring countries etc.; ② economy and society, such as medical treatment and health, and energy environment etc.; ③ cultures and tourism, such as introduction to Korean culture, Korean learning and recommendation on Korean scenic spots etc.; ④ entertainment and sports, such as reports of Korean celebrities'activities in China; ⑤ education and visas; ⑥ science and technology; ⑦ others.

Figure 2. Weibo Contents Categorization



From the above statistical graph, it can be observed that the Weibo contents of the South Korean Embassy in China places a particular emphasis on "others" and "culture and tourism" with around 378 and 330 releases respectively. In the category of "others," the vast majority of contents are from "greetings from the embassy," namely, the proverbs and quotes by famous people released in Chinese and Korean. The quantity of "politics and diplomacy," "economy and society" and "entertainment and sports" is relatively average, while the number of "science and technology" is the lowest with only nine releases.

Whereby, political contents have been under more detailed categorization:

Figure 3. Political and Diplomatic Contents Categorization



It can be seen from the above figure that the political contents mainly concentrate on the activity information of important politicians, which accounts for 50% of the total quantity. Whereby, the particular outstanding ones being the "microblog celebrities' who visit Korea," "invitation meetings of Korean ambassadors" and "China-Korea public diplomacy: beautiful diplomacy," which have caused heated discussions on the network.

(3) Weibo Release Form

Weibo release form is divided into four categories: plain texts, texts and

Figure 4. Weibo Release Form



pictures, texts and videos, and links supplement (the links with detailed information are used to supplement the text report of 140 words).

We can see that the Weibo of the South Koran Embassy prefers to use the form of combining texts and pictures, which meanwhile adapts to the requirement of "the age of interpreting charts." At the same time, due to the restrictions on words, their way of creating supplementary links will be adopted to facilitate readers in obtaining information when there is some content that can't be demonstrated completely.

(4) Originality

It is mainly used in order to study what the proportions of the posts are original or forwarded. If they are forwarded, what is the main type of these forwarded posts?

It can be observed that the Weibo of the South Korean Embassy in China takes an originality approach with most of their principal releases. It is noteworthy that there are 22 posts related to the activities of guests in Korea with "Weibo celebrities' visiting Korea" included in around 106 of the forwarded posts.

(5) Analysis on the Representative Weibo Posts

> *[New Year Food] The must-eat food of New Year in Korea is – "rice cake soup." Usually, people eat rice cake soup in the morning of*

Figure 5. Weibo Originality Distribution



Table 3. Analysis on Representative Weibo Posts

Topics	Themes	Contents	Points of view
Politics and diplomacy	"Personnel hearing meeting" of Korean Congress	"Personnel hearing meeting" is a system aiming at controlling the president's personnel power via the supervision of the congress when the president appoints senior civil servant of administrative department. Within three days, the congress makes the civil servants appointed by the president to turn out for work. "Personnel hearing meeting" carries out investigation and verification on whether the military service declaration, education background, and the relevant experiences and assets declaration are true. The review process is very strict with failures taking place occasionally.	Power balance Political transparency
Economy and society	Employ-ment	In recent years, along with the increasingly worsening social employment problems in Korea, government, enterprises and educational institutions have taken various measures to solve difficulties relating to employment. Quite a few job seekers participate in various job fairs (취업박람회) in search of suitable jobs. There are many types of job fairs, ranging from youth job fairs, overseas youth job fairs to job fairs specific to aged and middle-aged people, persons with disabilities, and females.	Concerns on people's livelihood
Culture and tourism	Tourism police	In order to solve the inconvenience that might confront foreign tourists during travel, the tourism police team was set up. Tourism police are equipped in various major tourist attractions such as Myeong-dong, Insadong, Itaewon tourist special zone and Hongdae, etc. They have good knowledge of English, Japanese and Chinese, and also shoulder the duties of keeping the peace and investigating and treating fraud and arbitrary charges.	Orderly management
Science and technology	Korean IT	Korea is a country with advanced IT fields, which can be explained via manufacturing and exporting various IT products, widely popularizing internet and mobile communication devices, etc. The exportation of IT-related products, such as computer chips and mobile phones, etc. accounts for 33% of all exports. Nowadays, the quality of semiconductors, mobile phones, thin film transistors, liquid crystal displays, etc. manufactured by Korea, have been affirmed by the global market as they have become extremely popular products.	Advanced science and technology

Data source: Sina Weibo of Republic of Korea's Embassy in Chin

Figure 6. Example Weibo Post



> *Lunar New Year on, which means getting one year older. It is actually very simple to make rice cake soup. Firstly, put the rice cake in beef soup or oyster soup and stew it; then, according to personal preference, add tofu and laver; finally, slice the fried yolk and white, and add in the soup for decoration; again, add some ingredients, it will be delicious!*

It can be observed from the above analysis that the Weibo of the Republic of Korea's Embassy in China has transmitted the Korean society's active and positive events to the Chinese public. Seen from the narrative side, it often uses expressions and cyber language to build a vital, people-oriented and equal national image.

WEIBO COMMUNICATION CHANNELS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN CHINA

The interactive methods of the Weibo accounts of the Republic of Korea's Embassy in China with fans involves fans' comments, fans' forward dialogue to other fans, and it also forwards other Weibo posts. Among the 928 sample posts, there is only one that has not received any comments and forwarding, so the effective interaction is as high as 99.9%, which is very

rare among similar Weibo accounts, and this also verifies the statistical data from "Sina tfengyun" in Table 1. In addition, various online and offline activities are also one of the communication approaches between the embassy and its fans, which has also become one of its features. Among the selected one-year samples, the embassy held various events monthly in order to attract more fans to participate. Detailed information is shown in the following chart:

Table 4. Summary of embassy activities from January to December, 2013

Time	Activity Name
January	Micro-interview activities, "2012 Strong Heart," "2013 Wishing Wall" activities
February	"Association Dream" activities
March	Chinese female opinion leader's dialogue with the embassy
April	Essay competition, Q&A activities with prizes
May	Essay competition, "Beijing meets with Seoul" China-Korea evening party
June	"Beijing meets with Seoul" China-Korea evening party, video production competition
July	Weibo celebrities' visit to Korea, the fifth Korea-China media high-level dialogue, video production competition
August	Photographing competition, famous bloggers and media professionals' visit to Korea
October	Korean cosmetics sharing meeting, National Day Reception
November	Korean cosmetics sharing meeting, Weibo celebrities' invitation meeting, "The Warmth in the Winter" activities, China-Korea diplomacy: beautiful diplomacy
December	"The Warmth in the Winter" activities, friendly night of returnees from Korea, Korean information compiling competition, year-end party of the embassy

Thus, it can be found that the embassy actively communicates with audiences through various activities. During the process of these activities, its Weibo sometimes acts as a platform, such as the case with micro-interview activities and "Wishing Wall" activities, etc., while for the majority of the time, Weibo plays the important role of a disseminating tool for activities. No matter what role it plays, Weibo has been important in these activities planned by Republic of Korea's embassy in China.

MICROBLOG AUDIENCES OF SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN CHINA

As of June 10, 2016, the Weibo of the South Korean Embassy in China has 394,051 followers. Among the fans that have interacted with the embassy's Weibo, 100 of them were randomly selected to compile age sampling statistics.

As shown in Figure 7, among the selected samples, 65% of fans were born in the '90s, 23% of fans born in the '80s, and the fewest amount of fans were born in the '60s and early 2000s. It can be seen that their audience consists mostly of young people.

According to the data provided by the Weibo team of Republic of Korea's embassy in China, female fans slightly outnumber male fans with a rough proportion of 5.5: 4.5. 20% of fans are from the first-tier cities of China, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, etc. 12% of fans are from overseas, which mainly consists of Chinese international students in Korea.[3]

Figure 7. Age Sampling Statistics of Followers



3 Interview time: March 23, 2015; Interviewee: Staff of the Weibo team of South Korean Embassy in China

THE WEIBO COMMUNICATION EFFECT OF THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN CHINA

The embassy's Weibo Communication effect is evaluated through two indexes: one is the attitude of the fans: as the fans' attitudes are either supportive or opposing, this can directly reflect the effects of the embassy's Weibo communication. The other is their ability to produce hot topics for discussion. Whether the embassy's Weibo posts are consistent with the main issues that the Chinese public cares about will affect the popularity of each hot topic to a great extent, thereby influencing the communication effect of Weibo.

(1) Fans' Attitude

Fans' attitude can be primarily divided into the following three types:

Supportive: Not only agree with the opinions of the original tweets, but also support some Korean policies and practices, and compare them with China's.

Opposing: There are two types of opposition, one of which is rational opposition, namely, considering something as it stands; the other is an irrational opposition, opposing all people and things related to Korea.

Neutral: Take discussion as the principal thing as well, but the subjective intention is not obvious.

(2) Characteristics of Fans' Comments

Firstly, fans' attitude is closely related to Weibo topics. Weibo comments and forwarding does not only show the interaction between the disseminator and audiences, but also contributes to the releaser's understanding of topics in which audiences are interested. Among the 928 post samples, the majority of fans held a positive attitude towards what the embassy posted. In particular, those posts concerning Korean democratic politics which was a topic that easily echoed amongst netizens. For example, on December 17, 2013, one post introduced a case of Korean civil servants: in Seoul, a civil

servant from the Ministry of Labor was suspected of sending invitation cards to the companies in his jurisdiction and receiving cash gifts when his daughter held her wedding. He was sentenced to jail for 10 months by Seoul's High Court of Justice which lead to a suspended sentence of 2 years, and a payment of fines and added levies. However, on the 16th, the Supreme Court withdrew the original judgment and returned to the High Court for a retrial due to a minor judgment. This release won many "likes" from fans, who indicated that it was worthy experience that the Chinese government could learn from. Afterwards, on October 28, 2013, one release reported that Korean President Park Geun-hye had kicked off a baseball match. Netizens praised President Park Geun-hye as being both amiable and affectionate to people and that her behavior proved she was "down to earth."

Secondly, when concerning some sensitive topics, the attitudes of netizens present the obvious tendency of polarization. For example, on December 3, 2013, the Republic of Korea's embassy in China released one microblog to learn about their fans' opinions on China announcing that they would establish an East China Sea ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone), which received 48 replies. From these comments, it was obvious to see that fans' attitudes differed to a great extent. Some fans indicated that they hoped that relations between China and Korea would develop and continue to improve and that they would collectively restrain Japan. However, there were also many fans that believed Korea was interfering where it shouldn't and asked it to stop making irresponsible remarks.

Fans' attitudes of polarization and variability toward Korea reflect that the Korean national image in China is in a split state. On one hand, along with the development of "Hallyu" in China, some Chinese citizens, especially adolescents, have an increasingly favorable impression of Korea, while on the other hand, due to the disputes of the Chinese and Korean islands and cultures as well as excessive reports by some domestic media in recent years, some Chinese are beginning to resist Korea, which has reduced acceptance between the two countries to some extent.

(3) Hot Topics

Among the 928 samples, there are a total of 16 releases that have been

forwarded more than 500 times. After categorizing them, the different types of hot topics can be summarized as:

Table 5. The Microblog type and the topic distribution of over 500 retransmissions

Ranking	Category	Main Topics	Quantity
1	Culture	Korean food, Korean celebrities	8
2	Others	Embassy activities	7
3	Politics	Inauguration of leaders	1

Whereby, the top ten retransmitted microblogs are:

Table 6. Top ten retransmitted microblogs

Ranking	Category	Contents	Retransmissions	Comments
1	Culture/ tourism	A bite of Korea: How to Make Sausage Stew	34403	12311
2	Entertainment/ sports	TVXQ's concert in Beijing	4145	327
3	Others	"Korean cosmetics sharing" activity: participating in the lucky draw by retransmission	3297	751
4	Entertainment/ sports	The fifth world tour of Super Junior	3212	238
5	Politics/ diplomacy	Inauguration of new president, Park Geun-hye	1857	144
6	Others	"The Warmth in Winter" activity: participating in the lucky draw by retransmission	1370	608
7	Others	"Korean cosmetics sharing" activity: participating in the lucky draw by retransmission	1362	809
8	Culture/ tourism	Korean food: Introduction to sullung soup	1258	200
9	Others	"Korean cosmetics sharing" activity: participating in the lucky draw by retransmission	1202	980
10	Others	Q&A activity with prizes	1149	676

What can be observed from this is that Chinese audiences are inclined to discuss the microblogs related to Korea's culture, microblogs related to "Hallyu" in particular. And then it comes down to the microblogs which are closely related to self-interest such as the lucky draw retransmissions, etc. Moreover, this is positively related to the release of the Weibo account from the Republic of Korea's embassy in China, that is, the usual releases from the embassy which have continued to induce a lot of interest from its audience. It can be said that the embassy's posts are an easy way to attract audiences.

MICROBLOG DISSEMINATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S EMBASSY IN CHINA

PRECISE POSITIONING AND BASED ON CULTURE

Popularity, reputation, and identity are respectively the three different levels of goals for public diplomacy (Shiren, 2013). In order to improve Korea's national image, increase Korea's attractiveness, and carry out Kim Dae-Jung government's cultural industry policy (문화입국), the microblog of the Republic of Korea's embassy in China focuses on the theme of "Hallyu," adopting currently popular Korean cultural elements and targeting young people who are more likely to use microblogs frequently. Hence, the microblog of the Republic of Korea's embassy in China is based on Korean culture and attracts the attention of Chinese netizens' through different areas of Korean culture, including Korean dramas, K-POP, Korean cosmetics, Korean food, etc.

In the language's description, the Weibo of the Republic of Korea's embassy in China is different from the ordinary microblog of other embassies which uses more serious, formal, straight and narrow language. Oftentimes, it uses cyber language and expressions which appear to be kind, humorous, natural and fashionable.

THREE-DIMENSIONAL COMMUNICATION AND LEVERAGING PROMOTION

The Weibo of the Republic of Korea's embassy in China disseminates information to audiences; and at the same time, it alleys with other professional media and microblogs of well-known celebrities so as to achieve the goal of promotion with the help of their influence through a series of online and offline activities. For example, in 2013, the embassy once invited some microblog celebrities to visit Korea, and inviting microblog celebrities to have a meeting as well as the fifth China-Korea media high-level dialogue etc., which allowed microblog contents to highlight their values and significance in media reports.

The advantages of three-dimensional communication lie in the multiple disseminators and media. Therefore, even if it is in the face of the same audiences, it may also receive different kinds of feedback. Thus, this has become one major contribution for microblog dissemination of the Republic of Korea's embassy in China. However, the disadvantage of three-dimensional communication is that there are many disseminators. Moreover, if placing each interactive disseminator close to an equal relation, the communication effect may occasionally be different from the expectation of the embassy. However, so far, this difference has been acceptable.

PAYING ATTENTION TO DETAILS AND BEING OBJECTIVES-ORIENTED

Among the selected microblog samples, there are 378 releases in the category of "others," of which there are 236 releases of "Greetings from the Embassy," accounting for 62.4%. In many cases, the Republic of Korea's embassy in China issues such a release on Weibo even if there is no special event. Under normal conditions, it releases a microblog of "Greetings from the Embassy" in the early morning before office hours, which is usually a proverb or a quote from famous people in Chinese and Korean. Such microblogs seem to be boring and without substantive contents, but they have relatively stable comments and retransmissions (usually no more than 100). Moreover, they enjoy a higher reputation due to posting material that spreads a more positive image.

Then, it is noteworthy that the Weibo page of the Republic of Korea's embassy in China plays a propagation video about Dokdo. The video is in Chinese, and it is 4 minutes and 59 seconds long. It mainly narrates the process of Japan intruding and occupying Dokdo and the evidence of Dokdo belonging to Korea, which has caught the attention of Chinese netizens. The release date of this video on the Weibo of the Republic of Korea's embassy in China overlapped with the time of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan, so it is obvious to see the purpose of the release of this video, which is a suspicious way of utilizing the dispute between China and Japan to form public opinions beneficial to Korea.

EVALUATION ON KOREA'S MICROBLOGGING DIPLOMACY

The microblog of each country's embassy in China is one of the achievements of "Public Diplomacy 2.0" (Xing, 2013). Therefore, analyzing the influence of microblogs on public diplomacy can bring much enlightenment on how to carry out public diplomacy in the age of new media.

Firstly, generally speaking, South Korea has won wider public influence by carrying out microblogging diplomacy, which goes undoubted. As can be seen from the topics chosen, the Republic of Korea's embassy in China is relatively cautious about selecting microblog contents by rarely concentrating on sensitive topics concerning Chinese politics and society. In their posts, it presents the audience with a Korean national image of uncorrupted politics, a developed economy, prosperous cultures and advanced technologies, which transmits Korean cultural thinking, lifestyle, and values unconsciously, influencing Chinese public's value judgment and thereby causes the Chinese public recognize Korea.

Secondly, the microblogging diplomacy carried out by the Republic of Korea's embassy in China is a part of its cultural diplomacy, and it has the same goal, which is to improve Korea's national image and increase the Korean national brand value (Debin, 2013). It is an extension of Korean cultural diplomacy in the age of "Public Diplomacy 2.0." Moreover, in its microblog, you can see Korea's popular cultural elements frequently appearing, including Korean dramas and movies, K-POP, Korean cosmetics,

Korean food, etc. In previous statistical data, it can be seen that in the hot topics created by the microblog of the Republic of Korea's embassy in China, most are related to Korean culture. The media diplomacy is a vigorous supplement to Korea's cultural diplomacy.

Finally, microblogging diplomacy makes the communication of traditional public diplomacy more three-dimensional. For example, in July, 2013, the activity "microblog celebrities' visit to Korea" combines online and offline dissemination, which not only cultivates Korean culture by the virtue of Chinese folks, but also reports the progress of the entire activity on the microblog under the label of [microblog celebrities' visit to Korea], successfully making a hot topic with low costs and high efficiency. This was a difficult thing to achieve prior to the appearance of microblogs.

CONCLUSION

It is the opinion of the author that microblogging diplomacy does not only update the approach of the dissemination, but also leads to the development of traditional diplomacy, which represents a future trend in the area of public diplomacy. Microblogs originated from the United States, and many countries and governments have opened accounts on Twitter as a symbol of the era of microblogging diplomacy (Twitplomacy). Microblogging diplomacy of foreign nations towards China began on November 23, 2009. The symbol is the opening of the British Embassy's Sina Weibo (Xing, 2013), and there are more than thirty sovereign countries that have opened their own official Sina Weibo accounts so far.

The impact of microblogging diplomacy is an issue that is worthy of further study from the angle of the mechanism of transmission of the microblogging diplomacy. Microblogging diplomacy is conducted through the microblog platform to create some topics, contributing to the formation of the country's media environment, helping the country establish a good national image. The ultimate goal of microblogging diplomacy is to influence a target country's foreign policy. Has this goal been achieved so far?

The Microblog is a new medium. Its propagation mechanism is different

from traditional media in that its main features are mutual integration of dissemination of media and content, it has a more three-dimensional communication process, and the feedback channels are also more diverse. Moreover, since the appearance of the power of the Internet, in the form of dissemination, text, pictures and videos are mixed and can be used to make it easier to penetrate the hidden values of the public in a target country. In addition, an interactive run-through of the communication process of microblogging diplomacy makes it easy to form a community of people similar points of view, which holds a greater influence. Importantly, the amount of money necessary to spread a microblog is low - much lower than traditional media, which is a major advantage of microblogging diplomacy.

So how is the utility of this high cost-performance microblogging diplomacy? First of all, microblogging diplomacy has promoted three levels of public diplomacy, which helps to promote the national image of a country. But microblogging diplomacy itself has disadvantages, such as information fragmentation, and short duration of heated topics. Overall, the microblogging diplomacy's influence to the foreign policy is still limited, but it is becoming a major influence in promoting and shaping the national image of a country.

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The Impact of the Launch of Korean Studies at the University of Nairobi

Aduol Audrey Achieng

INTRODUCTION

Academic literature is scarce on South Korea's relations with Africa, particularly Kenya. Studies of Africa's emerging partners have thus far focused and placed much emphasis on China. This 'Sino-centric' approach runs the risk of limiting efforts to fully understand the changes in the African development in the awakening of the new 'Scramble for Africa' The African Economic Outlook report highlights other key emerging partners such as Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey, which together comprise a larger share of many dealings (Soyeon Kim).

The Korean Studies Association is a strategy by which the Korean government promotes its language, culture, and values through education in Kenya. As Snow (2015,84) contends that relationship building in public diplomacy places an emphasis on engaging populations through increasing contact and interaction impacts which enhance one another's appreciation for one's country in the long term. She further mentions how these interaction impacts and contacts can be realized through strengthening educational, scientific, and sports ties, increasing tourism, international study, trade, and support for values. The Korean government under the banner of the Korea Foundation is tasked with the objective of spreading S. Korea's influence through the implementation of educational and cultural programs in four distinct fields: global networking, support for Korean Studies overseas, support for media and culture and arts exchange (Korea Foundation 2015b: 6). The Korean Studies Centre is hosted within a local

university, funded by a Korean Institution of higher learning aimed at promoting Korean language, values, and culture to the foreign publics in Kenya.

An examination of the mission, activities, programs and students at the University of Nairobi Korean Studies Association offers insight into the quality of the content offered by the Center and how the students perceive it. The success of the Korean Studies Association as a tool of Korea's soft power public diplomacy is measured by: (1) the political and social context of a nation's economic relations with Korea; (2) student perceptions of the Korean Studies Association and its purpose (3) the quality of the program's content. The author argues that Korean Studies is not insubordinate to the diplomatic aims of Korea and the Korean's government ability to influence Kenyan publics.

Public diplomacy comprises all activities by state and non-actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country's soft power. In their quest to promote mutual understanding between Kenyans and Koreans, the two institutions of higher learning - Academy of Korean Studies and the University of Nairobi - are engaged in a form of collaboration and are actively engaged in public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is often aligned with policy or the desire of a nation to promote specific policy to a foreign audience (Schneider, 2009, 261). As one component of its diplomatic strategy, the Korean government funds the Korean Studies Association through the Academy of Korean Studies and the Korea Foundation, as a means to establish a favorable reputation and sustain a mutually beneficial relationship with the publics. In contrast, the Kenyan government expects a Korean-speaking cadre of locals who will assist in facilitating trade and economic development between the two countries.

This article addresses two issues: the first is the strategic aspects of Korea's cultural diplomacy and its use of the Korean Studies Association within an institution of higher learning; and the second is, particular perceptions of the Centre as a diplomatic organ and a language instruction program.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Not much literature has been written between South Korea's engagements with Africa, in this context, South Korea engaging with Kenya.

There has been a lagging gap between Korea's current status and its past as it went from a war-torn country to an economic powerhouse within half a century (Kinsey and Chun, 2013). This rapid economic development has translated into an information gap in the international arena, of what it used to be and what it is now. The Korean government is attempting to narrow this gap between reality and image by telling the international audiences about its changes (Kinsey and Chun, 2013). Korea is attempting to establish a positive national image with foreign publics through its unlimited soft power assets. A favorable national image can be a political asset that is more valuable than territory or raw materials (Gilboa 2008, 55-77). The Korean government has put effort and resources into influencing how it is perceived, and ultimately, the realization of a positive national image. These efforts in summary are all part of public diplomacy in a bid to win the hearts and minds of foreign publics.

Public diplomacy, according to Leonard (2002), is about building relationships, understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples, communicating our points of view, correcting misperceptions, looking for areas in which we can find common cause.

The role of public diplomacy is to help a country to promote a country's image. Second, it helps in the formation of long-sustaining relations based on the accumulation of confidence among nations. Thirdly, it should promote understanding and justification of the policies carried out by a nation (Young, 2012).

As Yun Young notes in his article, Korea's strategy toward Africa should be different from other regions as Africa is less familiar with South Korea in terms of its culture and geography. The best way to go about it is through development and cooperation. He posits that learning Korean should be promoted through the activities of the King Sejong Institute, with focus on Korean language acquisition and cultural programs (Yun, 2012).

The Korean Studies Association at the University of Nairobi was studied

from an angle of whether it has been able to build relationships between the two respective countries, and whether the needs, cultures, and peoples of Korea and Kenya have been understood. How successful the Korean Studies Association has been as a public diplomacy strategy communicating Korea's point of view and changing its perception amongst the Kenyan publics.

Nye categorizes three dimensions of public diplomacy that he claims help a nation accomplish its goals through diplomatic activities: daily communication, strategic communication, and sustainable relationships among individuals through academic activities, exchanges, training, seminars and diverse media channels (Nye, 2008).

HISTORY OF KENYA-KOREA RELATIONS

Kenya-Korea relations date back to February, 1964 when South Korea established its consulate in Kenya's capital city, Nairobi. The year 2014 marked the jubilee anniversary of the bilateral ties between the two nations. The highs of the bilateral relations have been marked by presidential state visits, in 1982. President Chun Doo-Hwan was the first Korean Head of State to make a presidential visit to Africa, following the receipt of official invitations from Nigeria, Gabon, Senegal and Kenya (MOFAT). Recently, in June 2016, President Park Geun-Hye made the first visit in 24 years by a Korean State Head, which led to the expansion and strengthening of already existing diplomatic relations and economic cooperation (Mutambo, Daily Nation, 2016).

Literature on Korea's engagement with Africa reveals two distinct motivations that informed Korea's relations with Africa in the early years. The first being political recognition. In comparison to North Korea, South Korea had less embassies than its counterpart, the North. In the 1970s, North Korea had 23 embassies in Africa whilst South Korea had only 10 (Kim, Korea in Africa). The other reason for the interest in Africa was that South Korea was also seeking admission to the United Nations but it needed African political clout also to secure admission to the UN. Having secured a certain number of missions in Africa and UN membership, the vibrancy

somehow took a nosedive, with attention shifting to the Cold War. South Korea's engagement with Africa in the early years lacked strategy and long-term vision. The end of the Cold War ushered a revamped engagement of South Korea in Africa, themed, Seoul's Africa Strategy (Soyeun Kim, Korea in Africa: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle). Under the reign of President Roh Moo-Hyun's administration, Ban Ki-moon, who was the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs, changed Korea's trade and aid policies (The Washington Post, 2006). Ban's effort to put back Africa on Seoul's agenda simultaneously aided his campaign for the United Nations Secretary General position (Soyeun, Kim). Following various developments, since the mid-2000s, Seoul's Africa policy has become more formalized and institutionalized via various forums and initiatives.

NEED FOR KOREA TO ASSERT ITS IMAGE

Following Korea's successful development, the 21st century saw a need for Korea to pursue public diplomacy so as to assert its image and presence in the international arena. The international perception of Korea is that there is an ever-present sense of instability. The Korean government is attempting to narrow this gap between reality and image by telling international audiences about its changes (Kinsey and Chung, 2013, 4). To bridge this gap of relations not only with Africa but also the world, Korea implemented its Public Diplomacy in 2010 (Ma, Song, Moore, 2012, 5).

Ma (2012, 7) argues that from Korea's abundance in soft power resources, it can use the Korean language to expand its international influence through cultural centers such as King Sejong where people can study Korean language. Kim Taehwan (2012,5) contends with this proposition stating that one of Korea's PD realms is Korean Studies Diplomacy. Only when it is assembled within proper knowledge and information can Korean language and Korean studies appeal to the hearts and minds of foreign publics and governments. Winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics is indeed the gist of what nations pursue through soft power (Nye, 2004).

A look at Korea's public diplomacy is the revelation of a country that considers itself to be a "middle power" in relation to the great powers surrounding it and bears great potential in its soft power, given its cultural

and knowledge resources founded in its own experience of political and economic development (Taehwan, 2012). According to Kim, Korea's soft power potential when combined with its hard power capabilities is sufficient for it to play a leading role in bridging the advanced countries and the rest of the international community. Secondly, public diplomacy has presented Korea with an effective way of aligning itself with like-minded countries, hence its avoidance of too much reliance on the great powers. Thirdly, there is the emergence of the niche diplomacy, which is not dominated by any country. It is with the reasons mentioned above that Korea has asserted its abilities and is practicing niche diplomacy. Melissen (2005,71) describes niche diplomacy as the advantage, or 'corner', that a country may have by virtue of its favored situation, special competence or unique product is more or less permanent. Definition of niche diplomacy: Niche Diplomacy was a term coined by Gareth Evans, when seving as foreign minister of 'middle power' Australia. For him, the term essentially meant specialization. It suggested 'concentrating reources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having,rather than trying to cover the field'(Evans and Grant 1991). - Due to smaller states' size, they often lack the visibility and recognition by foreign public. The information people get on smaller states may be limited in both quantity and quality and easily be based upon prejudices. As such, these states need to struggle to gain international attention in the first place. Whilst major states already have an audience and a large supply of images and notions that foreign public associate them with, they tend to focus their diplomacy on advocating and explaining their policies, as well as engaging in *re*-branding (Bátora 2005, 6-7). Although Park Geun-Hye has improved relations with China, as reflected by the first China-Korean summit in Beijing in June 2013, South Korea is alarmed by China's rapid upsurge in influence internationally, and has sought to counter the leverage enjoyed by its rival by attempting to carve out its own pockets of influence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Darracq and Neville, 2014). South Korean policy-makers have pointed to the necessity of gaining a firm foothold before other global competitors take everything, in what they see as a new 'scramble for Africa' (Interview MOFAT, Seoul quoted from Narracq and Neville 2014).

Korea's interest in Africa is evident through the increased transactions it

Kim Taehwan (2012, 513) ***Categories of Public Diplomacy***



has with Africa, which is marked by Korean Air opening a direct flight between the two destinations. Korean Air launched a new route between Seoul/Incheon and Nairobi on June 2012. With flights operating three days a week at a capacity of 253 passengers, Korean Air advertises itself as the first airline in East Asia to run regular direct services to an African destination - Nairobi, Kenya (Korean Air).

Kim Taehwan (2012) in his article brings into perspective Korea's abundance in soft power assets and how it can go about realizing each of these soft power assets through the various public diplomacy categories.

AN OVERVIEW OF KOREAN STUDIES CENTER

The Korean Studies Center is similar to other international organizations that promote language and culture, but there are key differences. The inclusion of Korean Studies within a public institution in Africa is quite significant as administrators seek funding to support academic programs - a common practice within institutions of higher education (Wheeler, 2013). Korean Studies Centers the world across are charged with the mandate of diffusing Korean language and culture through the soft power assets of

Korean language and Korean studies.

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI KOREAN STUDIES (UONKS)

The Korean Studies Office was established on the 5th February 2013 which was preceded by the presentation and awarding of prizes for the best students in the then-concluded Korean-related essay competition. The center was officially opened by the Korean Ambassador to Kenya, Hon. Chan Kim-Woo (UoN Korean Studies website).

Accounting for the largest university in East and Central Africa, The University of Nairobi is home to 52, 000 undergraduate and graduate students, with a population of more than 1,600 academic members of staff (University of Nairobi home page). The University has seven colleges which are spread out in the city of Nairobi and its environs. The Korean Studies Centre is housed by the Department of Linguistics and Languages, which is under the College of Humanities and Social Sciences.

Korean Studies at the University of Nairobi is offered in two levels - the Certificate Level, which is a short course of 6 months long (2 semesters), and the Bachelors Level (4 years). The Korean Studies, Master of Arts (M.A) curriculum was being developed at the time the study was undertaken. The Korean Studies curriculum for both courses was developed by eminent academic stakeholders from the two respective countries. The courses offer a holistic and in-depth knowledge ranging from Korean History, Culture, Literature and Folklore, Art, Music, Language, Politics, Economics, Anthropology, Sociology and Korean Popular Culture (Korean Studies Brochure). Besides Korean Language, which is taught by a qualified Korean instructor, the rest of the courses are taught by qualified lecturers from various subfields. Because Korean Studies is a kind of collaboration, it applies and receives grants from the Academy of Korean Studies alongside the Korea Foundation. According to the terms and conditions of the MOU, the Korea Foundation dispatches a Korean language instructor and caters for his/her allowance while at the recipient institution. In this case, the University of Nairobi provides for the Instructor housing, office or research space and assists them with entry procedures and other formalities. So far,

only one Korean instructor has been dispatched tasked with teaching Korean language and culture.

The Vision of the Korean Studies Center at the University of Nairobi is to: Be a leading department in scholarship, research and dissemination of knowledge in Korean Studies in the world. Its mission is:

1. To provide quality teaching of Korean Studies;
2. To produce high-caliber graduates who will contribute towards the attainment of Vision 2030 for Kenya;
3. To provide quality research in Korean Studies; and
4. To lead in the publication of works on Korean Studies at the University and in the world.

The Korean Studies Association's core values are: Team Spirit; Professionalism; Meritocracy; Quality service delivery; Transparency; Freedom of speech and expression; Respect for fundamental human rights; Academic excellence; Creativity and innovation; and Multiculturalism.

When the Korean Studies office was established in 2013, already there had been ongoing agreements between University of Nairobi and other Korean institutions of higher learning. There has been an exchange of Kenyan scholars from the University of Nairobi, who were selected to teach Kiswahili, one of the national languages in Kenya and the most widely spoken language in Africa, in Korea, at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Their stated mission was to educate Korean students about Kenyan culture and Swahili language.

During one of the seminars held by the Korean Studies Office and entitled *Bridging the Divide: Networking African and Korean Researchers Seminar*, the Principal of College of Humanities and Social Sciences, stated:

> Let me start by pointing out that the bilateral relations between Kenya and Korea are warm and cordial. These cordial relations have trickled down to the institutional levels, with the University of Nairobi now soon to become the proud host to the Korean Studies Association, which is scheduled to be launched in July, this year (2014). The Association of Korean Studies will be housed in the

> Faculty of Arts, which is the largest faculty in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences. It will be our pleasure as a college to see a successful launch of the Korean Studies and the subsequent management of the association from its fledging stage to complete autonomy and installation as a Department of Korean Studies. Let me reiterate that all effort will be made to give all the support needed in this endeavor.
>
> In the 21st century, countries around the world are engaged in the common pursuit of boosting communication and exchange of information-all geared towards commerce, trade and industry. Thus, for the Kenyan scholar to attain mastery of the Korean language will be a step towards fitting himself on this large global picture. Mastery of language serves to streamline the participation of actors on trade and economic relations.

The University of Nairobi Korean Studies Centre is partnered with The Academy of Korean Studies. This is collaboration between two academic institutions that are actually acting for the realization of each state's foreign policy. Under the Academy of Korean Studies is a special body charged with the responsibility of fostering and promoting studies on national culture and history so as to enhance its national brand. The Korean Studies Promotion Service, with the support from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, is tasked with making proactive efforts to foster and promote the studies of national culture and history to thereby enhance their national brand (Academy of Korean Studies' website).

The opening of the office has also facilitated an official channel for communication between Korean companies and the Kenyan publics. Besides the Korean consular based in Kenya, Korean Studies is a contact point between Korea and Kenya, playing the role of a diplomatic organ. Should any Kenyan-based Korean company wish to undertake some form of activity involving the Kenyan publics, they can easily do so through the Korean Studies Centre, which provides it with some level of credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Kenyan constituents.

Since the establishment of the Association, the office and its administration have been able to organize a conference, which was themed:

Korean Studies: Past, Present and Future. It was held on December 12th-13th, 2014. The fruition of the conference was marked by eleven paper presentations being published in the *Nairobi Journal of Literature* becoming the first published material on Korean Studies and culture in Africa by African scholars.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The scope of the research was limited to the case study of the Korean Studies Centre at the University of Nairobi. This is one case out of the five centers that exist in Africa. The research was site-specific to the University of Nairobi as the interviews would offer in-depth accounts of perspectives and perceptions. The case study of Korean Studies presented a unique characteristic, a foreign language, whose activities were funded by a foreign government-funded institute but hosted in a local publically funded university. The study employed the use of semi-structured interviews as its method of data collection. The researcher endeavored to include the different voices of Kenyans so as to achieve objectivity in the study.

A total of ten participants were interviewed for the study. There were a total of six student participants who are enrolled in Korean Studies and one alumni of the Korean Studies Center, one Kenyan office coordinator and the Korean Studies Project Coordinator. Of the six student participants, one of them was an employee at a Korean company based in Kenya. The study would have been enhanced if the sample size of the participants was larger. The in-depth interviews were conducted through internet calls, as the locations of the interviewer and the interviewees were far apart (Korea and Kenya).

FINDINGS

FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH MATTERS KOREAN

Students were asked whether they had encountered anything Korean prior to undertaking Korean Studies. The student participants had varied answers on their first Korean encounters; some mentioned they have Korean friends; others work for Korean companies/organizations based in Kenya. For the avid football fanatics, their first encounter with Korea was in 2002 when Korea hosted the World Cup, and the performance of the Korean football team to the semi-finals level. For others, it was through Korean movies, music and dramas.

MOTIVATIONS FOR STUDYING KOREAN

Students were asked why they decided to undertake Korean Studies. The reasons stated by students for being motivated to pursue Korean Studies were: interest in Korean language and culture; curiosity about the Korean people; career progression and development; interest in the Korean model of development; and the desire to be intellectually challenged. One student participant mentioned that there is a paradigm shift from the West, that Kenya was aligning itself with the East in terms of development and aid; hence the future was in the East. Coupled with Korea's rapid development, this encouraged him to pursue Korean Studies.

The interviewer asked student participants whether or not they have encountered any resistance or any indifferent treatment for studying Korean language. Most students responded that they have never experienced any form of resistance or negative pressure; on the contrary, some say they were envied because of their ability to express themselves, while others received encouragement. Some students pointed out that their friends questioned their decision to undertake "the odd" language and not other disciplines or languages at the initial stages, but with a better understanding of the Korean culture, they said their friends have since encouraged and motivated them to study even more. However, most student participants were keen to point out

how at the initial stages it was difficult to learn the Korean alphabet, but with time, they became familiarized.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE PURPOSE OF THE KOREAN STUDIES CENTER

Asked whether the launch of Korean Studies at the University of Nairobi had any political or economic significance, most of the respondents were affirmative of the launch bearing political and economic interests. Nevertheless, they all mentioned the purpose was to 'spread Korean language and culture'. One student responded that definitely there are political and economic motivations behind the launch of Korean Studies. The participant believed that Korea had vested interests in African resources for its industries and Korean Studies was being used as a 'door' into Kenya so as to increase its influence. Another student participant mentioned that the launch was a 'lee way' for South Korea to look for markets for its ready-made goods as its domestic market was saturated with its own products it needs to look for foreign markets. He further stated that through Korean Studies, a population of Kenyans who can speak Korean can be realized in order to enhance trade relations. Another student participant said that the establishment of Korean Studies was influenced with its policy to share its development model. He looked at it as a way of popularizing Korean culture, people, brands and investments even in Africa at large. He gave an example of the rapid increase of Korean investment and how a big population of Kenyans was using Korean products, from mobile phones to automobiles, and stated that in order to effectively engage African communities, there has to be sensitization of the publics.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE CURRICULUM

Student participants were asked about their perceptions on the Korean Studies curriculum and mode of delivery and instruction. Most of the students expressed satisfaction with the structure and content of the curriculum, but expressed concerns that it was not sufficient to enable them to speak the language fluently. In terms of content relevancy, the students were happy with the curriculum as they were sensitized on the Korean

model of development and how Korea achieved rapid economic growth which is what Kenya needs. Most students credited the Korean model of development as relevant in the curriculum as Kenya could emulate or learn from Korea on matters of development.

Being that there is only one Korean language instructor, students expressed their concern that she is overwhelmed by the workload. One student sited that the language program has to be put on hold whenever she's unavailable.

All of the student participants were asked if they had expectations before enrolling for the program and whether their expectations had been met. Most of the students said that their expectations were met because they could express themselves in both oral and written Korean. They did, however, express the need to be proficient in Korean language whereby they could engage themselves fluently in professional conversations. They pointed out the fact that their Korean skills would be more polished if they use the language in its most natural setting, and that is Korea. Most of the students recommended visits and student exchange programs to achieve that expectation. Most of the students' expectations were to travel to Korea at one point, which they have, through academic exchanges and visits. It was revealed in every interview that for most of the students, their primary goal was to secure a scholarship to Korea. For others, it was to gain fluency in the language. For others still, it was to perform well on the Korean Proficiency Exam, otherwise known as TOPIK (Test of Proficiency in Korean Language).

Through the study, the researcher was able to discover the Korean studies curriculum was developed by qualified academic stakeholders from each respective discipline from both countries, in contrast to the Confucius Institute, which is a Chinese Language program, whose curriculum is developed by the Chinese government (Wheeler, 2013). The Chinese government developing a curriculum taught in a foreign country has brought about issues of autonomy amongst some institutions of higher learning, as it restricts academic freedom and the role of university officials in being autonomous yet accountable to entities that provide funding for educational programs (Alexender, 2003, 186-187; quoted in Wheeler 2013, 12).

BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF KOREAN CULTURE AND LANGUAGE

Student participants were asked whether they have a better understanding of Korean culture and language after undertaking courses in Korean Studies, and the student participants responded positively. Many students expressed that through Korean history and economic courses, they have a better understanding of Korea's rapid economic development and its current influence in the international arena; they understand why Koreans bow, filial piety as a Korean cultural custom, and the language. One student pointed out that he was now aware of Korea's location on the map, considering that it had been surrounded by 'big' countries.

The interviewer asked the student participants to describe their experiences learning Korean at the Korean Studies center to which most of the students responded positively. Most cited it was challenging studying Korean language at the initial stages because of the different writing system (Hangul). The use of characters, some students mentioned is quite different from most languages.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR KENYAN KOREAN SPEAKERS

Following the increased number of Korean companies based in Kenya, such as LG, Samsung, KOICA, Kotra, KIA, Hyundai, Sarang Africa, Safari Park Hotel, and Daewoo, one student participant expressed that there is a lot of demand for Kenyans who are fluent in Korean language. Some of the student participants mentioned that there are many Korean investors who would give priority to those who understand and can communicate in the Korean language. One of the student participants who works for a Korean company mentioned President Park's official state visit to Kenya (May 31st–June 2nd 2016) where she came with a trade delegation and a number of MOUs were signed. Amongst the delegation were Korean business people who expressed interest in investing in Kenya but they cannot speak English well. Such investors wouldn't hesitate to hire Kenyans who can speak Korean as this would eliminate the need for hiring translators.

One of the student participants expressed that there is a lot of demand

for Kenyans who are fluent in Korean language. Another student who has studied Korean language up to the intermediate level revealed that she has been sought on numerous occasions to help in translation services by the Korean Embassy whenever Korean officials visit the country. Hence, upon completion of the course, there is demand for Kenyans who can understand Korean language.

DISCUSSION

The findings of the case study at the University of Nairobi Korean Studies presents that a diverse group in terms of age, gender, education level, occupation and social background study Korean in accordance with various interests. The larger percentage of the student participants mentioned they were undertaking Korean Studies in order to acquire the language which can be advantageous in securing jobs. For others, knowledge of the language will help in the progression of their academic lives as they are better placed to secure a scholarship. For others still, they partake in Korean Studies out of interest. Most students opined that maybe in the near future the job prospects may not be very much, but they are optimistic and certain that more jobs will be available to them in the future upon completion of the course. Their assumption is based on the many trade and development MOUs and bilateral agreements signed between the two countries. One student mentioned the launch of Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), a second of its kind in Kenya. The student said, “the future can only be bright.”

The Korean Studies curriculum is well developed hence why most students are satisfied; however, the curriculum cannot produce students who are really proficient in the language. A contributing factor to this is the limited number of the language instructors. There is the reality that students who want to become proficient in Korean language must study in Korea. This results in students competing for the few scholarships available. A reasonable conclusion would be that the University of Nairobi Korean Studies teaches students about Korean culture, which offers personal enrichment and offers meaningful skills that make Kenyans competitive in

the marketplace.

The Korean Foundation and Academy of Korean Studies, who are the sponsoring bodies, by allowing consultative meetings for the development of the KS curriculum, have allowed for academic freedom and integrity in the role of the university and its staff to execute their duties uninterrupted. This massively contributes to cultivating trust between these two entities. Therefore, in as much as funding is concerned, there is room for the recipient institution to exercise academic freedom in matters academia. Public diplomacy, unlike traditional diplomacy, takes an overt approach towards its strategies and the flexibility exercised by the Korean Studies University of Nairobi which is the grant recipient. The actions of UONKS are not restrained much by the donors, as is usually the case whenever funding is involved. This is significant in the cultivation of long-lasting relations between the two actors.

Traditional diplomacy is no longer persuasive as it follows its covert approaches towards negotiations. There is more emphasis on the significance of interdependence in the age of ICT development. In the wake of the democratization and development of information, there has been a realization regarding the power of people. Public attitudes and opinions now directly exert an influence on a nation's ability to secure diplomatic gain and influence the decisions of policy makers. Gone are the days of diplomacy being a pure preserve of the men in suits. New public diplomacy has introduced new actors and new mediums of interacting. Korean Studies at the University of Nairobi presents non-state actors transacting on behalf of the state to influence foreign publics for the purposes of influencing foreign policy objectives. Korea has the Korea Foundation and the Academy of Korean Studies while Kenya has the University of Nairobi. We cannot overlook the significance of education towards development in the case of Kenya, thus Korea's strategy in influencing the Kenyan public has been wrapped into an appealing package in the form of education.

In comparison to the Confucius Institute, Korean Studies gives the impression of being unique when looked at in terms of its development and objectives. Unlike in the Confucius Institute, where the curriculum is developed by the Chinese government, the Korean Studies curriculum was developed by eminent academic stakeholders from both countries who came

together at a round table. This gives the program a high level of credibility, which was echoed in the students' responses indicating that they are happy and satisfied with the curriculum. The inclusion of the academic stakeholders from both sides presents interplay of expertise and specialized knowledge which presents an academic program that strives for excellence. At the launch of the program, two students enrolled at the certificate level while sixteen students enrolled at the Bachelors level. The numbers have since swelled, with eighteen students at the certificate level and eighteen at the Bachelors Level.

Korean Studies presents us with a public diplomacy approach that seeks to cultivate relationships with foreign publics that have a stake in the success of Korea and its values. Nye made a case for relationship-building in public diplomacy: 'The third dimension of public diplomacy is the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels (2004, p. 109)

Through student exchange programs, which take place yearly at the KS, there is two-way propagation of information between the performers and receivers of public diplomacy, which helps a nation to construct a desirable and appealing image in the eyes of the targeted publics. The students who have been beneficiaries of the academic exchanges have long lasting and positive narratives of Korea.

For genuine dialogue to ensue, mutual interests are a pre-requisite for relationship building. In the case of Korean Studies, they are learning about Korea's language and culture through Korean Studies. There are also academic exchanges with the department which has housed Korean Studies, where academic exchanges take place. For instance, a lecturer from the University of Nairobi is dispatched to Korea to teach Korean students Kiswahili language and culture. This fosters a two-way symmetrical relationship between the two institutions.

The launch of Korean Studies was a significant landmark with regards to Korean Sponsored activities at the University of Nairobi. The program offers a multi-disciplinary approach to not only students who have an interest in Korean career options through featuring a number of departments within the Faculty of Arts but also students who are interested in the Korean

model of development.

The last part of Leonard's (2002) definition says of public diplomacy, "looking for areas where we can find common cause. In the case of the Korean Studies Centre, it is a collaboration of two countries with a common ground," which is echoed in Korean Studies mission statement (Korean Studies Center, 2016):

1. Provide quality teaching for Korean Studies
2. To produce high-caliber graduates who will contribute towards the attainment of Vision 2030 for Kenya.

Through the above mission statement, we are presented with a win-win-situation for both countries. On one end is Korea spreading its influence and correcting its misperceptions, and Kenya on the other with part of its public being educated on a benchmark model for development and acquisition of knowledge which is important for the development of the nation and the personal growth and progress of the students.

CONCLUSION

This study sought to examine the rationale behind the opening of the Korean Studies Center at the University of Nairobi and its role within an institution of higher education, public diplomacy language planning and development. Kenyan policy makers hope that a competent group of Kenyans who are proficient in Korean language will be able to engage with Korean people and Korean-owned companies in Kenya.

However, the Center also helps the Korean government in achieving its political and economic interests. From the perspective of Korea, in promoting itself as a reliable alternative not only to the West but also to the East, the promotion of its language has implications beyond building cultural exchanges. It is a diplomatic strategy to spread its influence and its image and contribute to cultural diffusion of Korean culture and language.

A clear connection can be established between mutuality and cultural exchange, the outcome of the program and the beneficiaries. Unlike

Confucius Institutes whereby the curriculum is developed by the Chinese government and the allocation of resources to their own ends (Wheeler, 2012), Korean Studies offers a unique perspective whereby the curriculum is developed by academic stakeholders from both countries, and as much as the UoN receives grants, they account for the expenditure but there is flexibility in the execution of its duties. With regards to objectives, both countries have a win-win situation. There is symmetrical power balance in the relationship resulting in trust being cultivated between the two non-state actors, which has contributed to fostering good relations between the two countries.

For Korea to be more successful in its public diplomacy strategy through UoNKS, there is need for it to improve its ability to understand Kenyan values rather than solely focusing on exporting its values. There is thus an urgent call for Korea to understand the needs and the culture of the Kenyan people if its public diplomacy endeavors are to be successful.

South Korea's renewed interest in Kenya provides a platform for the formalization and institutionalization of the limited Korean-African relations.

There is need for the South Korean government to develop a concrete strategy through which it can publicize its existence and propagate positive images of itself to other nations (Yun Young, 2012). This strategy will see a move beyond the already-dominated cultural diplomacy and a focus on other soft power assets. Taehwan's article (2012) offers a comprehensive model for the Public diplomacy realms Korea can engage in, which include: knowledge diplomacy; culture diplomacy; corporate diplomacy; and sports and tourism diplomacy.

As it stands, Africa has its own variety of language and cultures, the most widely used language is English in transactions, and Korean language may not become the language of trade between Africa and Korea. That withstanding, there is need for the students partaking in the Korean Studies program to be exposed to rigorous language experience for the perfection of both their oral and written abilities.

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